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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

CLOSED UNTIL
1975

TURKEY.

PART VII.

JANUARY TO JUNE 1924.

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Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

Part VII.

[E 174/32/44] No. 1.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received January 7, 1924.*)

(No. 891.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 30, 1923.*

I ENCLOSED in a private letter to Mr. Oliphant of the 26th instant copy of a personal communication which I addressed to Adnan Bey on that day in regard to certain entirely unjustifiable and highly improper references to British intrigues in the public prosecutor's indictment of the 25th December against the journalists accused of high treason before the Court of Independence.

2. In the first of these references the public prosecutor, when examining the motives for the publication of the Aga Khan–Ameer Ali letter and the sources whence it originated, alluded to a "power" which instigated its authors. The second reference, which occurred much later in the indictment but was less ambiguous, was to the effect that "the English had always been accustomed to use the force of the Caliphate for their own purposes, and that they imagined they would achieve their aims by the troubles which they would create around the Caliphate and by the disorders which they would engender."

3. When I visited Adnan Bey on the 29th December in order to make a communication to him on the subject of the Mosul negotiations, I expressed surprise at not having received an immediate explanation from him on the subject of these intolerable insinuations on the part of a Government official. Adnan Bey was excessively embarrassed. He said that he had at once forwarded my letter to Angora, and then proceeded to attempt to prove that I had exaggerated the importance of the public prosecutor's statements. He denied that the latter, in the exceptional circumstances of this unusual trial, could be regarded as having spoken in the capacity of a Government official, or that, in any case, the Turkish Government could be held responsible for the views which he had expressed in the Court of Independence. He endeavoured even to make out that the press version of the indictment might not correspond with the official text, which he said he had not seen but was endeavouring to obtain. He explained that the Turkish word for "power" ("kuvvet"), used in the first reference above mentioned, should be translated by the French word "force" rather than "puissance," as in the expression "force motrice." (Mr. Ryan informs me that this argument is technically well founded, although its speciousness is apparent when the public prosecutor's language is read in the light of the constant suggestions previously made in less authoritative quarters that the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali were inspired by His Majesty's Government). Finally, he maintained that the use of the words "the English" in the second reference showed that not the "British Government," but particular individuals—"Mr. Lloyd George, for instance"—were meant, and that therefore neither His Majesty's Government nor myself had cause to be offended thereby.

4. I told Adnan exactly what I thought of such calumnies, and laid great emphasis on the impression they would produce on your Lordship. I concluded by stating that I had not telegraphed to you, but had written privately by courier, that my letter would reach you on the 31st and that I awaited some more satisfactory statement from

him by that date. Adnan replied that he would report my observations by telegraph to Ismet Pasha that evening.

5. On the morning of the 31st I received a message from him by telephone that he wished to come and see me at the, for him, unusual hour of 11·30. He came and remained for fully an hour trying to explain away the public prosecutor's allusions. He was extremely perturbed, and, though he did not say so, had obviously received instructions from Angora to make the best he could of a bad business. The Turkish press had published in the morning a statement that Yussuf Kemal Bey was leaving Angora the following day for London, and, though Adnan, while admitting its probable truth, denied that he had any official confirmation of this report, I have little doubt that his instructions had been to remove by any means that he could, short of formal official action, an impression which might react on Yussuf Kemal's reception in London. Ultimately he begged me to regard the incident as closed and to accept his explanations, which did no differ sensibly from those reported earlier in this despatch, and which he supported by a leading article in the "Times" of the 18th December commenting on the Aga Khan's letter, and stating that its publication in the Constantinople press was an indiscretion open to obvious misinterpretation.

6. I told Adnan that I doubted greatly whether your Lordship would regard these explanations as satisfactory, and that I could scarcely recommend that you should, unless I was assured that these utterly false allegations would at least not be repeated. I said that my Government had given several proofs recently of their willingness to return to more friendly relations with Turkey; that the latter had so far evinced very few signs of being actuated by a spirit of reciprocity in this respect, and that baseless imputations of this nature, particularly when made by Turkish officials in the position of a public prosecutor, would go far to convince my Government that, if such were the attitude of the Turkish Government, it was useless to attempt to cultivate better relations or even to return to normal ones. In this respect I mentioned that I had even contemplated suggesting to your Lordship that, if the Turkish Government did not publicly dissociate itself from these calumnies, it might be as well to suggest to Ismet Pasha that it was scarcely a suitable moment for a representative of Yussuf Kemal Bey's rank to proceed to London, and that it would be preferable to despatch a counsellor only, who would not expect to be received by your Lordship, and ultimately, after the ratification of the treaty, by His Majesty the King.

7. Adnan Bey said that he would at once report all my observations to Ismet Pasha with the exception of the last, which he would not dare to mention. He added that, though he could give me no formal assurance that such statements would not be repeated by official personages, he did not think that they would. I said that, for my part, I would inform your Lordship of his explanations.

8. For the reasons given in my telegram No. 548 of to-day's date, I think the matter might well be left as it is for the present. I do not believe that any further official action would materially magnify the impression which has been created. It would need considerable pressure and possibly threats of specific action to induce the Turkish Government to publish an official disavowal. If such pressure were applied it might lead to a serious controversy entailing a delay in Yussuf Kemal Bey's departure for London and possibly thus prejudice an early commencement of the Mosul discussions.

9. I venture, however, to express the opinion that a very useful purpose might be served if your Lordship, when you receive Yussuf Kemal's first visit, were to allude to these unjustifiable calumnies, which, by no stretch of imagination, can be explained away, and which are merely calculated, by producing a painful impression, to check any inclination His Majesty's Government may feel to revert to friendly relations with Turkey.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 202/202/44] No. 2.

Sir Odo Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 7, 1924.)

(No. 182.)

My Lord, *Vatican Mission, Rome, December 30, 1923.*

WITH regard to my telegram No. 36 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to report that I took an opportunity this morning, when visiting the Cardinal Secretary of State after my audience with the Pope, to enquire when I might expect a definite

reply to my communication with regard to the desire expressed by His Majesty's Government that no foreign representative should be accorded a privileged position or liturgical honours in Palestine now that they had definitely assumed the mandate. Cardinal Gasparri said that the delay in transmitting the written comments of the Vatican was due in a large measure to a request made by the French Ambassador to be allowed to consult his Government before expressing a definite opinion; and that, once in possession of that, he hoped to be in a position to send a more complete reply. His Eminence did not, however, anticipate that his note would be in any way modified by the attitude of the French Government on this subject. The French Ambassador, he continued, had acquiesced in his contention that the French Government had renounced their right to a privileged position in Palestine; but he, the Ambassador, personally seemed to cling to the retention of special honours within the precincts of the church while abandoning them in processions, &c., outside. It was when the Cardinal pointed out that it was inside the church that liturgical honours were rendered, and not outside, that M. Doulcet sought refuge in the request to consult his Government. Cardinal Gasparri then went on to tell me that the original instructions sent to Jerusalem from the Vatican were to the effect that liturgical honours to the French representative were to cease after the signature of peace. He had not heard yet what had happened during the Christmas services in Jerusalem; but he had no reason to suspect that these instructions had not been followed.

I have, &c.
ODO RUSSELL.

[E 176/109/44] No. 3.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 4.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Consul-General Edmonds, Smyrna, regarding the exchange of populations.

Constantinople, January 1, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson.

(No. 177.)

Sir, *Smyrna, December 20, 1923.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 164 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to report that two shiploads of Greeks have recently been despatched from here. About 2,500 left in the "Archipelagos" on the 6th December. On the 22nd December 1,100 were despatched. The first shipload were surprisingly fit; the second batch were rather less so. Some fifty women and children who had been detained here in Turkish houses were sent away largely, I believe, through the instrumentality of the American Near East Relief, and more Greek women and children are likely to be sent away before long.

2. The "Archipelagos" had on board Mr. Jacquith of the Near East Relief and two representatives of the Greek Red Cross. These, together with Turkish delegates, form a sub-commission as provided by the Convention for the Exchange of Populations.

3. A few thousand Moslems have already arrived from Greece. Some 2,000 from Crete disembarked from the "Archipelagos" at Aivaly at the beginning of the month. It is hoped that their experience of olives in Crete will enable them to maintain the olive groves at Aivaly. On the 10th December 120 Moslems from the Cavalla and Drama district arrived here, and on the 18th December 160 arrived from Salonica and are to be sent on to Sokia. The arrangements made for the housing and maintenance of the refugees seem to have been sadly defective, and are subjected to

considerable public criticism. The authorities have announced that land will be transferred to Moslem immigrants through the agricultural bank on the security of lands which they own in Greece, and that money for tools, animals and seed will be advanced. It remains to be seen how far it will be possible to carry out this measure.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 183/32/44] No. 4.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 12.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 2, 1924.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 878 of the 26th December, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that on the 27th December the Court of Independence by a majority found Lutfi Fikri Bey guilty of an offence under article 1 of the Law on Treason, but decided to sentence him to five years' penal servitude under article 3, rather than to death under article 2, on the ground that his opposition to the decision of the 1st November, 1922, regarding the Sultanate and the Caliphate had been manifested not by acts, but by writing only. The court held that Lutfi Fikri's offence was aggravated by the fact that he, a man of such intellectual capacity as to be able to appreciate what the country had gone through, had lent himself to efforts to destroy the peace and tranquillity of the nation and had urged the Caliph to subversive action, "with the simple object of promoting ideas designed continuously to poison the conscience of the people with the evil intention of again destroying and upsetting our country from without." The sentence was therefore fixed at five years, being two years in excess of the minimum penalty.

2. Lutfi Fikri Bey received his sentence with sang-froid, and he and his lawyers announced later that they would contest it in the Court of Cassation under another article of the law. It is, however, more than doubtful whether his contention that that article applies will be admitted, as it is generally held, and is indeed laid down in the Law on Courts of Independence, that the decisions of those courts are final, subject only to the necessity of sanction by the Grand National Assembly for the execution of death sentences.

3. The trial of the journalists was resumed on the 29th December and occupied three lengthy sittings of the court on that and the two following days. Certain witnesses, one of whom was Dr. Riza Nour Bey, were heard for the defence of Velid Bey. Riza Nour testified to Velid Bey's patriotism, especially during the Lausanne Conference, when he was the only journalist who fully supported the Turkish delegation. Incidentally, he took the opportunity in this connection to have a fling at Jahid Bey, who, as your Lordship may remember, violently attacked Riza Nour for his conduct at the conference. He attributed any lapses on Velid Bey's part to neurasthenia. Another witness, who was heard *in camerâ*, appears to have testified to Velid's activity in forwarding war material from Constantinople to Anatolia during the Allied occupation, and capital was made later by the defence of his services in this direction. Otherwise there is little worth reporting in the long speeches by the lawyers and the accused themselves, except that the advocates attempted to curry favour with the court by various onslaughts on the conduct of the Allies during the armistice period, and one of them, speaking on behalf of Jahid Bey, referred to alleged intrigues of Mr. Fitzmaurice, chief dragoman of this Embassy, at an earlier period. Towards the end of the trial Jahid himself, provoked by certain allusions in the public prosecutor's final speech, passionately defended his honour and said, among other things, that a time would come when he would sit in the public prosecutor's place and bring to account those responsible for blunders committed and rights sacrificed at Lausanne.

4. The trial ended late on the 31st December, but the court reserved its sentence. From various remarks let fall by the president and the public prosecutor during the last sittings, it seems possible that it had already been decided, even before hearing the case for the defence, to acquit the accused. The issue is nevertheless very doubtful, for the hostility to Jahid and Velid Beys in Angora is extremely strong.

5. Ismet Pasha scored a success in the Grand National Assembly in the final decision of the 26th December on the question whether all sentences of the Court of

Independence should be subject to review by the Assembly. The report of the Committee on Drafts, recommending that the opposition proposal in this sense should not be entertained, was accepted by 112 votes to 44, with four abstentions. It was generally felt that Ismet had strengthened his position, although there were a fair number of Deputies, perhaps as many as thirty, who did not attend the sitting and who must be reckoned in the potential strength of the opposition. Within the last couple of days, however, a critical situation seems again to have arisen. The Minister of Finance, Hassan Fehmi Bey, resigned on the 31st December, and rumours of a reconstruction of the Cabinet, or even its resignation, are again current. Angora is greatly preoccupied with internal, and to some extent with foreign, affairs. It is an open secret that great difficulty is being experienced in forming the budget for the coming year without admitting an estimated deficit of over £T. 50,000,000. A report that official salaries will have to be reduced has provoked much criticism, all the more bitter because of the increase in army pay a couple of months ago. The question of the Anatolian Railway is again on the tapis, and various other matters tend to increase the difficulties of Ismet Pasha and his Government in the Assembly. These difficulties may possibly be increased by the absence of Mustafa Kemal, who left for Smyrna on 31st December. It has apparently been decided not to appoint an Acting President of the Republic, but to refer important matters to Mustafa Kemal during his absence, which is expected to last two or three months.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

P.S.—The verdict on the journalists was pronounced this afternoon. All were acquitted, amid general applause in court. According to a report which has just reached me, the court held that the letter of the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali contained passages contrary to the Law on Treason, but acquitted the accused on the ground that there had been no connivance between them and the authors of the letter.

N. H.

[E 185/185/44] No. 5.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 14.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 2, 1924.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 851 of the 19th December, 1923, relative to Greek patriarchal affairs, I have the honour to state that on the 27th December the Anatolian Telegraph Agency published a telegram from Angora contradicting a report in a Salonica newspaper to the effect that the Patriarch Gregorius and four other Metropolitans were to be tried for treason.

2. In view of the semi-official character of the Anatolian Agency, this *démenti* is significant, having regard more particularly to the widely advertised efforts of Papa Eftim a couple of weeks ago to induce the Court of Independence to purge the Greek patriarchate of what he considers to be pro-Hellenic elements. It is a further indication that the Turks are for the moment on their best behaviour as regards the patriarchate.

3. On the other hand, the Turkish Government have not yet committed themselves to official recognition of the new Patriarch. Announcements have appeared from time to time that inquiries are being held as to the manner in which the election was held. Mustafa Kemal Pasha returned a correct reply to the telegram addressed to him by Mgr. Gregorius after his enthronement, but the text of the reply given in the local newspapers does not show whether the President addressed him by the style of Patriarch. I have not thought it advisable to inquire regarding this point, as I prefer in present circumstances, in the interest of the partriarchate itself, to avoid any appearance of concerning myself with the affairs of that institution.

4. I may mention in this connection that I have refrained from sending any message of congratulation to the new Patriarch on his election or enthronement. It will be for consideration later whether the visits which it is customary for a member of my staff to pay to the Greek Patriarch and other heads of communities at Easter, a purely religious festival, should be continued.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 249/249/44] No. 6.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 7, 1924.*

YOUR telegram No. 353.

Two principal delegates, Rassih Effendi and Kemal Eumer Bey, accompanied by Adnan Bey, called on me to-day. They expressed grateful thanks for facilities afforded to Red Crescent delegation, and gave formal assurances that it would concern itself solely with humanitarian object of mission. I spoke to them in the sense of telegram of Government of India of 3rd December enclosed in India Office letter to you of 7th December last, and laid stress on necessity in their own interests as well of abstaining from all political discussion.

The two delegates above mentioned will be accompanied by chief accountant of Red Crescent, Bedri Bey, and one interpreter not yet finally selected. They propose to leave in about ten days' time viâ Egypt. I shall report exact date later. Present idea is to wait till they reach Bombay before making plans as to itinerary, which they will submit to authorities there.

[E 212/145/44] No. 7.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 9.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 7, 1924.*

I HEAR on good authority that M. Poincaré has requested the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies to select a reporter for the Treaty of Lausanne, with a view to speedy ratification. This selection will probably be made on the 9th instant.

This evening's "Temps," in a leading article, of which text goes to your Lordship by bag, attacks what it describes as England's "policy of conquest" in the East. Article concludes by declaring that France cannot imitate that policy, for she seeks neither to divide nor to dominate. She will give Mussulmans proof of her friendship by ratifying Treaty of Lausanne, which re-established Turkish independence.

[E 297/210/44] No. 8.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January 8, 1924.*

YOUR despatch No. 1602.

I have repeatedly pressed Ministry for Foreign Affairs for answer, and they now inform me that they are awaiting return of M. Montagna to obtain his views before answering. M. Montagna, who is destined for post of Italian representative in Turkey, is ill, but may be back at the end of this week. As I learn privately that when offered post he said that he would sooner stay where he was than proceed to Angora, I take it as assured that Italian Government will be in agreement with your Lordship at least on this point.

[E 367/186/44] No. 9.

Lord D'Abernon to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 12.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to state, with reference to various statements which have appeared in the press regarding the intention of the

German Government to appoint a diplomatic representative at Angora, that the following notice has been published to-day:—

> "This report in its present form is incorrect. Possibly it arose from the following facts: After the Turkish Government had entered into negotiations for the conclusion of treaties of friendship with various Powers which did not take part in the Lausanne Conference, a provisional exchange of views took place between the Turkish and German Governments in regard to a treaty which might form a basis for the eventual resumption of diplomatic relations. With a view to simplifying matters, the German Government would probably entrust the conduct of negotiations for a treaty of this nature to one of the German representatives in the Balkans."

In conversation with Herr von Schubert on this subject to-day, he stated that negotiations for the moment will be limited to the endeavour to agree upon a skeleton treaty of peace. It was proposed to negotiate this before going into details regarding consular jurisdiction, Capitulations, &c.

As regards the appointment of a German representative either at Constantinople or Angora, the idea of the German Government was still to await action by England and France, and to follow whatever example they might set (see Berlin despatch No. 802 of the 6th November, 1923). Meantime, a German consul might be sent to Smyrna.

Berlin, January 5, 1924.

[E 419/32/44] No. 10.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 30.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 9, 1924.*

I HAVE endeavoured during the past year to keep your Lordship very fully informed of internal developments in Turkey, feeling as I have done that the geographical situation of this country, its international position and its importance as a factor in the evolution of relations between East and West gave those developments an interest out of proportion to the size of the new Turkish State or the numbers of the population directly affected by them. My despatches having necessarily abounded in detail, I think it may be useful if I indicate in a broader fashion some of the general features which strike me as I look back over the fourteen months which have elapsed since the decision taken by the Grand National Assembly on the 1st November, 1922, to abolish the Sultanate.

2. When that decision was taken the Angora Government were at pains to attenuate its effect on Turkish and Moslem opinion by representing the Caliphate as a great institution which the Turks held, as it were, in trust for the whole of Islam and the authority of which rested on the support of the Turkish State. Their efforts in this direction were aided by their avoidance of any positive definition of the new form of the State, and by the fact that it was possible without political inconvenience to "elect" to the Caliphate the Prince, who under the old rule of succession would have come to the throne on the disappearance of the late Sultan. Even so, they were taking a considerable risk, for many had felt that one of the few things which might outrage the much-tried and hitherto docile Anatolian peasant would be a direct attack on the throne. The event justified their boldness. The peasant accepted the change, as he had accepted every other innovation. He was doubtless ignorant of its significance, but his ignorance was itself due to that patient indifference to all but immediate personal concerns which is one of his chief characteristics.

3. It is as true as ever that there is no public opinion in Turkey in the European sense of the expression. Yet this statement must be qualified by an admission that during the last four years there has been a great increase in the number of people who take a lively interest in public affairs, people who from one point of view may, for want of a better term, be described as patriots, although the standard of patriotism is low, and who, from another, may be described as constituting the *intelligentsia* of the country. They are a small minority relatively to the bulk of the population, but

they are now numerous as a class, and it is among them that one must look for the various trends of opinion which influence the course of events, so far as it is influenced at all by moral forces. They belong to every class possessing any sort of education or stake in the country—officials, khojas, army officers, professional men, journalists, schoolmasters, students and local notables. To them the controversies of the day mean something real, and, while they include large numbers of more or less conservative persons and large numbers of subservient opportunists, they include also a strong and rather more homogeneous element of radicals. All, except the opportunists, have one thing in common, namely, a violent doctrinairism, which finds its completest expression in the political debates at Angora and the columns of the press in all the more important centres. The sheep-like people look up and are fed only with words, but the words have come to have a real meaning for the doctrinaires who deal in them.

4. The ideas of the advanced members of this class have crystallised about such expressions as "national sovereignty," "republic," "liberal" and—a notable addition to the vocabulary of the Turkish revolution—"laic." Older systems of ideas have disintegrated to a large extent. To be a constitutional monarchist of the 1908 type is now to be a reactionary. To go further back and to wish to see any real power restored to the throne is to be a traitor. Once this position had been created, it was not hard for Mustafa Kemal, within less than a year of the *coup* of the 1st November, 1922, to elicit an express definition of Turkey as a republic and to engineer a campaign to discredit not so much the Caliph as the institution of the Caliphate. He is a great man, and a man, according to his lights, of genuine patriotism, as are many of his supporters, but it is not unfair to say that ambition and fear have driven him and them to extreme courses.

5. The fear to which I refer is partly fear of the Western Powers. The Turks, with all their arrogance and sense of triumph, realise that those Powers could crush them if they chose to exert their strength, and they imagine that some at least of the Powers still look at the newly won liberty of Turkey with jealous eyes, at her undeveloped resources with covetousness and at her territory with a desire to carve out of it new dependencies. And it is partly fear of the Caliphate, as the possessor of a tradition of personal sovereignty and the possible rallying-point of the incoherent and partly latent, but potentially strong, forces of Conservatism in the country. It is now not so much the present Caliph, who has learnt caution, as the whole House of Osman which is mistrusted. To Mustafa Kemal, the ambitious creature of fortune, that house is a rival. To Mustafa Kemal, the doctrinaire patriot, and to the doctrinaire patriots who are the best of his followers, it is the incarnation of the evils of the past. They have got to the point of being prepared, by reducing the Caliphate to a simulacrum, perhaps even by destroying it, to sacrifice the prestige which the possession of the Caliphate gives Turkey in a large part of the Moslem world rather than see it retain enough of its own prestige at home to make the restoration of the temporal power and of the old régime possible.

6. This is the most striking development of a general kind during the last year. It has been facilitated by the rapid growth of what, again for want of a better term, may be called irreligion in the educated class. Here I am not speaking of new phenomenon. What is new is the open enunciation by certain publicists of principles inconsistent with Islamic conceptions, the efforts of others less courageous, to read new and subversive meanings into old Islamic formulæ and the facility with which it is recognised that the applicability of those conceptions and formulæ to life under a republican régime is a suitable subject for public discussion. In using the word irreligious, I am conscious of using a rather misleading expression, for it covers not merely agnostic or sensual indifference to the claim of Islam to regulate every concern of human life, but a whole series of phenomena, such as, for instance, the growing emancipation of women, the frequentation by Turks of both sexes of European balls and other social functions, the Caliph's son dancing with the rest; the tendency to make monogamy, with only a little relaxation, the law of the land; the frank handling of the prohibition question as merely an economic and administrative problem, in which Turkish liquor merchants no less than others have vested interests at stake; the suggestion that religious law courts should be done away with; and the recognition that, if Turkish law is to be adapted to the needs of modern life, it must be divorced much more completely than was done in the middle of the 19th century from the law of Islam.

7. If Turkey is to be reorganised on the lines of an European State, and that is the ambition of those Nationalists who are now beginning to be called Liberals, many

of these things are necessary to that end. The trouble is that those who have abandoned Islam in all but name have found no new basis of real principle; that they still retain of Islam its intolerance doubled by the intolerance of infant Nationalism; that they lose themselves in wrangling with each other and with the Conservatives; and, most of all, that they have no real sense of how the problems which they ventilate so lightly are to be dealt with in a practical and constructive manner. Constitutional questions are solved by sewing Republican patches in a more or less haphazard fashion on to the fabric of the now unrecognisable, but not wholly abolished, Constitution of 1876. Economically, the country is going to rack and ruin, while politicians and fortune-hunters play with schemes for building railways and reconstructing devastated areas. The financial situation is so bad that for the coming year a deficit of over £T. 50,000,000 is spoken of as probable in a budget of not more than three times that amount, and, although this will certainly be reduced on paper to a very much smaller sum, it is much more likely to represent the true state of the case than the actual estimates which will be submitted to the Assembly. In the administrative services there is a general indiscipline, and in the lower branches, at any rate in Constantinople, a formidable aggravation of the time-honoured system of bakhshish. In Anatolia the scourge of brigandage, the product of misery and imperfect control, has once more assumed such proportions that the Minister of the Interior had recently to admit in the Assembly that after the arrest of over 1,000 brigands there were some 3,000 to 4,000 still at large.

8. To cope with these varied evils, so largely economic in their nature or origin, a cautious, but really constructive, policy is needed. Such a policy cannot be conceived without a broadness of view, which the present Grand National Assembly entirely lacks, nor can it be put into execution without a powerful driving force, which for the moment no party and no individual is capable of providing. After the reconquest of Smyrna in the autumn of 1922 it looked as though Mustafa Kemal himself might supply the driving force for an economic revival. His speeches at that time showed an apparently sincere conviction that only by such a revival could Turkey hope to retain her newly won independence. Had he thrown his full strength into the realisation of what he then preached he might have imposed on the country the bases of a sound economic policy and seen it through by the force of his personality, notwithstanding his ignornce of the details of economic questions. Hampered by political difficulties, however, and broken in health, he has dropped, at least for the time being, into a background of watchful detachment. Nor could even Mustafa Kemal have triumphed easily over the obstacles which the Nationalists have themselves placed in the way of economic development by encouraging rampant xenophobia, by ignoring the principle that fresh foreign capital can only be attracted to Turkey by showing some serious sense of the sanctity of existing obligations, and by their attitude to the non-Moslem minorities, whose practical elimination from Anatolia has largely upset the old balance of commercial life and whom it is the settled policy of Angora to eliminate still further.

9. There are not lacking Turks who realise the situation, but such of them as have influence are too disunited to effect a cure. The political antagonism between Constantinople and Angora has its counterpart in a growing recognition in the old capital that its whole economic life is menaced. This, as much as anything, is responsible for the fact that nearly every Turkish paper in Constantinople is either definitely in opposition to, or at least critical of, Angora. But the opposition elements, though it is becoming the fashion to call them Conservatives, are for the most part as chauvinistic regarding foreigners, existing obligations and non-Moslems as are the pure Nationalists, Republicans or Liberals, whatever name be applied to them. This it is that makes it unwise to expect that the advent of any other party to power would mean an early improvement in the situation from a British or general European point of view. Whatever Turks assume power, they will continue to wrangle at the cost of the true interests of their country, to squeeze or frighten away the foreigners and non-Moslems, of whose collaboration they have need, and to discuss great schemes instead of effecting slow and gradual reconstruction. They will only learn in the hard school of experience that, if Turkey is to achieve stability as a really independent State, there must be a change in her present mentality. Unfortunately for her, the lesson may be learned too late to retrieve the damage which is now being done. Meanwhile the extreme Nationalists are probably no worse than any other element which is at all likely to come into power. They have among them one great personality, namely, Mustafa Kemal, who, if he recovers, may yet succeed in pulling the country together. They have, moreover, one advantage from a British point of

view, namely, that they have become so mad on nationalism that pan-Islamism is rather at a discount among them, and for some time to come they are likely to put aside dreams of Imperialist expansion or any serious hegemony in the Islamic world, and to confine themselves to cultivating the idea of Turkish *irredentas* in Northern Irak and Northern Syria.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 573/448/44] No. 11.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 72.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1924.

YUSSUF KEMAL BEY, the new Turkish representative in London, called upon me at the Foreign Office this afternoon in order to present his Letter of Appointment.

I had already met him two years ago when he was in London, and was glad to renew our friendly relations, even although my official connection with him was likely to be short.

Perhaps from his inability to speak or to read English, he was so little aware of the political situation that he had not realised that in a very short time he would be dealing with somebody else in my place, and evidently expected from me assurances which he could only obtain from my successor.

He brought me messages of a very warm and friendly character from Ismet Pasha, but did not discuss, any more than did I, any political questions. The only point upon which he expressed anxiety, and about which I had the right within certain limits to reassure him, was as regards the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty.

He appeared to share to some extent the Turkish apprehension, which had been reported from Constantinople, that His Majesty's Government desired to evade or to postpone this issue.

I assured him that, so far as I was entitled to speak, he need entertain no such alarm. Had the Conservative Government remained in power, I should have asked Parliament to ratify the treaty in December last. The accident of events had rendered this impossible, and there will probably be a still further delay owing to the interval that must elapse between the retirement of the present Government and the resumption of the parliamentary session after the appointment of its successor. It might therefore be that a period of five or six weeks at least would elapse before the matter could be taken in hand. Unless, which I thought unlikely, the next Ministry held different views from our own, I thought that they would be as anxious as we to conclude the matter, and would introduce the necessary Bill in Parliament to that effect. For my part, I undertook to exercise any pressure that I could, either in the House of Lords or elsewhere, to induce them to take this action, and I thought therefore that no long time ought to elapse before the ratification, which we equally with the Turks desired, came about.

The Turkish Minister seemed very much pleased at receiving this assurance, which, he said, he would communicate to his Government.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[C 1046/401/96] No. 12.

Sir C. Eliot to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tokyo, January* 19, 1924.

[GROUP undecypherable.]

Japanese Government have made arrangements to proceed with ratification as soon as France and Italy have completed formalities.

[E 611/249/44] No. 13.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 19, 1924.

MY telegram No. 6.

I have given diplomatic visa to Red Crescent Mission, which is probably leaving 23rd January viâ Egypt. Interpreter is a certain Tewfik Bey, who was in India before the war and whose activities there were, I understand, viewed at that time with suspicion by Indian Government. Since the armistice he has lived in Constantinople, and was a major-domo in ex-Shah's household. He is well known to Mr. Ryan, and during occupation period nothing is known to his detriment at this High Commission. He is a native of Basra.

I thought it as well, however, as soon as I learnt of his appointment to see Adnan and to draw his attention to undesirability of attaching to the mission anyone whose past record in India was unsatisfactory, and whom Government of India might consequently decline to allow to land. Adnan pleaded difficulties experienced in finding anyone so qualified as Tewfik owing to his knowledge of Persian as well as English and Turkish. All the others with similar qualifications had either been unwilling to go or were even less suitable, such as the Malta deportee whom he mentioned as having been a candidate. He promised between now and the 23rd to do his utmost to find someone else. If not, I have agreed that Tewfik may leave with the others, since I appreciate real difficulty of replacing him.

I earnestly trust that, if another with equally good qualifications cannot be found, Government of India, unless his past activities render it patently impossible, will not refuse to admit him. No exception can be taken to his record during the past four years here; his position in the mission is most subordinate, and Adnan gave me most specific assurances with regard to him and instructions which he would receive.

[E 632/632/44] No. 14.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 47.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 15, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the question of Turkish Government finances has recently been the subject of much discussion in the press, which appears to view with misgiving the situation at the close of the present financial year ending February 1924, and which, notwithstanding official declarations to the contrary, estimates the budget deficit as ranging from 15 million to 50 million Turkish liras. These conjectures, however, are not based on any solid foundation, as complete details of Government expenditure and revenues have not been made public. I have, however, obtained a copy of the official report of the Ministry of Finance covering the period in question, which contains an exhaustive analysis of the Government finances.

2. I accordingly transmit herewith—

(*a.*) A forecast of the revenues (total, 94,537,874 Turkish liras) estimated by the Ministry of Finance at the commencement of the current year as compared with the total of 60,619,150 Turkish liras for the year 1922–23.

(*b.*) A table showing the credits demanded by the various Government Departments for 1923–24, and the credits, namely, 118,449,904 Turkish liras finally allowed by the Ministry of Finance.

The considerable increase in the estimate of Government revenues is, of course, attributed in great measure to the restoration of Constantinople to national administration.

3. Information is also given in regard to the Ottoman Public Debt during the period September–November (inclusive) 1923, from the following additional statement:—

[illegible] receipts assigned by the Ministry of Finance were not received by the Assembly in their entirety. An ordinary credit of £T500,000 was voted to cover the expenditures for the months of August and September, and a special credit of £T2,000,000 was voted for the month of October, thus making a total of £T2,500,000 Turkish. As a matter of fact, only £T2,349,293 Turkish has, to the best information received by the Ministry of Finance, as shown in table B.

No correct statement of actual expenditure can be issued for many reasons, foremost among them being the necessity, on the part of the Government, of making certain readjustments.

In addition to the above-mentioned, the following supplementary credits were also passed by the Assembly:

	£T
Expenditure to the above date	120,279,979
Payments to the military classes	1,000,000
Pensions and various expenditure to the Budget	40,000
A provisional credit for the exchange of populations	5,000,000
Grand total of estimated expenditure	126,619,979

According to the latest information received by the Ministry of Finance, the actual receipts for the year, from the 1st March to the 31st December, were expected to be £T120,000,000 Turkish, but it is now estimated that they will amount to 87 million to 87½ million Turkish pounds. The gross receipts for the period 1st March–30th September, 1923, have been calculated at £T87,000,000 Turkish, and the net receipts are estimated at £T58,000,000 Turkish. The following statement of the estimated receipts and expenditure for the year 1924–25 is also of interest:—

	£T
Receipts by Ministry of Finance	107,000,000
Interest due by concessionaire companies	5,730,000
Reduction of 5 per cent. on credits voted, approximately "	6,000,000
Total, approximately	132,730,000

According to the official statements, the total budget deficit was therefore expected to amount to more than 44 million Turkish pounds. This proved, however, to be an optimistic estimate, as the following additional expenditure subsequently became necessary:

	£T
Exchange and reconstruction (in addition to £T10,000,000 previously voted)	3,097,260
Greek Refugees Administration	375,850
Advances to agriculturists (seeds, agricultural instruments, &c.)	2,000,000
Increase in military pay	2,000,000
Increase in salaries of employees of restaurants	42,000
Salary and rewards of the Secretariat-General and its establishments	820,000

An increased expenditure of approximately £T8,000,000 is therefore involved, and with the already provided for 44 million Turkish pounds the total deficit is increased to 52 million Turkish pounds. It should be noted that the Ottoman Public Debt, further explanation of which is given above, must increase by about 5 million Turkish pounds, exclusive of sums necessary to cover the Navy Debt, the amount of which is 1,178,674 Turkish pounds at present allocated to the Ottoman Public Debt, being no doubt the estimate of expenditure necessary for purely naval purposes.

6. In regard to the budget for the financial year beginning 1st March 1924, a preliminary statement has already been made by the Minister of Finance, with the following results:

	£T
Total Government revenues estimated at	107,789,810
Additional expenditure expected to be allocated to the National Debt and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration at	10,000,000
Thus leaving a surplus of approximately	2,000,000
Increase of the credits to be assigned to the National Debt and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, however, will probably exceed by approximately	1,000,000
Thus leaving a budget surplus of approximately	1,000,000

It was stated, however, that the following economies would be effected:—

	£T
Reduction of 5 per cent. expenditure by Departments, approximately	6,000,000
Reduction of subsistence grants and properties instead of money, approximately	600,000
Sale of vessels, warstocks &c., approximately	1,000,000
Profits arising from the administration of national factories	400,000
Total	8,000,000

was expected, the remainder to be met by foreign loans.

Similar statements were made with regard to extraordinary expenditure in regard to restoration of army pay, pensions, &c., and it is also proposed to create additional revenue of 5 million Turkish pounds by means of increased taxation, fines, &c. It is also proposed to reduce the expenditure of the Ministry of Interior, and to create a new Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Welfare, to which will be transferred certain expenditure hitherto borne by the Ministry of Interior, and also certain expenditure hitherto borne by other Departments of the Budget.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

Enclosure in No. 14

(A.)—*Revenues of Turkey.*

BUDGET Estimates for the Financial Year March 1923–February 1924.

Chapter		Mar 1923–Feb. 1924.	Preceding Year.
	I.—*Direct Taxes*	£ T	£ T
1	Land taxes and taxes on house property	1,000,000	1,200,000
2	Income tax (cedulle)	2,500,000	1,200,000
2 bis	War profits tax	1,300,000	600,000
3	War tax (25 per cent. of tax on added property	700,000	600,000
4	Tax for postponement from military service	400,000	2,000,000
4	Tax on military transport	500,000	800,000
5	Tax on exemption from military service	350,000	200,000
—	Tax on animals (sing tax)	4,002,300	3,001,200
8	Tax on { tobacco / silk }	25,300,000 / 130,000	13,200,000 / 6,000
9	Death duties		2,000,000
10 and 11	Increment from private forests and mines	85,000	55,000
12	Stamp duty on assessments (corporation income tax &c	30,000	4,000
13	Stamp duties, registration, tax on lotteries	1,300,000	360,000
14	Treasury shares	800,000	250,000
15	Revenues derived from issue of passports, attestations, passport fees, registration &c.	250,000	250,000
16	Trade-marks and patents	10,000	4,000
17	Registration and transfer of property	685,000	150,000
18	Fines	700,000	500,000
	II.—*Indirect Taxes*		
19	Income on coal	100,000	11,000
20	Duty on coal tax	30,000	2,500
21	Customs	16,000,000	8,500,000
23	Maritime taxes	520,000	44,000
24	Sanitary taxes	190,000	30,000
25	Game and hunting licences	1,000,000	172,500
26	Salt duty	5,000,000	3,500,000
27	Tobacco	4,202,500	600,300
28	Share of output of military factories	1,500,000	1,300,000
29	Alum	200,000	
30	Post and telegraph	2,175,000	1,165,000
32	Schools, agricultural colleges &c.	20,000	10,000
33	Sanitary institutions	1,500	450
34	Public Health Department	1,500	400
35	Government share of pensions	40,000	50,000
36	Meteorological office	18,000	
38	Mines	140,000	75,000
9	Railway administration (share of Government)	15,700	
40	Revenues from State lands	1,800	1,670,000
41	Revenues from State forests	200,000	470,000
42	Sale of various goods (old war stocks &c.)	700,000	200,000
43	Irrigation of Konia plain	30,000	30,000
46	Financial operations of Treasury	75,000	40,000
47	control of concessionary companies	2,000	
48	Various receipts	1,200,000	400,000
49	Pensions funded or ceded from official salaries	2,670,000	86,000
50	Voluntary contributions to Government	30,000	2,500,000
52	Returns from various concessions	773,354	
53	Receipts of revenue from agriculturists	35,000	31,000
54	Preventive service contributions of various administrations (Customs, Post, Posts &c.	400,000	
56	Consumption tax on cigarette papers	600,000	4,200,000
57	Consumption tax on cards	4,000	9,000
57 (a)	Consumption tax on playing cards, chess, &c.	1,000	500
58	Consumption tax on matches	600,000	500,000
59	Other consumption taxes (sugar, tea &c.)	8,500,000	700,000
60	Tax on places of amusement and entertainment	140,000	
	Extraordinary receipts		3,250,000
	Total	94,537,874	60,379,150

* Added later

N.B.—The total general for 1922–23 does not correspond with individual items, which give a total of £T 60,379,150, i.e. an error of £T 249,000.

(B.)—*Expenditure*

	Credits demanded by Departments.	Credits passed by Ministry of Finance.
	(A.)—1923–24.	(B.)—1923–24.
	£ T	£ T
Khedivate	436,697	436,697
Grand National Assembly	263,872	263,872
Ottoman Public Debt	3,571,894	3,578,678
Pensions	16,400,000	16,400,000
Ministry of Finance	5,274,700	5,274,700
Cour des Comptes	158,380	158,380
Customs administration	2,143,307	2,143,307
Posts and telegraphs	4,804,190	2,978,241
Council of Ministers	44,562	44,562
Ministry of Interior	3,066,826	3,866,432
Public security	1,843,700	2,306,418
Assistance sociale	3,656,108	28,767
Ministry of Health	1,741,697	1,438,936
Gendarmerie	1,467,562	1,249,923
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	911,541	485,945
Seyhul-Islam ..	1,683,771	1,180,572
Ministry of Justice	6,114,716	4,201,857
Ministry of Education	3,865,121	80,000
Ministry of Public Works	1,457,360	1,052,258
Ministry of Economy	1,478,577	1,178,177
Press and information	175,990	110,115
Total of Civil Services	74,174,772	53,347,713
Marine ..	6,075,533	2,272,138
National defence	96,515,108	93,000,000
Military factories	7,691,170	2,251,053
Total of all services	179,336,278	18,449,904

N.B.—The totals (A) and (B) do not correspond with individual items which amount to £T 78,856,278 and £T 18,453,504 respectively.

No. 15

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received January 21*)

(No. 18)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 9, 1924.*

A very lengthy despatch (No. 8 of the 9th instant) has been received from the Embassy at Angora on the obstacles to the economic revival of Turkey. It is, in the opinion of the Ambassador, of the greatest importance that the views of the Turkish Government with regard to the part which foreign capitalists, and especially British and other foreign interests in Turkey, may be useful to them should be fully examined, and I have therefore decided to refer to the general review which I have given in my despatch under reference, it should be specially noted, owing to the fact that Turkey has been in the past peculiarly subject to such influence. It is accentuated by a number of other factors, notably the suspicion with which foreign Powers and foreign capitalists are still regarded, their identification in the Turkish mind with an aggressive Christianity and the recent memory of the privileged status enjoyed by foreigners under the Capitulations. While these factors are obviously interconnected, it will be convenient to consider them separately.

3. The suspicions of the Turks are for obvious reasons specially directed against the Great Powers, with the exception of Japan and so far as fear of actual encroachment is concerned the United States of America. They are directed most of all against Great Britain, then France, and then Italy. For this particular purpose Russia and Germany have dropped into the background of Turkish thought, though many Turks have at the back of their minds an uneasy feeling that Russia in its new guise is still the traditional enemy. Great Britain is most mistrusted because it is

thought that a Power with the largest number of Moslem subjects in the world should strive to wage a religious war, and appeal to Moslem fanaticism for the defence of the Treaty of Paris, and the integrity and works of the Empire of Constantine and Abdul Medjid, would be a step of such [illegible] as to [illegible] the whole of Europe and of the United States. Such an appeal would be the more natural that the Sultan has always claimed to be the Protector of the Moslem subjects of foreign States, and that he has shown himself the Protector of the Arabs in Algeria, where he has exercised a [illegible] influence. But it is needless to say that the United States would not be disposed to [illegible] the Sultan in any such policy. The Sultan's own subjects would suffer the most from the [illegible] of such a war, and the Sultan would be regarded by the Moslem subjects of foreign States as a traitor to the rights of the Moslem faith.

France is [illegible] to the Sultan, and has always shown a disposition to [illegible] the Sultan's authority in Algeria, where the Arabs have been [illegible] by the French Government. The Sultan has always claimed the right to [illegible] the Arabs in Algeria, and has [illegible] the French Government for the [illegible] of the Arabs in Algeria. The Sultan has also claimed the right to [illegible] the Arabs in Algeria, and has [illegible] the French Government for the [illegible] of the Arabs in Algeria.

The Sultan has also claimed the right to [illegible] the Arabs in Algeria, and has [illegible] the French Government for the [illegible] of the Arabs in Algeria.

the right to [illegible] foreign merchants from non-Moslem schools [illegible] certain [illegible] in the schools system in the selection [illegible]

The [illegible] of the Sultan's subjects, which need [illegible] that they are [illegible] the Sultan's [illegible] foreign merchants [illegible] as to [illegible] the Sultan's [illegible] that they are [illegible] the Sultan's [illegible] foreign merchants [illegible] the Sultan's [illegible] foreign merchants [illegible] the Sultan's [illegible] foreign merchants

official support that the majority of the cases which I have to take up with the Turkish authorities at present are comparatively unimportant, however troublesome and unsatisfactory to deal with. I have mentioned some of the really important cases, by way of illustration in the earlier part of this despatch. I may cite some other examples of minor cases in order to illustrate further the general position. The desecration of the British cemetery at Sultan Pasha in October was an instance of anti-British spite on the part of the actual perpetrators of the outrage, a low class of native labourer, not discouraged perhaps, but encouraged by the local police, except that the court which tried the affair dismissed it very lightly. I cannot say that the subsequent attitude of the higher Turkish authorities was different from what I should have expected in the case of a European country. Another typical example of xenophobism on the part of the authorities themselves is afforded by the unwillingness to allow the return of Maltese British subjects to Smyrna. There is probably some truth in the suggestion that they are afraid of a pro-Greek slant being given to the case of foreigners. But they are Turks, really anxious to keep British subjects of the poorer class out, in the hope that Turks will do the work for cheaper by locally the Maltese. Secondary to the greatest difficulty in getting permission for Dr. Cassar to return to Smyrna, even after he had established his right to practise and a dentist left Constantinople some time ago rather than wait for his case to be forgotten. As Riza Nour Bey openly stated at Lausanne the Turks wish to give their own doctors a chance. Mr. Edmonds is experiencing great difficulty at Smyrna in securing the return to British subjects of property which was, in one way or another, forced away into the possession of Turks. Another matter which illustrates the mistrust of foreigners are the refusals of the Turkish authorities to allow the transfer of real property to foreigners. Turkish pre-war treaty rights are in force, but the treaty of Lausanne, their unwillingness to recognise the British rights of native Christian women married to British subjects without a decree of the Grand National Assembly. I might multiply instances in which I am having difficulty in getting settled small matters, but I will choose those which are the best illustrations of the subject of the present despatch.

I have, &c.

NEVILL HENDERSON.

E 637/32/44 No. 16

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received January 21*)

(No. 53)

His Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Consul-General Edmonds regarding Mustafa Kemal's visit to Smyrna.

Constantinople January 16, 1924

Enclosure in No. 16

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr Henderson

(No. 4)

Sir,

Smyrna, January 11, 1924

As I had the honour to report in my telegram of the 2nd instant, the President of the Turkish Republic arrived here on that date. The local authorities had got ready a yacht with the owner's consent, the house, at Boudja, of Mr. David Fermes, a British subject who was absent. The house has been very badly looted by Turkish labourers after the destruction of the town and owing partly to the present dearth of skilled labour and of water also the efforts of the municipality to make good the damages were not very successful. Jewish carpet merchants in the bazaar were forced to lend carpets for the occasion but not more than the first floor could be made habitable. Mustafa Kemal and his wife moved suddenly the next day to the house of Latifa Hanem's father, Muammer Bey, at the suburb of Karantina.

2. As Muammer Bey's house is near the water, this unexpected move produced reports that Mustafa Kemal had a yacht waiting to take him off if the political

situation should develop against him. There is, so far as I can make out, no such yacht in the whole gulf. Latifa Hanem is in a delicate state of health and that seems a sufficient reason for Mustafa Kemal Bey moving his quarters.

3. The Italian Consul-General, who is the senior consular officer here, enquired through the Vali whether the President wished to receive the consuls. The reply was that as this visit was a private one he did not, but the Vali pointed to me that Mustafa Kemal Pasha might change his mind later on. My colleagues and I therefore received cards.

4. The Ghazi Pasha has received the visits of Turkish notables. His public appearances have been few and unostentatious. On the 8th instant he visited the barracks and the hospital and dined. On the 9th he drove through Bournabat to visit Cordelio. His movements have been watched with interest rather than enthusiasm. There has been a little cheering displayed to order, but so far as I am informed, no real ovation. It is true, though, that he does not court ovations, for he ordered that there should be no special preparations for his welcome, and on the few occasions when he has appeared he has either has been driven so quickly that he could scarcely be recognised.

5. The Pasha has only a small escort of soldiers and a number of police and detectives guard his movements. These measures seem not to be without reason, for according to Turkish information which I believe true, a man in the crowd drew a revolver on Mustafa Kemal's first arrival at the station and was instantly shot down by police, while another man who got out a revolver was lynched by soldiers.

6. Mustafa Kemal Pasha cannot be said to be a popular hero at Smyrna. Public opinion here seems to be against the present Government. It has been noticeable that during the trial of the journalists at Constantinople there has been a keen demand for the "Tanin." The Turkish populace seems to be hoping for the Committee of Union and Progress to come out into the open again, but the old Committee of Union and Progress leaders here, whatever they may do in secret, show no activity. I understand that they expect Mustafa Kemal Pasha to be carried off before long by an abominable disease from which he is believed to suffer. He certainly looks ill.

I have, &c.

W. S. EDMONDS

E 639/32/44 No. 17

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received January 21*)

(No. 55)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 16, 1924*

The acquittal of Edib Bey and his fellow-journalists, which I reported in the last paragraph of my despatch No. 10 of the 2nd January, was received with universal relief in Constantinople, and Angora's face on that day also the results were accepted as a triumph of justice appropriate to a republic. The young forces of the University—one of the strongest centres of Nationalism in Constantinople—presented bouquets to the accused as they left the court. The flow of sound reached its climax a few days later when the Turkish Press Association invited them and the members of the Court of Independence to a tea-party.

2. The court has since been dealing with minor cases, but is proceedings have created considerable interest. On the 7th January the Khoja Ibrahim Edhem was sentenced to a year's imprisonment, under an article of the ordinary Penal Code, for writing to prejudice Ghazi's use of the new order of things. On the 12th January the court began the trial of Ali Osman and Hassan of the Lighterman's Union and twenty other persons for being concerned in a plot against Mustafa Kemal's life and for inciting other persons to treason. The trial has made little progress and the details of the alleged plot have not been disclosed.

3. On the 8th January Ekrem Bey, the aide-de-camp of the Caliph, who was arrested two days after the arrival of the court in Constantinople, was suddenly released. No explanation either of his arrest or of his release has ever been vouchsafed. The decision not to proceed against him is a further indication of the extent to which Angora realises that the sending of the court to Constantinople was a political blunder. Yet another proof of the unpopularity of the whole business is that there is already a strong movement on foot for the pardon of Tevfik Fikri Bey, whose condemnation

to five years penal servitude for possession of explosives. In my despatch No. 12 of the 2nd instant

[illegible] Angelheri [illegible] has been sentenced to [illegible] constant [illegible] during the past fortnight. The opposition newspapers are naturally disparaging [illegible] on [illegible] Bey [illegible] Assembly [illegible] the Party, but encouraged himself for the most part by [illegible] [illegible] writing [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] Angora has become [illegible] two [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and the future of the [illegible] drawn [illegible] Mahmoud Bey, a former Malta [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] telegram [illegible] Assembly [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[E 706 249 44 No. 20

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received January 22.*)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 22, 1924.*

MY telegram No. 16.

Vahid called on me to-day to inform me that in spite of every effort it had proved impossible to find suitable substitute for Tewfik, who would consequently leave with mission to-day.

Though I told Vahid that I could not guarantee Tewfik's admittance to India I think it should be understood that I should be grateful to be informed if possible what reception will be accorded.

Effect of my representations respecting Tewfik will in any case have been salutary.

[E 847 847 44] No. 21

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received January 28.*)

(No. 17.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Consul-General Edmonds respecting the Vali of Smyrna.

Constantinople, January 22, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 21.

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Smyrna, January 17, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Vali of Smyrna, Aziz Bey, resigned last week and has been succeeded by the Vali of Angora, Murad Bey.

2. For the last two months Aziz Bey's friends at Adrianople have been urging him to accept the governorship of that vilayet. The arrival of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his dissatisfaction with the arrangements made by the Vali for his accommodation on Mr. Fraser's house may however have hastened Aziz Bey's resignation. It is said that words passed between the two.

3. Aziz Bey is about 40 and a native of Rodosto. He was a junior in the Political Department at Adrianople during the Balkan wars, and I have a grateful recollection of Colonel Sir Stanley Olivier, His Majesty's consul at Adrianople, who obtained his release from the temporary process of expulsion. In 1918 Aziz Bey was secretary of the Committee of Union and Progress, and I believe that it was he who escaped with the archives on board of the Committee of Union and Progress when the Allies were upon the point of entering Constantinople. He is probably identified with the Committee of Union and Progress rather than with the Kemalist party, and it may be that he finds it opportune to serve his connection with the present regime. He is a man of some mild generosity, energy, excitement and vanity. His administration here has been weak, but I believe that it has been due in some measure firstly to his lack of sympathy with the Angora policy, and, secondly, to the personnel appointed by Angora, which seems more than usually efficient or corrupt. Aziz Bey has been in Germany and, among other things, has studied the case of Protestantism. A crank of his is the Turkification of Islam in Turkey. He regards the Arabic element in Islam as an obsolete fossilised development, and wishes to see greater freedom of thought. He would like to see the Koran translated into Turkish.

4. Murad Bey is a native of Adana and between 30 and 40. In 1908 he was a political official in Monastir. Later he came to Constantinople and in 1914 he was an

Assistant Director of Public Security in Constantinople. He is a man of very little education. His appointment here seems a bad one for the economic life of the place is paralysed by excessive policing and spying for mere existence is a strain.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 848 32 44] No. 22

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received January 28.*)

(No. 66.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 25, 1924.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 55 of the 16th January, I have to submit herewith the text of the Grand National Assembly's acceptance of the proposals made by Suleiman Sirri Bey, Minister of Public Works, as successor to Makliev Bey, who resigned over the question of the Anatolian Railway.

2. Suleiman Sirri, who is one of the Deputies for Constantinople, has had a first Ministerial post, and I have not heard that he has any strong pronounced political attachments. He is by profession an engineer and has, I understand, held various administrative posts in the former Ministry of Public Works in Constantinople.

3. From various pronouncements by the new Ministers and others, it is evident that the Government are going every length to counteract the opposition to the Ministers' proposals to provide for the future of the Anatolian Railway by a new agreement with the present company represented by M. Huguenin. They are attempting, not without success, to delay a settlement of the question, while creating the impression that they are in no way averse from the proposals to increase the concession, provided it can be shown that it is financially feasible. I am dealing at greater length with this subject in my reply to the Foreign Office despatch No. 57 of the 14th January.

4. Ismet Pasha's tactical handling of the Anatolian Railway question appears on the moment to have strengthened his general position. There have been no political excitements during the past week.

5. The question of proposed modifications of the Constitution continues to be discussed at Angora, but the committee in charge of it seems to be proceeding in a very dilatory fashion. In this matter also it is pretty evident that the Government are playing for time.

6. In Constantinople also the lull continues. The trial of the Young Turkish and others implicated in the alleged plot against Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the republic continues to occupy the Court of Independence at long intervals, but so far it has excited little interest. Ekrem Bey, the aide-de-camp to the Caliph, whose release I reported in my despatch under reference has resigned his appointment at the Palace.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

E 851 632 44] No. 23.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received January 28.*)

(No. 72.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 23, 1924.*

WITH reference to the concluding part of my despatch No. 47 of the 21st January, I have the honour to state that the Angora newspapers of that day, which were not available when my despatch was drafted, gave the text of estimates for the year beginning the 1st March, 1924, which Ismet Pasha had only decided to circulate to the People's party. I enclose a translation of these estimates. The version printed in the "Hakimet-i-Milliè" paper shows in some detail how they compare with the earlier estimates mentioned in my despatch under reference. According to this version the actual figures for expenditure were arrived at by various increases and decreases in certain votes, resulting in a net increase of £T 3,64,073, while the figures for revenue

are covered by the small remainder of £T 13,500,000 resulting from new or modified taxes and by an equal increase in the return from receipts and telegraphs.

2. In fact Pasha's estimates of prospective deficit of £T 7,800,000 which, however, he hopes to cover by economies in estimates, by reductions on expenditure. He also told his statement to the people's party that a provision had been made for interest on the foreign debt. But these are not Public Debt figures in the expenditure side of the proposed budget but this, I understand, is merely for the purpose of the Public Debt Administration.

3. Sir Adam Block assumes that the Department will require for interest and sinking fund £T 6,000,000 as the gross charge against £T 10,000,000 as the gross receipts under the heading of sterling. In the latter figure are included in fact Pasha's estimates the prospects which will be over £T 1,500,000, without allowing for supplementary revenue to be derived during the year. Sir Adam Block assumes that the standard of prospective revenue will be also. Whether this is key to the case or not I cannot say, but in Sir Adam Block's opinion the revenue estimates are mainly upon the same general principles I have proposed to return to you below.

4. The standard the assumption of Pasha's revenue estimates is compared with last previous year's figures, and the details of the wealth tax, assistance public works, reduction of the internal debt, the list of which I have sent to you, has previously been given. It has partially been met by increases by increased business, and by the Ministry of the Interior, amounting to £ where are for small sums. The foreign [illegible] only £1,240,000 of which [illegible] the Ministry of State. This is a very liberal figure compared with previous estimates to meet [illegible] with the exhibit of the Government and keeping to the supplementary estimates.

5. This statement to the party Pasha also spoke to the previous for securing the services of foreign experts, which, would be employed in large sums. I have [illegible] to the Ministry of Finance, Public Works, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry. Some [illegible] of the [illegible] to be paid for foreign experts out of the £T [illegible] to be placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance to the Value Agency of the Wealth Tax, which [illegible] that sum of £T 24,000 had been collected to the [illegible] to meet the arrears of the second half sum of the first [illegible].

6. The [illegible] assembly, to pass the [illegible] Pasha's statement by the [illegible] Pasha's estimates should be taken to [illegible]. As I have said in [illegible] the year may be considerably affected by the [illegible] to raise the amount of the [illegible] that the Government ask the latter seriously to take [illegible] the Deputies is strikingly [illegible] by the fact that the People's party at a meeting on the 20th January voted by 90 to 67 votes, with [illegible] votes against, in favour of the [illegible] the Deputies [illegible] Pasha's proposal to raise £T 20 [illegible] This will [illegible] the Assembly to [illegible] an increase in the pay of civil servants [illegible], and [illegible] to assist [illegible] to indicate that the party [illegible] as [illegible] all [illegible] consequent [illegible] of [illegible].

I have, &c.
NEVILLE HENDERSON

Enclosure in No. 23.

(Translation.)

Budget Proposals for the Year 1341 (March 1, 1924–February 28, 1925), as given in Ismet Pasha's Statement to the People's Party, January 14, 1924.

Estimated Expenditure	£T
Civil list	331,695
Public Debt	6,388,060
Personal allowances (pensions, &c.)	630,000
Grand National Assembly	1,065,455
Ministry of Finance	5,600,000
Land Property Department	680,000
Audit Department	77,500
Customs	320,000
Posts and Telegraphs	4,800,000
Ministers of Prime Ministers Department	41,000
Ministry of Interior	
Public Security	15,000,000
General Income Commission	
Public Health and Social Assistance	4,000,000
Foreign Affairs	1,000,000
Religious affairs	1,200,000
Justice	500,000
Public instruction	5,650,000
Public works	15,000,000
Evkaf affairs	8,150,000
Press and Intelligence	200,000
Marine	
National defence	32,400,000
Extraordinary budget	
Military factories	
Ministry for Exchange of Populations Reconstruction and Settlement	7,000,000
Presidency of the Republic	247,120
Floating debt and specialists	200,000
Assistance to city of Angora	500,000
Emergency [illegible]	5,000
Total	128,000,000

Estimated Income	£T
Total estimated receipts previously submitted to Assembly	107,989,810
New additions which must be made as follows:	
Automobile tax (new)	400,000
Surtax on [illegible] of ½ per cent.	1,000,000
Liquor	500,000
Transport tax	1,000,000
Military exemption (commutation)	500,000
Posts and telegraphs	1,000,000
Total	112,389,810

E 8844] No. 24

Mr. Neville Henderson to the Earl of Saint Aldwyn.

(Received January 28, 1924.)

Your Excellency, Foreign Office, January 28, 1924.

YOU left Ankara on the 21st September last for Constantinople. An Anglo-American Railway Company has been recently considered by His Majesty's Government, and I am directed by the Secretary of State to request that you will be so good as to inform me of the present situation of the question on behalf of His Majesty's Government, which we have

...to remove, but I would assure your Excellency that I am also here to discuss the question in a spirit of conciliation.

2. With regard to the Treaty of Lausanne, the Governments of France ... and Great Britain in relation to the Turkish Navy were concerned, interest was primarily one of principle, as they did not wish to create a precedent which might be used by other Powers to denounce other Treaties. As regards the Straits Convention, a clause was inserted in the Treaty of Sèvres which provided that no such Convention should be concluded without the consent of the Powers signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres.

3. It was also one of interest to the Powers in the creation of the Turkish Railways, since what was at present Turkish territory was likely to be divided between the Successor States. The Treaty of Lausanne, however, contained no provisions in this respect, and the Turkish Government had declared that they would not be bound by any agreements which might be concluded in regard to railways in the territories detached from Turkey.

4. The Turkish Government had also declared that they would not be bound by any agreements concluded in regard to the Ottoman Debt, the Régie, the Ottoman Bank, the Tobacco Régie, or the Turkish Petroleum Company. Your Excellency will remember that the Treaty of Sèvres contained provisions in regard to all these matters, and that they were ... by the Treaty of Lausanne.

5. As regards the Ottoman Debt, the Treaty of Sèvres ... Your Excellency will remember that the Treaty of Lausanne ... Ottoman Debt ... Your Excellency ... Ottoman Debt ... Your Excellency ... Ottoman Debt ... Your Excellency

3 (a) the negative side the great treaty of Paris of 1856 which the change of Government in Great Britain has so good an opportunity of altering to the Foreign Office Lord Granville, who is not for the present Foreign Secretary, has always been a strong supporter of the Turkish Empire, and has always been associated with the Liberal party of the utmost importance to Turkey. Lord Granville's attitude during the Russo-Turkish war was generally believed to be unfriendly to Russia, and he was the first Minister to call attention to the atrocities committed by the Turks in Bulgaria. The first act of Mr. Gladstone's Administration was to send Lord Odo Russell to Berlin to watch over British interests there, and to counteract the influence which Prince Bismarck was supposed to have acquired over the Congress. Lord Odo Russell represented Lord Beaconsfield's policy at Berlin, and was supposed to be in full accord with Lord Salisbury. It is not unlikely that the Foreign Office will send a Liberal Ambassador to Berlin to represent the views of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville. Lord Ampthill, who represented Lord Beaconsfield at Vienna during the Congress, is a Liberal, and is supposed to be in full accord with the views of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville. Lord Ampthill

however, that on the 25th January the "Herald" recorded the generally favourable impression created in Turkish circles by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's suggestion that judgment until the attitude of the new British Government towards Turkey was put to the proof, emphasised the independence of the Labour Party. Liberal support pointed out that it was no known what arrangements have been passed between yourself and the Lloyd George-Asquith group regarding Turkey, and wondered whether the new Government would maintain the selection for the Mosul negotiators of Sir Percy Cox, a man who had never been in favour of the cession of Mosul to Turkey. On the same day the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar" correspondent urged the desirability of pressing on the negotiations in order to obtain a settlement before the end of the short period during which it expects the Lausanne Governments to remain in power before the advent of Mr. Lloyd George, who it expects will overthrow the Ismet Government early in the Autumn. It also suggested that the question whether the two months' period for the negotiations had begun or not had been lost by reason of the change of Government in England must first be cleared up before it was pushed forward with the expectation of hope of a friendly settlement. It was also suggested that the question should be first discussed between the parties, privately and not by the Press.

11. The views published in Constantinople newspapers other than Turkish are of so little importance or pretensions and fall so far under the present regime to express anything like independent opinion on political subjects that I have not troubled to collect specimens.

12. The two principal Angora newspapers have welcomed the change of Government in Great Britain. The issues of the 22nd January "The Hakimet-i-Milliye" which is the official organ of the Kemalist party, welcomed the victory of the Labour Party as a victory for democracy. It referred to the "Liberal" Government as the Lloyd George Government, and said that the defeat of the Conservatives was a victory for democracy. It referred to the Liberal Government as the Lloyd George Government, and said that the defeat of the Conservatives was a victory for democracy. It referred to the Liberal Government as the Lloyd George Government, and said that the defeat of the Conservatives was a victory for democracy.

13. After again referring to the dependence of the Labour Government on Liberal support, and the possibility of a new general election, which might be with Irish the "Hakimet-i-Milliye" writer says: "It is difficult to foresee the movement developing in Turkey and its progress with the assistance of Labour Government in England. We can only express our wishes, that the MacDonald Administration, which is entirely built in the first place for British patriotism, will at the same time prove its true and solid opinions of international peace and justice, particularly that it will pursue an Eastern policy emancipated from greed and accordance with that gentleman's saying, as we know from Gladstone's time. On this score the new British Government deserves to be welcomed with satisfaction by us."

I have &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON

[E 1302 448/44] No. 26

Note on the Economic Aspect of the Lausanne Peace Settlement. (Communicated by Mr. Payne, Board of Trade, February 8, Received February 11.)

IN the sphere of commercial relations the Treaty of Lausanne had, of course, not to provide for the application of the past but for the resumption of international trade on a proper footing. As regards the past, provision has been made for the material restoration of property belonging to aliens or Turkish owners, and, as in the case of the other treaties of peace, a mixed arbitral tribunal is to be set up to deal with questions of dispute. Further provision has been made for the maintenance in force for certain specified classes of contracts of a separate Convention providing for the restoration of concessions which had been interfered with before the break of war and for other matters to form the subject of future negotiations. This restoration of concessions applies particularly to the Turkish railway concessions. No clear or effective procedure is laid down for the determination, recovery of debts, but it is provided in the Treaty itself that the Treaty agreed upon into contracts under which they arose.

As regards the future conduct of commerce between Great Britain and Turkey, a separate Convention provides for the most-favoured-nation treatment of British goods. The Turkish customs tariff was originally under the capitulations 11 per cent. *ad valorem*, and recently, with the consent of the Powers, was raised to 15 per cent. *ad valorem*, at which it stood just before the war. Negotiations were in progress before the war with a view to a further increase to 30 per cent., during the war the tariff was raised to 30 per cent., and in March 1916 a tariff which was screwed up to the eighteenth part of this figure. Under the Treaty of Lausanne the Allies have succeeded in maintaining against Turkey that the tariff of 8 per cent. should be applied to their goods for the period of the Convention, seven years. The duties are to be regarded provisionally as fiscal duties only, varying with the level of exchange, but to be applied on the basis of the depreciation of Turkish paper money in relation to the sterling.

Generally speaking, Turkey grants to Great Britain and other Allies most-favoured-nation treatment in commercial matters, as to dues on shipping, and treatment as well subject to the provision that the existing trade and port services are reserved to the Turkish flag.

The Treaty contains provisions respecting the status of residence and business and protection affords protection for Anglo-Turkish banks and companies operating in Turkey which takes the place of that afforded previously by the capitulations. This Convention gives British subjects the right to establish themselves in Turkey and to engage in any kind of business they may carry on there, and to own such business, they are further protected from any higher taxation than is imposed on Turkish nationals. It is moreover provided that in order to ensure that the judicial system in Turkey shall be fully independent, foreign judges, European legal counsellors selected from a list to be drawn up by the Permanent Court of International Justice will be taken into the Turkish service for a period of five years.

Board of Trade, February 8, 1924.

[E 1323 1323/44] No. 27

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald. (Received February 12.)

(No. 95)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 4, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the annual report for 1923 on the schools of missions in Turkey.

2. The portions between asterisks are taken from the report for 1922.

I have &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON

Enclosure in No. 27

Report on Heads of Missions

France

GENERAL PELLE after having been somewhat ostentatiously omitted from the first Lausanne Conference was appointed principal French delegate during the second stage. He has been described in previous reports. His principal characteristics are great astuteness, extreme lucidity of mind and a persuasive charm without any great personality. I have always found him a most loyal and helpful colleague. Unfortunately, in spite of his own loyalty, he has not sufficient strength of character to check the disloyalty of some of his subordinates. He is asked by the Turks and his reappointment here which is said to be probable, would be well received.

Since April M. Jesse Conty has been in charge of the French High Commission. M. Jesse's last foreign post was Peking. He served during the war at the Quai d'Orsay where he was Chef du Bureau du Levant. He is a friendly though very reserved colleague, and is extraordinarily stolid and phlegmatic for a Frenchman. He professes no great love for M. Pontarce and has never concealed his disgust at the attitude of France during the Chanak crisis. He has no love for the Turk but spends most of his spare time in the Bazaars.

Throughout the year Colonel Morgan has been in attendance at Angora; theoretically as representative of the French High Commissioner for Syria but practically as representative of the French Government. The French High Commissioner here has a very low opinion of Colonel Morgan's capacity. General Pelle has described him as being certainly loyal, honest and brave, a Frenchman who would like to see minarets on Notre Dame. His party are regarded as worthless owing to their blind pro-Turkishness. He is now on leave and will probably not return to Angora.

Italy

M. Marsan, the Italian Acting High Commissioner, is the father-in-law of Sir Harry Lamb. His acquaintance with Turkey dates from prior to the Berlin Congress when he already held a consular post in Constantinople. He was at one time Italian Minister in Tehran and was High Commissioner here before the arrival of the Marquis Garroni. He was subsequently Governor of Rhodes. Since his return here he has never been more than Acting High Commissioner, in order that Marquis Garroni, who has a pension, might enjoy the emoluments of the post. He is an amiable old man, his chief merit was attributed to great moments of crisis owing to his excessive obstinateness and his dislike to putting in any action distasteful to Angora. He is nevertheless sincerely devoted to activity by M. Massoni, who hates and fears more than the Turks. His passion for letters and love of minor issues is most a stumbling-block at times when the Allied representatives have to consider and take counsel together. He is somewhat introspective by nature and inclined at the High Commissioner's meetings at this Embassy to put in his pocket the pencils and pipe placed before him. On one occasion he removed a large sheet of letter paper which he was greedily and frankly appropriating, was taking away owing to its superior quality to that supplied to the Italian High Commission.

I imagine that he will retire into private life as soon as M. Montagna is appointed to succeed him.

United States of America

"I think it is put that the American Government have not long ago sent out a career diplomatist to take charge of the United States High Commission. I cannot bring myself altogether to trust Admiral Bristol.

Admiral Bristol and his wife entertain a great deal in a simple way. They are both devoted to dancing and I am told are frequently to be seen at Maxim's and other similar places in this town."

Japan

Mr. Ushida returned to Japan in the summer. He visited Angora before leaving and was received by Mustafa Kemal.

Since his departure Mr. Akio Kosaka has been Acting High Commissioner. He talks English reasonably well, and has followed in Mr. Ushida's footsteps in endeavouring to shine in local society. He plays golf with one of his secretaries.

Persia

Prince Isaac Khan Mofakham-ud-Dovleh Isaac Khan was appointed Persian Ambassador in Constantinople in 1922. He is an elderly gentleman of distinguished appearance and pleasant manners. He has had a long career in the Diplomatic Service and was Ambassador in Rome before coming here. The main object of his appointment was to put an end to the scandals at the Persian Embassy and colony which for a couple of years had brought the former into general contempt. In this object he has succeeded. He was not a little embarrassed in the latter part of 1922 by the arrival at Angora of Mumtaz-ed-Dowleh who was sent there apparently without his knowledge.

Isaac Khan detests the Nationalists. His feelings in this respect were aggravated by the fact of his mission to Angora in the summer of 1923 when he went there to present letters of recall. After waiting there for a week he was not allowed to present them owing to their being addressed to the Grand National Assembly instead of to Mustafa Kemal personally. Isaac Khan was very sensitive to the humiliation to which he had been exposed. He has at one time desired to be removed elsewhere if possible as Persian delegate to the League of Nations.

He is known to be a genuine supporter of good relations between Great Britain and Persia.

The Vatican

Mgr. Ernesto Filippi has been in charge of the Apostolic delegation since the 14th August last. His arrival ended the interregnum due to the prolonged absence of Mgr. Dolci during which Mgr. Testa was in charge. He is a very quiet prelate, carried on the work. To all and sundry however Mgr. Filippi is here not as delegate but as Apostolic Visitor. Instructions must have been made in order to avoid anything which might raise the thorny question of the French protectorate of the Church, if only by having to face the problem of the French representative's precedence at any official ceremony which the newly arrived prelate might hold on taking possession of his post. Mgr. Filippi, who is perhaps about 50 years of age, has had a long career in the Diplomatic Service of the Vatican in its most important previous posts having been that of Apostolic delegate in Canada and Mexico. He was recalled from the latter country some time ago owing to a dispute with the Mexican Government. He is a good example of the typical Vatican diplomatist, intelligent, quiet in demeanour and I believe cultured. He speaks French well but has a Turkish-oleate of English. Some weeks after his arrival here he presented Mustafa Kemal Pasha with £T 5,000 for the relief of Moslem immigrants and refugees. He recently visited Angora but stayed there only a few days. His principal preoccupation appears at present to be to know when the Peace Treaty will come into force and how it will affect the interests of His Church in Turkey, especially from the point of view of its effect on the special position still claimed by the French. He is very much in general diplomatic society here. I give my impressions of him at second hand as I have not yet made his personal acquaintance.

Spain

"The Spanish Minister M. Severt y Vest is the lever of the Ministers. He has spent most of his career in South America and finds the climate somewhat trying. Owing to the difficulty of finding suitable quarters in Constantinople itself he lives rather an isolated life at Buyuk Dere where he spends the whole year. He is a quiet man of literary tastes."

Belgium

"M. Michotte de Welle was Belgian Minister at Belgrade when the war broke out. His personal effects there were plundered whilst his property in Belgium was likewise stripped. His wife lost her family possessions in France. These misfortunes have saddened a man who was expressed to me as a very nervous. He lives at a fine legation which until recently was sparsely furnished. He has now ordered to receive. He states that there is a minister's amount of work to do presumably in connection with the electric light and tramway companies which are Belgian concerns. He is very bitter about the Italian High Commissioner for insisting that his daughter-in-law should take precedence of Mme. Michotte de Welle."

Denmark

M Wandel plays no part whatever and is much seen at big parties. He recently married a Levantine lady.

Sweden

M Wallenberg realised on his arrival that he was under suspicion of having been very pro-German during the war. The fact that he is in charge of German interests here is to the credit of his astuteness, but he works hard to dispel this legend that he is German philé. After the conclusion of the Prisoners Exchange Agreement with the Angora Government some of the returned Turks did not hesitate to state in the Neutral press that they had been badly treated at Malta and had suffered indignities there. M Wallenberg procured a report from the Swedish consul at Malta on the treatment of the Turks. This report was very favourable to the British authorities, and M Wallenberg sent to them a communication relating to the Turkish Government.

M Wallenberg goes a great deal for Turkish society, and Turks are always to be found at his evening parties. In fact he rallies Turks on the virtues of his Allied colleagues.

Mme Wallenberg is a good natured lady who mours for the unending stream of visitors. She is somewhat strident voiced, which breaks in shrewdly on her husband's dinner.

Holland

Baron Rengers's last post was at Rome. Unlike the majority of one's diplomatic colleagues at Constantinople he never loses the hall mark of the diplomatist de carrière. He does not appreciate Constantinople as a post. He is fond of wine and after dinner can be very exacting. Owing to the Dutch Legation being in charge of Austrian interests he has a certain amount of work to do, otherwise most of his time is spent in frequenting places where he can get the opportunity of drinking or of seeing a pretty woman.

Roumania

M Filalti the Roumanian Minister was a colleague of mine at Nish during the war. He has been absent a good deal from his post and was employed in 1922 as Roumanian delegate in the negotiations with the Soviet at Warsaw. He is a learned man. He is short and round with a keen sense of his own humour. He conceals much shrewdness beneath a jovial exterior and his apparent bonhomie does not prevent him from being exceedingly caustic at the expense of others.

Jugoslavia

M Chaponitch was succeeded by M Gifkovitch in the course of 1922. M Gifkovitch is not very attractive and has a thirst for information which he seeks to slake at inappropriate moments. He does not strike me as being very reliable.

Bulgaria

During the greater part of 1923 a General Markov resided off and on in Constantinople in a sort of unofficial capacity. Towards the end of the year however the Bulgarian Government appointed M Simeon Radev to be its official representative here. He is a man with considerable diplomatic experience having been Bulgarian Minister in Bucharest from 1913 to 1916, and subsequently at The Hague where I met him for one of Mr Lessare's receptions. He is stated to have been removed owing to irregularities in his accounts. Though he is of somewhat shady and shifty appearance this story seems impossible in view of his subsequent appointment as second Bulgarian delegate to the League of Nations. In spite of his appearance I like the little that I have seen of him. He is a keen student of history more particularly of the period about the Berlin Congress. He recently read to me extracts from a secret agreement signed by Andrassy and Sir Henry Elliott which had been under the discussion at Vienna and which constituted a definite agreement between Great Britain and Austria as to the views which those two Powers would support at the Berlin Congress. He told me with great pride that the existence of this agreement had hitherto been unknown and that he proposed to have it published in England.

Czechoslovakia

The Czechoslovak representative M Svetlik is married to a Miss Armstrong of Australian origin. I know him but little but he gives one the impression of being heavy and uninteresting. Most people describe him as a deadly bore.

Poland

M Baronowski is the Polish delegate. He was employed on propaganda work in Switzerland during a part of the war and was afterwards at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Warsaw. He has quite a number of Polish subjects around Constantinople including the Polish farming colony started in Anatolia several miles from the entrance to the Black Sea. He gives receptions which are very good affairs and is evidently keen on playing a part socially.

Greece

The Spanish Legation was in charge of Greek interests throughout the year. As soon as the Spanish Minister was appointed the post was a sinecure and such actions as were taken on behalf of the Greeks was generally as the result of unofficial action by the High Commissioner. On the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne formally Greece M Jean Politis was appointed Greek Chargé des Affaires to reside at Angora. After the opening of the Straits of Dardanelles M Politis left Constantinople with his staff for Angora. Here business was planned with the opposition party and the Turkish Government. There is no Greek Consular officer in Constantinople. M Politis served until Greek delegation of Prisoners and Deserters was likely to cease to take up their duties with exceedingly disagreeable difficult posts.

The diplomatic missions of the following countries have been permanently represented at Angora throughout the year and I am not personally acquainted with the heads of them :—

Russia

M Aralov whose activities and influence at Angora throughout 1922 and 1923 have been very great was recalled in April last probably in great part as the result of the attitude of the Turkish delegation at Lausanne. He was succeeded there by Chukhin, a nominee of M Soviet Ambassador to Italy, over the Soviet trade representative at Constantinople and held several posts in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The last objection M Soviet has raised to the conclusion of the Lausanne Convention is that their representatives at that Conference have not been accredited to the Government of the Grand National Assembly at Angora. In fact, the Turks have steadfastly refused to recognise the diplomatic capacity of M Sokolnikoff who came to Constantinople last February as a sort of Bolshevik consul to deal with passport matters. M Sokolnikoff was compelled unfortunately to close his office and leave Constantinople together with the other Russian Government officials at this city, were likewise recently ordered to leave Angora by the Soviet authorities, December last. The Embassy itself is now occupied by M Potemkine the so-called Soviet delegate for the repatriation of Russians.

There is also in Constantinople a Russian trade delegation of which the head is a M Zolotarev.

Afghanistan

The Afghan representative is a certain Sultan Ahmed Khan who appears to play a very minor rôle.

[E 1330/1330 44] No. 28

Sir Rendel to the Marquess of Curzon — *Received February 12*

(No. 102)

Sir *Constantinople, February 9, 1924*

IN view of the possibility of the early ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne by His Britannic Majesty I have the honour to forward herewith a memorandum prepared by Mr. Forbes Adam in regard to various questions which will be constituted by the entry into force of the treaty and the effect which they will make upon the British official staff here.

2. I submit for consideration the question whether it would be desirable to bring up to date the information contained in the memorandum circulated in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office in September last (see Foreign Office print "Turkey No. 3 (1923)") and, if so, whether a detailed estimate in general way and so far as this is possible, of the contingencies which may be thrown on the British official staff here.

3. The Board of Trade will, I presume, be prepared to issue a similar warning to the Board of Education and Departments concerned with such matters as those affected by the following articles: 65, 66, 69, 70, 75, 77, 78, 80, 87, 89, and 91 of the treaty with special reference to the schools question. Some of these articles

I have &c.
NEVILLE HENDERSON

ENCLOSURE No. 28

Note of the Work likely to be thrown upon the British Embassy at Constantinople by the Ratification and Entry into Force of the Treaty of Lausanne

THE following are the matters which will emerge on the treaty coming into force and which seem likely to affect Constantinople and involve work on the staff here:—

Political

(a) *Boundaries of Demilitarised Zones and Thracian Frontier Commission* (*Articles 2 and 5*)

Establishment of commission within fifteen days of *Bulgarian* ratification (Greece and Turkey having already ratified). Brigadier-General Nicholls will *follow* closely with the Great Powers representatives into force of the treaty.

Preliminary discussions with Foreign Office officials and Indian Legal Commissioner are said to have taken place in November last. The three Allied Ambassadors have subsequently received certain proposals regarding the rank and pay of commissioners and these proposals have been sent home to get the Government's decision before approaching the Turkish Government but no despatch to the Foreign Office has pointed out that the Turks could naturally be expected to object to any scheme of which they had not been given their own arrangements with the commissioners.

(b) *Boundary Demilitarised Zone on the Straits* (*Articles 141 and 20*)

Establishment of commission within fifteen days of the entry into force of the convention (or treaty as the case may be). We do not believe that the Turks appreciate the importance of this, but it is obvious that the boundary between the demilitarised zone and Paris and Rome

(c) *Turko-Irak Boundary*

Turkish views are not at present known. Although His Majesty's Government regard discussions as provided by the protocol of the 5th October 1918

which date under the Evacuation Protocol the nine months' period during which an attempt is to be made to fix the frontier by Turco-British Agreement runs. There is every reason to believe that the Turks will be ready to start discussions however, when Great Britain ratifies the treaty, or at furthest when the treaty comes into force. Unless the new Cabinet change the line to be adopted here, preliminary discussions will then probably begin under Sir P. Loraine with assistance from Irak Arab adviser and one British official from Irak. Colonel Jardine is reported to have been appointed as the latter while according to press reports Gabriel Noradounghian has been appointed by the Irak Government as their agent.

(d) *Straits Commission to sit at Constantinople*

Although no time limit for its constitution is laid down in the treaty its establishment is certainly intended in the spirit of the treaty. His first official work will be the calculation of Black Sea fleet units as, under terms of article 2, Commander MacDonald has been appointed British representative.

(e) *Sanitary ad hoc Liquidation Commission* (*Article 116 of the Treaty*)

No time limit is set for its constitution, but presumably it will begin its work soon after the entry into force of the treaty.

His Majesty's Government have appointed Dr. Clemow as their representative.

(f) *Graves on Gallipoli Peninsula* (*Articles 130, 133 and 134*)

On the coming into force of the treaty the Imperial War Graves Commission (representing His Majesty's Government) have to appoint (*a*) a permanent commissioner, (*b*) a permanent organisation for the maintenance &c. of the graves and (*c*) special Constantinople to work under (*b*). No time limit is set for these appointments. Sir F. Ware will be able to tell us how the matter stands.

Financial

(g) *Calculation of Annuities and Capital of Debt as redistributed* (*Articles 47 and 49*)

The Ottoman Debt Council will proceed to the liquidation of the Ottoman Debt at Constantinople within three months of the coming into force of the treaty. A representative of the Colonial Office or representatives of Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan are entitled to, and presumably will, attend all meetings here to check their allotments.

N.B. The registration of the capital debt will take place at Paris, with a moratorium after the coming into force of the treaty regarding the annuities.

(h) *Turkish Reparation Commission*

It is said to be established on the coming into force of the treaty but through the original intention of the drafters of the convention was to have Constantinople the seat of the commission it is now at least where it will sit. Commander Earle is understood to be the British representative.

Economic

(i) *Mixed Arbitral Tribunal* (*Articles 92, 96 and 97*) *at Constantinople*

An Anglo-Turkish tribunal will be established here within three months of the coming into force of the treaty, each Government appointing one member and the two Governments choosing a president by agreement. If two Governments fail to agree within the above period to an agreement as to the person to be appointed secretary general of the tribunal and as to the establishments of the president and secretary general (article 97). The possible appointment of sub-secretaries to sit in any other part of Turkey (e.g. Smyrna) may follow in due course. Each Government will appoint agents to appear before it.

We do not know what appointments His Majesty's Government contemplate.

(j) *Establishment Convention* (*Article 4 Separate Protocol Convention*)

Within one year from the coming into force of the treaty, His Majesty's Government will have to negotiate a separate convention regulating the question of the

admission of British subjects in Turkey and reciprocally Turkish subjects in the United Kingdom (British Empire possibly) to various professions and industries.

We do not know what procedure for appointment His Majesty's Government contemplate.

(k) *Establishment Convention (Article 19, Notification of Non-adhesion of Dominions &c.*

At the time of the coming into force of the treaty the Foreign Office will have to instruct Consuls to the ratification (if any) to be made by the Turkish Government regarding the non-application of its provision to any Dominion colony &c. We know that the Colonial Office were taking the necessary steps to enable them to do this.

(l) *Commercial Convention (Article 9) and Exchange of Letters re Cabotage.*

Within six months of the 1st January 1924 the three British lines, named in the exchange of letters as entitled to maintain the cabotage trade will have to open and conclude negotiations with the Turkish Government. They are to be able to continue the services for a further period of two years. The treaty text does not make it clear whether the two years' period runs from the 1st January 1924 or from the date on which the negotiations are to take place. We do not know why or what precisely or whether here or at Angora the Turks intend to conduct the negotiations but the companies concerned are aware of the position and are understood to have deputed representatives of Constantinople or the negotiations. In the case of the Khedivial Company's vessels Messrs Cuthbert Walker & Co. were to represent them and we asked that the latter should be the firm with whom the shipping negotiate and how the Turkish Government proposed that the negotiators should be accredited.

(m) *Commercial Convention (Article 8 Reciprocal Most Favoured Nation Customs Treatment.*

There is a possibility that on or before ratification of the treaty of 1923 having to make a declaration to the Turkish Government or exchange letters with them as to India's north west frontier trade. In any event instructions from London.

(n) *Commercial Convention (Article 16 Declarations of Non-adhesion of Dominions &c.* (see above under (k))

(o) *Commercial Convention (Article 15) Separate Convention regarding Records, Registers and Designs &c.*

Same remarks as regards the ratification time but after the coming into force of the treaty may be required by Laws, Palestine and Transjordania if so they will have to be registered here or at Angora presumably during the course of this year but no precise information seems likely on this point.

(p) *Concessions Protocol (Article 2 (1)) Armstrong Whitworth Lurkers and Co's Concession.*

Negotiations will have to be undertaken, presumably here or at Angora, by this company with the Turkish Government as soon as possible after the entry into force of the treaty for the modification of their pre-war concessions or for the grant of a new concession or an undertaking of equal importance.

(q) *Concessions Protocol (Articles 1, 3, 4 and 5) and the Unilateral Turkish Declaration attached to the Protocol.*

Various British concessionary companies and Turkish companies in which before the 1st August 1914 British capital was preponderant will have to take up with the Turkish Government presumably at Angora as soon as possible after the entry into force of the treaty, the question of the settlement of accounts and the readaptation of their concessions. If no agreement is reached within one year between the companies and the Turkish Government article 6 provides for settlement by specially selected experts.

Presumably the companies concerned can be left at any rate to take the initial steps of approaching the Turkish Government as to place of negotiations and procedure. The Aidin Railway Company has already made considerable progress with the preliminaries of their negotiations for the settlement of accounts contemplated in their own agreement with the Turkish Government.

(r) *Anatolian Railway.*

The letter addressed by Ismet Pasha on the 24th July 1923 to the president of the Third Committee of the Lausanne Conference provides, *inter alia*, for the recapitulation of the Anatolian Railway Company's concession a third of a year of the coming into force of the treaty.

The Anatolian Railway Company can be left to look after their own interests unless and until they approach us.

(s) *Pre-war Claims.*

Under article 71 all claims the subject of discussion before the war may have to be reopened and their settlement pressed on the Turks.

Lastly it may be borne in mind that a proposal was discussed during September October and November for the general question of the settlement of such minor matters as appointments to commissions, salaries and organisation of commissions, &c. by the diplomatic representatives of the signatory Powers conferred here, which, the representatives of the three principal Allies and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to preside in rotation. The Italians agreed to this proposal. The French have apparently never stated their views, but Ismet Pasha was so opposed to the whole proposal that we suggested to the Foreign Office in November that it should be dropped unless and until experience proved its necessity and the matter could be pressed on the Turks on the basis of such a necessity.

It is difficult to estimate in advance precisely what work or therefore how much extra work will be thrown on the staff of this High Commission (Chancery and Drug-manning and on the consul-general's staff by the coming into force of the treaty and the subsequent initiation of the various negotiations referred to above and the establishment of the various commissions. It seems probable however that very soon after the entry into force of the treaty the following negotiations will open here and the following commissions, &c. be established:

1. *Thracian Demilitarised Zones.*

This commission will presumably have its headquarters here and one or two preliminary meetings in Constantinople but most of the work will afterwards be done on the spot. Doubtless the Turks could provide accommodation for the preliminary meetings.

Not much extra work should be thrown on us by this.

2. *Straits Demilitarised Zones.*

Same observations as regard Thracian demilitarised zones.

3. *Turco-Irak Boundary.*

Presumably the Turks will provide accommodation here for these negotiations. Unless the present Government have some compromise frontier to propose it is difficult to foresee many meetings for close negotiation. While therefore we may have to provide a secretary for the negotiations this is uncertain as the Colonial Office may send out a man in addition to Colonel Jardine), not much extra work should be thrown on the chancery and cyphering staff.

4. *Straits Commission.*

There seems no real reason why any general assistance should be required from the High Commission. The commission will have to make arrangements for its own secretariat after it meets and there seems no need for representation in the secretariat by every nation represented on the commission itself. Presumably there

will not be much reporting home required either by despatch or telegram The Turks can and will probably provide the necessary accommodation Indeed it has been announced in the press that a building at Taphané is already being prepared

5 *Sanitary Commission*

The Sanitary Commission can probably provide their own secretariat without calling on the High Commission's staff, nor should there be much reporting home required

6 *Graves*

The Imperial War Graves Commission as now will presumably provide their staff for the various commissions and organisations at Gallipoli Some extra work will be thrown on us, however, as the result of the inevitable discussions with the Turks and the consequent increase in correspondence

7 *Debt Annuities*

The Colonial Office or Irak &c representatives may require to telegraph through us a certain amount regarding the redistribution of the debt annuities The clerical work will become at the Ottoman Public Debt offices

8 *Mixed Arbitral Tribunal*

Presumably the Turks will provide accommodation and no extra work will be thrown on the Chancery

9 *The Turkish Reparation Commission*

With the Greek assets here will presumably cause us a certain amount of extra correspondence regarding Lausanne & that it will presumably provide its own secretarial staff If it meet in Constantinople the three Allied High Commissioners will have to arrange to provide it with the necessary accommodation and it is not clear at first sight where this is to be found

10 *Separate Conventions regarding Professions and the Surrender of Registers &c under the Establishment and Competence of Consulates*

These negotiations may have to take place at Angora It is too early to foresee whether any extra work will be thrown on the Embassy in consequence

11 *The Various Concessionary Negotiations*

Will be direct between the companies concerned and the Turkish Government They will probably therefore take place at Angora In any case apart from extra correspondence not much increase of work should be caused to the Embassy

12 *Pre-War Claims*

Will certainly entail an increase of correspondence and therefore a good deal of extra work for the dragomanate

To sum up it should be possible for the existing Embassy staff to cope with the increase of clerical work in holding up other work which seems likely to be thrown on them by the entry into force of the treaty But this is only on the assumption that the registry remains at its present strength, that no claim is made on the dragomanate staff to provide for the needs of the consulate general and that separate representation at Angora does not materialise at any rate until the new negotiations are well under way and the commissions are established and working smoothly By then experience which should be available before the end of March when Mr Walton's appointment as cypher officer terminates) may prove that even in the absence of separate representation at Angora Mr Waltons services may be indispensable to us as a second cypher officer or part time cypher officer and part time registry clerk

As stated above however it is very difficult to foresee now what actual increase in the volume of our work will be caused by all these new organisations and negotiations.

Incidentally we shall presumably be responsible for finding accommodation for all the officials sent out here to negotiate but this should be available at Tokatlian's or the Pera Palace.

[E 1332, 32 44] No 29

Mr Henderson to Mr MacDonald (Received February 12)

(No 104)

Sir *Constantinople February 6 1924*

WITH reference to my despatch No 63 of the 23rd January I have the honour to acquaint you that there has been little change in the internal political situation in Turkey during the last fortnight except in the matter of Ismet Pasha's relations with Ali Fethi Pasha (Mr Rumbold's despatch No 80 of the 30th January) There have however been certain incidents which, though for the most part of little intrinsic importance, are sufficiently significant to be worth recording

2 The Court of Independence has continued at intervals of a few days to hear the cases against the lighterman and others accused of plotting against the life of Ismet Pasha These proceedings have excited little interest On the 2nd January the Public Prosecutor asked for the death penalty in five cases, namely that of Lazo who disappeared when his arrests were originally made, under article 170 of the Criminal Code of the Law of Treason and Rebellion of the 4th March 1920 and the other four accused under article 55 of the same Code of the Lighterman Ali Osman and Messrs Rumbold Bennett and Company's employés Ismet Effendi and Ali Rizza Effendi The Public Prosecutor asked for the confiscation of the property belonging to the first two accused, who were politically the most important persons implicated in the plot, and for imprisonment for life or for terms of years in the case of the remaining three accused

Meanwhile the Grand National Assembly had elected Ismet Pasha on the 25th January to succeed Rauf Bey as Prime Minister and President of the Council of Ministers Since then the Assembly has been occupied with the discussion of the Budget and the Law of Finance and has passed the latter Law on the 31st January The Budget is now under discussion in the Finance Committee

3 An incident which occurred at Angora has tended to intensify the hostility between the Republican Party as Deputies and journalists – the two most vocal elements in the community – which culminated on the 23rd January in certain Anti Salih members of the Assembly having assaulted by force Salih Effendi the Editor of the Tanine a Republican paper which had been the most violent of the opposition papers in its attacks on the Government and on Ismet Pasha in particular Salih Effendi had published in the Tanine on the 22nd January a letter addressed to him by Ali Fethi Pasha in which the latter had declared that the Republican Party was in danger of disruption and that the Government was responsible for this state of affairs Salih Effendi had also published in the Tanine on the 23rd January a letter addressed to him by Rauf Bey in which the latter had declared that he had resigned from the Presidency of the Republican Party because he had found that the Government was responsible for the disorganisation of the Party Salih Effendi had also published in the Tanine on the 23rd January a letter addressed to him by Kiazim Karabekir Pasha in which the latter had declared that he had resigned from the Presidency of the Republican Party because he had found that the Government was responsible for the disorganisation of the Party

is now very commonly practised among [illegible] proper [illegible] to [illegible] by the [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] with law [illegible]

[illegible] &
NEVILL HENDERSON

E 1432 634 44

E 3115/76/44

Ambassadors in Paris and Rome on the 30th November 1922 instructing them to point out to the Governments to which they were accredited that it might fairly be considered attempt to impose the Greco-Turkish Armistice and prolong the neutrality of the Allies, that the best chance of peace was contained by the danger of hostilities between the Turkish forces and those of the three principal Allies in Turkey, and that we should therefore be on the last degree imprudent if the Allied Governments, who were admittedly unable to reinforce their own troops in Turkey were to allow the continued supply of arms to the Turkish forces. In view of these considerations the French and Italian Governments were to be urged to take all possible steps to prevent any military supplies from reaching Kemal from French or Italian sources.

E 373/76/44

8. The French and Italian Governments agreed to this urgent request that no permits for the export of arms to Turkey were accordingly allowed until the conclusion of the settlement at Lausanne.

E 8,87 15/44
E 3, 15/44

9. On the ratification of the peace settlement the Turkish Government pressed that the danger of such supplies from Great Britain no longer existed, and after further consultation with the French and Italian Governments, it was decided on the 7th December 1922 that the embargo on the export of arms to Turkey which had been imposed as the result of the conversations of December 1922 should be withdrawn.

E 78 252 9-
E 90 12-2 95.
177 177

E 1661 1031 44

10. Since that date several British firms have applied to His Majesty's Government for licences to export arms &c. to Turkey. The Ottoman Bank (Limited) has asked for assistance in obtaining a concession from the Turkish Government for the establishment of a munition factory in Turkey. These applications were at first provisionally referred to the American Department with the hope that the Arms Traffic Convention would result in the export of arms from this country.

E 1903 1031 44

In consequence of these representations it was thought advisable to ascertain privately whether the French Government would be prepared to agree with His Majesty's Government that the Arms Traffic Convention should be brought into force by the decision of the Supreme Council of the 21st August, so far as Asia Minor was concerned. It was pointed out that the two strongest signatories would not be enabling the exceptional treatment to Turkey that was made for the present at least. Turkish territory was explained to consist of the interior of the Asiatic mass, the access to which was from all sides, and the principal objects of the Arms Traffic Convention would be defeated if Turkey might legitimately receive arms in any quantities she pleased.

E 1903 100 1 44

Although objections to permitting the export of arms to Turkey had thus been conveyed to the French Government, the latter indicated unofficially that His Majesty's Government would look with favour on a further proposal to obtain a concession for the establishment of munition factories in Turkey, and would give their most sympathetic consideration to the matter.

A 7078 1252 95

13. The French and Belgian Governments were informed of the information received from the United States Government that the Turkish Government had applied to the latter for permission to purchase arms in the United States, and that the United States Government had replied that they would be glad to see American capital employed in the manufacture of arms in Turkey, but that they could not grant licences for the export of arms from the United States to Turkey.

78 252 44
E 1084 1031 44
E 15 10031 44

The Czechoslovak Government have now stated that they propose to grant licences for the export of arms to Turkey, and have asked that the United States Government should co-operate with them in this matter.

E 1082 98 90

14. The Greek Government have also expressed complete agreement with the views of His Majesty's Government, and have undertaken to refrain from granting licences for the export of arms to Turkey. They pointed out, however, that they had no power to prevent the export of arms from Greek ports in Greek ships.

A 7078 1252 95

15. The United States Government expressed general agreement with the policy of preventing arms from reaching Turkey. They asked for further information as to the extent to which, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the policy was likely to prove effective, and pointed out that the fact that a European Turkey was not included in the prohibited zone was likely seriously to interfere with its success. In any case they would not be able to undertake to do more than to discourage the flotation of any foreign

loan in the United States for the purpose of armament, and to refuse support to United States citizens in their efforts they might make to promote the manufacture of arms. Turkey might still purchase arms to Turkey in other countries. This, of course, as the Board of Trade have pointed out, would be less effective than as long as they by His Majesty's Government, would effectively prohibit the export of all arms and munitions to Turkey from the United Kingdom.

A 675/98/44

16. The Belgian Government replied that they were willing to co-operate in our policy, but only on condition that the other Powers to whom we had addressed representations on this subject also agreed to it.

A 7027/98/9.

17. The Italian Government pointed out the inexpediency of the present policy of preventing arms from reaching Turkey, and stated that in consequence of instructions to refuse the embargo of December 1922 (see paragraph 8 above) had been asked for further explanations on this point before taking any action.

A 2-2 98/9.

18. The French Government have now replied that they do not regard the Arms Traffic Agreement as having been brought into force with regard to Turkey, but that was because it was not regarded as advisable to bring Turkey under the Arms Traffic Convention. They have since decided that in view of the terms of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 (see paragraph above), and the change in the export of arms to Turkey of December 1922 (see paragraph above), which was based for purely political reasons at that time, they do not propose to maintain the embargo. They consider, however, that the question should be kept under consideration, and that they would like to have the opinion of His Majesty's Government on the subject before they take any further steps in the matter.

A 508 98/9.

19. Meanwhile unexpected difficulties have arisen in regard to the sale of certain British firms concerned. The Nobel Industries, Limited, having the concession of His Majesty's Government, were entitled to proceed with the Turkish Government have been in the factory question, and it seems possible that the Ottoman Bank may also be found that as they have a Government guarantee they may be able to export from this country. Messrs. Vickers and Armstrongs, Limited, have also been in communication with the Turkish Government with regard to the establishment of a factory for the manufacture of aeroplanes, and it is understood that the Turkish Government have given permits for certain consignments of revolvers for which they have applied from Constantinople, which, however, have been withheld. Messrs. Vickers, Limited, have also been in communication with the Turkish Government with regard to the establishment of a factory for the manufacture of aeroplanes, and it is understood that the Turkish Government have given permits for certain consignments of revolvers for which they have applied from Constantinople, which, however, have been withheld.

E 1084 1031 44
E 1903 100 1 44
A 7078 1252 95
A 804 177/95

20. Moreover, as a matter of fact, the proposed export of arms to European Turkey even from the point of view of the Arms Traffic Convention since European Turkey is not in the "prohibited zone" of arms traffic. European Turkey would not prevent their being transhipped to Asia Minor.

21. Meanwhile the Turkish Ambassador has written to Europe to procure large quantities of material in this country, and the Air Ministry are apparently ready to welcome them to this country. There is reason to believe that the French are prepared to undertake to supply the Turks with any military aeroplanes, material, stores, and even if necessary to send military instructors to Turkey. Numerous British firms have received orders from Constantinople for munitions of war, and have been informed privately that licences for the export of these articles will be granted.

E 1084 1031 44
E 15 10031 44
E 12000 15/44
E 11486 15/44
E 134 034 44

22. If there is any question of our reconsidering our present policy it would be best that the decision should be reached as soon as possible in order to reduce the risk of British firms losing orders unnecessarily.

G. W. RENDEL.

Foreign Office, February 12, 1924.

[E 1416 145 44] No 31

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr MacDonald *Received February 15*

(No 105) [By Bag]
(Telegraphic) *Paris February 14 1924*

YOUR telegram No 11 of 7th January

"Chamber reports that the Secrete Foreign Affairs Commission discussed the Lausanne Treaty on 13th February

No decisions were of course taken as the treaty is still under consideration by the Chamber Commission but M Herriot informed M Bompard that his own attitude remained unchanged Latter gathered from conversation that Commission as a whole was in favour of ratification M Victor Berard however is known to be opposed to Turkey and had he wished to let the results of further concessions to Turkey and the prestige of the East was concerned Bompard states that in support of this argument M de Lasteyrie urged that the concessions might in the starting point of a policy useful for French interests which would be satisfactory when were friendly relations between France and Turkey

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E 1512 109 44 No 32

Mr Beaumont to Mr MacDonald *Received February 18*

(No 89)
Sir *Athens February 8 1924*

WITH reference to my despatch No 809 of the 10th October last I have the honour to report that in carrying into execution the statistics stipulated by the Mixed Commission for the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations in accordance with the Convention of Lausanne of the 30th January 1923 and with a view to opening on 1st/22nd November last showed that there were 51 118 and 56 917 Moslems were then reported to Greece the latter figure being reported in the presence of the Mixed Commission the necessary facilities for the removal of their goods The above statistics are detailed as follows

From Salonica	30 402	have been transported
Cavala	6 659	
Carea	3 547	
Drama	5 254	
Cavalla	7 055	

The measures taken by the commission gave every cause to hope that the transport of these Moslems would be carried out in a humane manner

2 Thanks to the efforts of Mr Morgenthau of the American Near East Relief Society several thousands of these Greek subjects are at last being transported to Greece to join their families Those who left the ranks of the halt and maimed began to appear in the streets of Athens on Saturday

3 From Epirus deputy Governor reported that 41 472 Moslem inhabitants of the district of Preveza Gomenitza 9 760 recognised as Turks and as hostile to Christians with whom they lived in peace whilst 1 912 declared that they were Albanians These territories were later on commissioned and three or four months ago by the Governor General of Epirus who were confirmed in their decision to proceed to Turkey by first steamer Their informant stated that the people in question were aware that if they declared themselves to be Turks they would be included in the exchange of populations but they asserted that they wished to go to Asia Minor This gentleman who has many friends among these Moslems endeavoured to persuade them to declare themselves Albanians and so to remain in Epirus but they refused He was not able to state definitely what the 6 000 7 000 Moslems who inhabit the Preveza District had decided to do but thought it probable that they would also elect to leave Epirus He put the total Moslem population of Epirus at 24,000 or less

4 The same gentleman said that it was universally believed in Epirus that the murderers of the Italian mission were Albanians and he thought it probable that as soon as the incident had become forgotten the murderers would be discovered in Albania

(Copy to Constantinople No 4)

I have &c
C H BENTINCK

[E 1478 467/44] No 33

Mr Howden to Mr MacDonald *(Received February 18)*

(No 117)
Sir *Constantinople February 11 1924*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Major General Sir Fabian Ware, vice-chairman of the Imperial War Graves Commission arrived at Constantinople on the 7th instant His Excellency the High Commissioner has arranged for the necessary facilities to be granted to him and he was met at the station by a representative of the Vali of Afion Karahissar

2 Mr Bruce spent the day sightseeing and the 8th instant was spent by the Turks with motors for us all Lieutenant General Sir Fabian Ware together with Colonel Hughes, the Director of the Imperial War Graves Commission at Kingston upon Thames now in Asia Minor and myself left early in the morning by motor car for Ismid

3 Mr Bruce has informed Your Excellency by telegram of the journey and I will only add that the roads were in a shocking state and we were frequently compelled to leave the "Calypso" tower to Khabakoi, which we reached at 6 o'clock in the evening

4 The 9th February was spent visiting the cemeteries of the Gaba Tepe area, Lala Baba Beach and Suvla Bay Mr Bruce has already informed Your Excellency that he was shown round Kaba Tepe by Major Mackesy who appeared to be in charge of the whole area and who took great pains to point out everything of interest

5 Mr Bruce's suggestions as to the cemeteries which ought to be kept in order particularly the Lone Pine Cemetery, Australian Memorial Park, Johnston's Jolly and Chunuk Bair, are likely to produce the very best effect and will have brought home to the Turks the unpleasant fact that these cemeteries are Dominion property and that any interference with them by Australia or New Zealand might give rise to grave offence Lieutenant Colonel Hughes has also expressed the opinion that the Turkish authorities of the Australian and New Zealand troops during the war as soon as the Peace Treaty has been ratified and that Mr Bruce's suggestion that the Kaimakam of Gaba Tepe should have an interview with Mr Bruce, Sir F Ware and myself on the Saturday for the purpose of receiving definite instructions from Angora to facilitate in every way the work of the commission

6 I trust that the visit will be found to have been of good use and may prove to be a lasting one, and that Mr Bruce's observations to the Kaimakam will be faithfully reported to Angora There is however a fact to be recorded with, and by no means inconsiderable conviction among the Turks, that the cemeteries are a cloak for ulterior motives in connection with the Anzac Bay has more than once somewhat disagreeably referred to these suspicions In rebutting them I have suggested that those who had them should go down and see for themselves In speaking to the Kaimakam I expressed the hope that Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself would inspect the cemeteries on the work should be found to be finally completed I am of opinion that an official visit by the Prime Minister, who himself fought on the peninsula would, if it could be arranged at some date before Ramazan

7 Mr Bruce left Kabatepe on board HMS Chrysolite for Port Said I returned by road with the Head Quarters Staff to Ismid "Calypso" on the same day to Constantinople Sir F Ware was to remain at Anzac a few days longer, in order to have an opportunity of making a detailed inspection

8 I cannot refrain from taking this opportunity of a personal visit to Kaba to pay a warm tribute to the excellence of the work that in spite of climate and other difficulties and of Turkish mistrust and suspicion has been and is being performed by Colonel Hughes and the other members of the commission on

the peninsula. Colonel Ingress himself is most efficient and valuable officer with great driving power, and initiative. He is a recent acquisition to the Treasury staff and those of his personal friends who are dispersed in the world to be armed on with interest.

I was much impressed with the arrangement of the camel corps and the simple and good issue of the despatches. They assist in the easier highways of Europe a wonderful memorial of the mighty deeds of the rôle played by the British Empire in the great war.

I have, &c.
NEVILLE HENDERSON

[E 1480 640 44 No. 34

Mr. Ingram to Mr. MacDonald. Received February 20.

No. 12(1)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 6, 24.*

With reference to Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 18 of the 7th January last, I have the honour to forward herewith, in respect of despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna regarding the method to be adopted in the event of Turks becoming naturalised foreigners, a memorandum of the different kinds of naturalisation.

I am in communication with Mr. Fabricius by telegraph on this question, and will forward to you shortly the information which he will obtain from the Turkish authorities. Mr. Fabricius states that the Turkish Government have issued orders to the Turkish Consuls to prevent Greeks from employing those of their compatriots who have acquired Turkish nationality in the Greek boycotting movement.

For instance, the Greek Government recently refused to allow the Greek telegraph clerks to engage in political work against Turkey, and instructed their Consuls to withdraw from the Turkish telegraph offices those clerks who refused to obey. Similar orders were issued by the Turkish Government, and the Greek clerks were withdrawn from the Turkish offices.

Most of the important Turkish officials who are now in Constantinople have reported themselves to the Angora Government.

According to Mr. Fabricius, the Turkish Government have also issued orders that all Greek goods destined for Turkey should be stamped to show their origin.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

Enclosure in No. 34

Memorandum on Naturalisation in Turkey.

(No. 17)

Sir, *Smyrna, February 1, 1924.*

HAVING had occasion to report that the Greek authorities were forcing Greek subjects of Turkish origin to become naturalised Greeks, I have the honour to report that the Turkish Government have, in retaliation, issued orders that Greeks who have become naturalised Turks are to be treated as Turkish subjects, and are not to be allowed to leave Turkey without the permission of the Turkish Government.

2. This order has caused great alarm among Greeks who have become naturalised Turks. Many Greeks, both Ottoman and foreign, have become naturalised Turks in order to avoid military service, and to be able to trade in Turkey. Many Greeks have become naturalised Turks in order to avoid the Greek boycott, and to be able to trade in Turkey. Many Greeks have become naturalised Turks in order to avoid the Greek boycott, and to be able to trade in Turkey.

3. The Turkish Government have also issued orders that all Greeks who have become naturalised Turks are to be treated as Turkish subjects, and are not to be allowed to leave Turkey without the permission of the Turkish Government.

4. The Turkish Government have also issued orders that all Greeks who have become naturalised Turks are to be treated as Turkish subjects, and are not to be allowed to leave Turkey without the permission of the Turkish Government.

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8. The Turkish Government have also issued orders that all Greeks who have become naturalised Turks are to be treated as Turkish subjects, and are not to be allowed to leave Turkey without the permission of the Turkish Government.

9. The Turkish Government have also issued orders that all Greeks who have become naturalised Turks are to be treated as Turkish subjects, and are not to be allowed to leave Turkey without the permission of the Turkish Government.

10. The Turkish Government have also issued orders that all Greeks who have become naturalised Turks are to be treated as Turkish subjects, and are not to be allowed to leave Turkey without the permission of the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS

E 1482 1482 44 No. 35

Mr. Ingram to Mr. Henderson (Athens). (No. 2 of Constantinople despatch No. 2 of February 18.)

(No.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 11, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Greek Consul-General has left Constantinople for Smyrna. He did not apply for a visa to enter Turkey, but was informed that he would be allowed to enter Turkey on the understanding that he would not engage in any political activities. He left Constantinople on the 10th February, and arrived in Smyrna on the 11th February.

2. The Greek Consul-General has been in Constantinople for some time, and has been engaged in political activities. He has been in touch with the Greek Government, and has been in touch with the Greek Government, and has been in touch with the Greek Government.

3. The Greek Consul-General has been in Constantinople for some time, and has been engaged in political activities. He has been in touch with the Greek Government, and has been in touch with the Greek Government, and has been in touch with the Greek Government.

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9. The Greek Consul-General has been in Constantinople for some time, and has been engaged in political activities. He has been in touch with the Greek Government, and has been in touch with the Greek Government, and has been in touch with the Greek Government.

10. The Greek Consul-General has been in Constantinople for some time, and has been engaged in political activities. He has been in touch with the Greek Government, and has been in touch with the Greek Government, and has been in touch with the Greek Government.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS

3 Pte Marshall was sent for to see General Townshend & reply furnished at great length & with great ability & knowledge of the whole subject of the negotiations which were then proceeding between the Turkish Government & General Townshend

4 After a long interview with Nur-ul-Haq Bey the Commissioner left for Constantinople on the 17th inst. Before leaving he had asked for some further assurances regarding the safety of the garrison & Pte Marshall was requested to see him again & to inform him that it would be necessary for him to remain in Kut until the receipt of the Commissioner's reply. Pte Marshall whilst strongly pressed that the visit would be of no use & could lead to no result was unable to refuse the request & returned to Kut with Nur-ul-Haq Bey & remained in the town for 3 days during which time he had many interviews with the Commissioner & Turkish officers & was able to form a very clear opinion as to the intentions of the Turkish Government & the probable duration of the siege. He was also able to obtain a considerable amount of information as to the numbers & condition of the Turkish troops & the defences of Kut & Baghdad. On the 20th inst Pte Marshall left Kut with Nur-ul-Haq Bey & arrived at Baghdad on the 22nd inst. He was received by the Commissioner & Turkish officers with every courtesy & was lodged in the Commissioner's house. He was informed that the Commissioner had received instructions from Constantinople to the effect that he was to remain in Baghdad until the fate of Kut was decided. Pte Marshall was also informed that the Commissioner had received instructions to the effect that Pte Marshall was to be detained in Baghdad & was not to be allowed to return to Kut

[E 1696 448 44] No 37

Mr Lindsay to Mr MacDonald *Received February 2*

(No 131)

Sir *Constantinople February 1 1924*

I WROTE to you on the 31st ultimo reporting my arrival here on the 12th instant I took the first opportunity of seeing Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha and I enclose herewith a memorandum of the conversation which I had with him on the 13th instant I saw him again on the 15th instant and had a long conversation with him on the subject of the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I also saw Ismet Pasha on the 15th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Rauf Bey on the 16th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Fethi Bey on the 17th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Adnan Bey on the 18th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Refet Pasha on the 19th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 20th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 21st instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 22nd instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 23rd instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 24th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 25th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 26th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 27th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 28th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 29th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 30th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 31st instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 1st instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 2nd instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 3rd instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 4th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 5th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 6th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 7th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 8th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 9th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 10th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 11th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 12th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 13th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 14th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 15th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 16th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 17th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again on the 18th instant and had a long conversation with him on the Mosul question and I enclose herewith a memorandum of that conversation I saw Ismet Pasha again

the question of the Caliphate for the service his removal from Constantinople. The [illegible] Hilmi Bey [illegible] a selection for the President of the Republic came here [illegible] to [illegible] Fethi should [illegible] his attitude towards the Caliph, and resistance more [illegible] as the attack on His Majesty mentioned in Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 104. The 6th February has been the [illegible] of a series of less offensive but equally [illegible] articles in the [illegible] press suggesting that members of the ex-Imperial family [illegible] the Caliph himself should be granted an allowance from the revenues of his Majesty's old landed estates, and the intent with one palace and [illegible] the [illegible] given to other members of the family should be disentailed. There was quite a breeze in the Assembly on the 9th February over these [illegible] but no [illegible] were passed.

2. In this connection I may draw attention to a conversation with Mustafa Kemal which appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes, and to which [illegible] was given in the important Constantinople papers of the 11th February. In this interview the Pasha held language regarding the Caliphate the tendency of which is difficult to follow, but which appears to have been [illegible] intended to [illegible] the Caliphate at home and to exonerate [illegible] from [illegible] for political purposes abroad. The [illegible] of the article by the Turkish papers state definitely that the [illegible] was given before the proclamation of the republic and that it was [illegible] in Paris.

3. The [illegible] Committee of the Assembly has continued its labours and has [illegible] a [illegible] Law, consisting of about 100 articles, which [illegible] to be laid before the Assembly. Some stir has been created by a proposal that all [illegible] foreign inhabitants of Turkey should be called Turks and [illegible] according to their religion. At least two Constantinople Turkish papers [illegible] this suggestion, but both the ultra-Islamic Tanin and the [illegible] issue of the 10th February attacks the proposal with [illegible] and points out that it is not fair to assimilate the poisonous [illegible] Moslem elements to Moslem inhabitants who are [illegible] to be called Turks. In other words it is urged that the use of a common name for Moslem and non-Moslem [illegible] will of itself be much more effective than similar provisions [illegible] constitutional measures since 1830. Nevertheless it must [illegible] fairness to say that [illegible] Tanin advocate more generous and [illegible] treatment for Moslems than has been observed of late and the proposed [illegible] of the [illegible] is of some value as indicating that responsible people at Angora [illegible] and at least in principle, to subscribe to this moderate view.

4. It is stated that Ismet Pasha will return to Angora towards the end of the present week. According to the latest official reports he and Mustafa Kemal with various other persons will have attended the military conference at Smyrna which will [illegible] on the 23rd February. In any case Mustafa Kemal is expected to arrive before the 1st March when Parliament will [illegible] its regular sessions. The proceedings of the Grand National Assembly for the new financial year [illegible] what with the [illegible] budget and the new Constitution [illegible] of Mustafa Kemal there can hardly fail to be important developments in the near future. It remains to be seen what the attitude of Ismet Pasha's opponents will be. On the 12th February Ismail Djanbulat [illegible] Reouf Boys, related in [illegible] the Assembly by alleging that letters addressed to them had been [illegible] in the post. Three days were allowed for [illegible] of the [illegible] which time the Minister of the Interior seems to have [illegible] that [illegible] Assembly that there had been no irregularity. [illegible] was stated that [illegible] apparent tampering with letters appears to be [illegible] [illegible] and that for the rest letters will [illegible] to [illegible] of the senders used stationery prepared with better [illegible].

5. Apart from the latter Opposition so far as it can be an Opposition to Mustafa Kemal has [illegible] been scarcely [illegible] affected by the fact that Reouf Bey left Angora rather unexpectedly on the 18th February. He is reported to be going to Carlsbad for reasons of health but there is also some talk of his having been entrusted with a mission which will take him in due course to Berlin, Paris, and possibly London. Some little time earlier a hint was given that discipline was to be maintained in the People's party by the expulsion from it of one Muzaffer Bey, Deputy for Adalia, because he had criticised a decision of the party apparently [illegible] in favour of increasing the salary of Deputies.

12. I have mentioned in a separate despatch the Turkish attitude towards Great Britain, as manifested on the occasion of my own arrival here as the first representative appointed by the new British Government. As regards France [illegible] was [illegible], though latterly press campaigns [illegible] the 6th February and the following days, arising out of the report that the French Government intended to [illegible] the [illegible] of the Peace Treaty dependent [illegible] ratification by [illegible] Turkish [illegible] in Turkey. The [illegible] of the 10th February published an interview with the French representative here in which [illegible] sought to attenuate the [illegible] to [illegible] the controversy. This statement [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 2 [illegible] only, [illegible] privileges could be [illegible] to [illegible] Schools. Since the [illegible] was [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Madame Angora and at assurance [illegible] that the interview in the [illegible] of the 12th February, that the treaty will be ratified in [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] hope that the French Government will ratify without [illegible] [illegible].

I have &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure No. 3.

Consul General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson.

No. 49.
Sir,

Smyrna, February 9, 1921.

With reference to my despatch No. 44 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to report that the [illegible] of the Press Bureau at Angora [illegible] the Chief of the Staff, Ismet Pasha, [illegible] the Minister of the Interior, Fethi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Public Instruction, Hamdi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Finance, Hassan Fehmi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Justice, Mahmud Essad Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Public Works, Yunus Nadi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Commerce, Mahmud Djelal Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Agriculture, Ali Fuad Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Evkaf, Rechid Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Health, Dr. Adnan Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Ali Fethi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Ways and Communications, Ali Munif Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Supply, Ali Saib Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Labour, Hamdullah Soubhi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, Dr. Rechid Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Evkaf, Hamdi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Public Instruction, Hamdullah Soubhi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, Dr. Adnan Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Health, Ali Fethi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Yunus Nadi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Public Works, Ali Fuad Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Agriculture, Mahmud Djelal Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Commerce, Hassan Fehmi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Finance, Mahmud Essad Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Justice, Hamdi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Public Instruction, Fethi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of the Interior, Ismet Pasha, [illegible] the Chief of the Staff, Ali Munif Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Ways and Communications, Ali Saib Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Supply, Hamdullah Soubhi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Labour, Dr. Rechid Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, Hamdi Bey, [illegible] the Minister of Evkaf

A very great revolution was taken place his revolution has been carried out in the name of the safety of the Sultan and the national right Our nation, by establishing a democratic Government has separated the enemy's armies and has saved the national existence such The victories of our glorious armies in the field have borne fruit in the peace of Lausanne The new Government of Turkey after strengthening its position by the successes made its name known to the whole world that strength which is the character of what some people have called great powers has proved that it is the state, and has made a radical change in the Ottoman history

Gentlemen the sport of the Turkish nation was the right to be embodied in the Sultanate which was against foreign although the Sultan was the extreme enemy of the nation Relying on the friendship of the nation and the armies were in progress and created a new state of the nation's existence the Turkish nation established the Republic

Gentlemen the Turkish press would have to study the article though our interest from the subject was the real voice of the nation and represented it as well The opinion would be formed from the leaders of the press

Gentlemen the last war was a struggle for civilization and the victory was the happiness of the country beyond it is The struggle is not over It is the duty of the press and today it is the press to convert its truth to the world and how is to be the nation

Gentlemen we have said that the world is now going to start a war about New Turkey and the Turkish Republic We have already said that the press that our opinions and interests in particular have set themselves against

Gentlemen we have always told that we are ready to enter into friendship and peace with those who have difficulties with us but that we will not enter into bargain We know how to defend our rights and positions We have explained clearly and determinately to the whole world that we shall settle the question of Thrace and Mosul with the Ottoman Government and that we shall not allow any interference in the solution

4 To this the Berliner Tageblatt replied that it would be difficult to believe the words about a great European conference It said The last regular meeting was at Lausanne And the Allies replied that the question of the people and the evacuation of the zone of the Straits Lord Balfour said that he was going to devote himself to removing the present state of things The Times said the Ghazi's tone is moderate It remarks the spirit of peace The Standard says he speaks strongly but sincerely The Daily Telegraph says that Turkey's assurances must not about their objects on principles but stand on words However in treating the question of Thrace Ismet Pasha was more moderate but could be met by a conciliatory and generous and good will by getting rights which have been taken away from the Ghazi Pasha He then drank to the health of the President of the Parliament

5 Above all that is known in Constantinople journalists What is really going on in the Committee of Coordination Yesterday Mustafa Kemal Pasha arrived here by special train to Ayasoluk where Mr Ismet Essat Bey the former Minister of Interior entertained them at his house The President with his colleagues visited the ruins of ancient Ephesus The train was stopping at the stations where crowds of people had gathered Fethi Bey the delegate to Moscow negotiations Hamdi Arifi Bey Refet Bey Ali Fuad Bey Hewat Bey the Minister of Foreign Affairs Nafi Bey the Minister of Finance Ismet Pasha and others were amongst the Pasha Looks like that those who will have to go not yet come Time now Hamdi Bey is in Constantinople

I have &c
W S EDMONDS

[E 1633 448 44] No 40

Mr MacDonald to Mr Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No 28
Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office February 27 1924*

BILL to give His Majesty's Government power to carry out obligations of peace settlement was introduced in Parliament on 20th February

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E 1863 1752 44] No 41

Mr Lindsay to Mr MacDonald (Received February 29

(No 36)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, February 29 1924*

MY telegram No 33

Situation is developing in sense indicated in my despatch No 166 which should reach you 2nd March It seems to be definitely decided to expel Turkish Catholic members of Parliament

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E 1713 202 44] No 42

Mr MacDonald to Sir Odo Russell (Rome)

No 3)
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office February 29 1924*

YOUR despatches Nos 21 and 24 of 15th and 20th February French proposals would not in our opinion be in the least degree conducive to European pacification

Presidential Parliamentary Secretary to State for His Majesty's Government to state publicly that we are in agreement with the views expressed by him and to express the hope that the Italian Government will be in a position to take similar steps

Such a declaration would be most welcome at the present moment and would help to create a favourable atmosphere for the discussion of the various questions still outstanding between France and Italy

Your despatch No 24 refers to the French note of August 1922 which contained a series of proposals for the creation of an East African Empire which have been under consideration by His Majesty's Government but which have not yet been communicated to the French Government

You should also point out to the Italian Government that the French proposals would not only be prejudicial to the interests of the British Empire but would be contrary to the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations

You should also point out to the Italian Government that the French proposals would not only be prejudicial to the interests of the British Empire but would be contrary to the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations

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E 1907 109 44] No 43

Mr Bentinck to Mr MacDonald Received March 3)

No 11)
Sir, *Athens February 5, 1924*

WITH reference to my despatch No [illegible] of the 31st instant I have the honour to report that Tewfik Rachid Bey the Turkish Delegate to the Commission for the Exchange of Populations, called to see me this morning to inform me of the progress which he expressed the opinion that he could see that there would be no difficulty in getting 7,000 Mohammedans to leave Greece for Turkey Hardly any remained in Greek Macedonia and those would be evacuated because they were of the same race as the Turks Those who remained were to be found in Epirus and in Thessaly and Western Macedonia Every precaution was being taken to protect these populations from [illegible] incursions

2 Some 700 Moslems had already been evacuated to return their families There remained some 1,000 Greeks at transport posts between Constantinople Chatalja Trebizond Samsoun Kumbat and Cesarea These he said would be brought after May to Greece as he understood no boats for them [illegible] the

Turks have left the country. Rashid Bey added that he thought the commission would finish their labours this year. I do not think this optimistic view is shared by the other members.

3. An example of the very active propaganda which the Turks have already carried out of the alleged hardships undergone by the Moslems of Greece, is interesting to record that Izzet made very marked references to their undoubted and largely unfortunate sufferings, and that whilst blaming the Greek authorities he exonerated the Greek Government.

4. He added that the commission would very probably not proceed to Smyrna. It was his intention, if possible, to go far enough East to make further personal investigations, but the only possible base for such would be Greece. Turkish passports would be very difficult to obtain, and the whole proceedings would probably take many months. He was hoping that the commission would be able to finish its labours in Greece within a fortnight, and he was very anxious to obtain as much information as possible before the Greek Government left office.

5. In this connection I may observe that certain Venizelist papers are reported to have accused the Ministry of Education at Kodjaeli in Asia Minor of Greek famine relief funds. At Mersina 250 persons are waiting to be transported to Greece, whilst in Cilicia the 40,000 Greeks are said to be starving.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK.

E 1901/32/44 No. 44

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 41.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 19, 1924.*

With reference to my despatch No. 40 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of the draft Treaty prepared by the Constitutional Commission of the Grand National Assembly to regulate the position of the Straits in time of peace and war, and also to draw attention to certain points in the Treaty which appear to call for comment.

2. Article 1 of the proposed convention is clearly intended to secure the right of free passage through the Straits for the merchant ships of all nations, whether at peace or war with Turkey, and this principle is in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres.

3. Article 2 provides that the Straits shall be open to the merchant ships of all nations in time of peace, and that no dues shall be levied except those which are destined to cover expenses incurred in improving the navigation of the Straits and in the sanitary service of the ports of the Straits. This provision is also in accordance with the Treaty of Sèvres, but the latter stipulates that the dues shall be fixed by the Council of the League of Nations, whereas the draft convention suggests that they should be fixed by the Turkish Government. With regard to the latter proposal, it is to be observed that the Turkish Government has already, during the Lausanne Conference, expressed its willingness to submit to the decision of the Council of the League of Nations any dispute which may arise between Turkey and the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Sèvres as to the interpretation of the latter Treaty.

4. Article 3 of the draft convention provides that the Straits Commission shall be composed of the representatives of Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria, Roumania, Greece, Italy, France, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States of America, and that the Commission shall be under the control of the Council of the League of Nations. It will be noted that the Commission is to be composed of representatives of all the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Sèvres, with the exception of Armenia, Hedjaz, Albania, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and that the control of the Council of the League of Nations is to be substituted for that of the Conference of Ambassadors.

5. Article 4 provides that the Commission shall be invested with considerable powers. Power is given for the right of ordering new elections, the right of recalling deputies at any time, the interests pointed out that a two-thirds majority in the Assembly is necessary for important questions referred to it, and the right of participating in local cases. It is proposed that the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Justice should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the Commission, as well as the Deputies of the Assembly, except in the case of flagrant delicto.

6. The position of the Commission is one especially of the President of the Republic, as further safeguards to the proposals put forward in the Assembly are rendered necessary by the fact that the Commission is to remain in office for seven years, whereas the life of the Assembly, although at present settled for only four years, and that the Government has proposed, will be only for three years, and that the Government has proposed, will be only for three years, and that the Government has proposed, will be only for three

[illegible] press with [illegible] suggestions that not only the Caliphate but other questions connected with Holy Places and Turkish Trust should be dealt with [illegible] Curzon's despatch of [illegible] It is quite stated that the Caliphate is bound [illegible] Turkey, Constantinople and Turkish Trust should be considered [illegible] and that [illegible] reasons Turkey should be in [illegible] representation. The last of these suggestions is one which has not yet been brought [illegible] It is particularly [illegible] that the Caliphate as being [illegible] the resources of the country, but [illegible] conceivably [illegible] by which Caliphate could be [illegible] the contributions of the Moslem world without [illegible] of [illegible] It is suggested [illegible] that [illegible] schools as at present [illegible] that [illegible] and that [illegible] Moslem [illegible] Affairs corresponding to [illegible]

[illegible] the [illegible] that when Mustafa Kemal [illegible] Grand National Assembly [illegible] March [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[E 2120 1100 44] No. 51

Mr Lindsay to Mr MacDonald.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 18)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Austro-Turkish Treaty.

Constantinople, March 4, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 51

Traité d'Amitié, Convention d'Établissement, Convention de Commerce conclus entre la Turquie et l'Autriche, le 28 janvier 1924, à Constantinople.

(1)

Traité d'Amitié entre la Turquie et l'Autriche.

LA Turquie d'une part et l'Autriche d'autre part, également et sincèrement désireuses d'établir et de consolider les liens de sincère amitié entre la République turque et la République d'Autriche et partant de donner une nouvelle base aux relations entre les deux États, une fois établies, se vouant à la prospérité et au bien-être de leurs nations respectives ont résolu de conclure un traité d'amitié et ont à cet effet, nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le Président de la République turque : Le Dr Adnan Bey, délégué du Ministère des Affaires étrangères à Constantinople et Député de Constantinople à la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, et

Le Président de la République d'Autriche : M. Auguste Kral, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Sofia,

Lesquels après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Il y aura paix, amitié et amnistie sincères et perpétuelles entre la République turque et la République d'Autriche, ainsi qu'entre les citoyens des deux parties.

ARTICLE 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour rétablir les relations diplomatiques entre les deux États conformément aux principes du droit des gens. Elles conviennent que les représentants diplomatiques de chacune d'elles seront, à charge de réciprocité, dans le territoire de l'autre le traitement consacré par les principes généraux du droit international public général.

ARTICLE 3.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour conclure à la date de ce jour une convention de commerce et une convention d'établissement.

ARTICLE 4.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Angora aussi tôt que faire se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur le quinzième jour après l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Constantinople, le 28 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) DR. ADNAN
(L.S.) KRAL

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(2)

Convention d'Établissement entre la Turquie et l'Autriche.

La Turquie, d'une part, et l'Autriche, d'autre part, animées du désir de fixer les conditions d'établissement des ressortissants turcs en Autriche et des ressortissants autrichiens en Turquie, ont résolu de conclure une convention, et, à cet effet, ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le Président de la République turque : Le Dr Adnan Bey, délégué du Ministère des Affaires étrangères à Constantinople et Député de Constantinople à la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, et

Le Président de la République d'Autriche : M. Auguste Kral, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Sofia,

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront le droit de s'établir et de séjourner sur le territoire de l'autre et pourront, en conséquence, aller, venir et circuler librement en se conformant aux lois et règlements en vigueur dans le pays.

ARTICLE 2.

Il est entendu que les dispositions de la présente convention n'ayant pas pour objet la question de l'immigration ne portent pas atteinte au droit de chacune des parties contractantes d'autoriser ou d'interdire librement l'immigration dans son pays.

ARTICLE 3.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront, sur le territoire de l'autre, la liberté entière, le droit d'exercer toutes sortes d'industrie et de commerce et le droit de tous actes et professions quelconques, sauf ceux réservés aux seuls nationaux, suivant les lois et règlements spéciaux en Turquie, en vertu de la loi, usages et ordonnances intérieurs, &c.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes n'auront à payer pour séjourner et s'établir sur le territoire de l'autre que les droits perçus sur ce territoire de tous genres de commerce, industrie, métier ou profession quelconque, droit, taxe ou charge, de quelque nature que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux perçus des nationaux.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes seront soumis sur le territoire de l'autre, quant à leur personne, leurs biens, droits et intérêts et jusqu'à l'expiration possessoire desdits biens, ainsi qu'il sera effectivement possédé, imposition, héritage, taxe de charge, taxe ou impôt direct ou indirect, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui pourront être imposés aux nationaux.

ARTICLE 4.

Dans le cas où l'une des parties contractantes sont à la suite d'une sentence légale soit d'après les lois ou règlements sur la police des mœurs, sur la police sanitaire ou sur la moralité, soit pour des motifs de sûreté intérieure ou extérieure de l'État, expulserait par mesures administratives les ressortissants de l'autre partie contractante, celle-ci s'engage à les recevoir. Le transport jusqu'à la frontière des personnes expulsées sera à la charge de la partie qui expulse.

ARTICLE 5.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront, sous condition de réciprocité, sur le territoire de l'autre le droit d'acquérir, de posséder et d'aliéner toute espèce de biens meubles et immeubles, à l'exception des biens ruraux, en se conformant aux lois et règlements du pays. Ils pourront en disposer par acte de vente, échange, donation, testament ou autrement, quelque soit celui en faveur ou en possession par voie de succession ou héritage ou autrement, dans les dispositions entre vifs ou testamentaires.

Ils ne seront assujettis dans aucun des cas susmentionnés à des charges, taxes ou impôts, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui sont ou seront établis pour les nationaux.

Article 6

Les ressortissants de l'une des parties contractantes seront astreints sur le territoire de l'autre à aucun service militaire ni à aucune obligation ou charge qui le remplace.

Ils seront exempts de tout emprunt forcé. Ils seront également exempts de toute autre prestation pécuniaire levée pour des buts de guerre et qui ne serait pas imposée légalement aux nationaux.

Article 7

Les sociétés anonymes ou autres, commerciales et industrielles, qui ont leur siège sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes et qui y sont constituées en vertu des lois respectives pourront, en se soumettant aux lois et ordonnances de l'autre pays, ester en justice devant les tribunaux soit pour intenter une action soit pour s'y défendre.

L'autorisation des sociétés à l'exercice de leur commerce ou de leur industrie sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante reste réservée aux lois et prescriptions qui sont ou seront en vigueur à ce sujet.

Lesdites sociétés, établies conformément à l'alinéa 2 ci-dessus, auront à payer pour l'exercice de leurs affaires et de leur industrie dans le territoire de l'autre partie des impôts, taxes, impositions et charges quelconques que ceux perçus sur les sociétés nationales.

Ces sociétés pourront à condition de réciprocité et en se soumettant aux lois du pays acquérir toute sorte de biens mobiliers ainsi que les biens immeubles nécessaires au fonctionnement de la société, et ils ne tomberont dans ce cas que l'expropriation n'est pas d'un intérêt public et moyennant indemnité. Aucune expropriation ne pourra avoir lieu sans publicité préalable.

Article 8

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes ne pourront sur le territoire de l'autre être exposés à aucuns droits ni taxes, même temporaires, et, dans la poursuite de leurs affaires ou pour ester en justice, ils auront le recours libre et facile aux tribunaux et pourront librement se présenter devant eux. Aucune expropriation ne pourra avoir lieu sans publicité préalable et indemnité.

Article 9

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes pourront sur le territoire de l'autre être exposés à aucuns droits ni taxes, même temporaires, et, dans la poursuite de leurs affaires ou pour ester en justice, ils auront le recours libre et facile aux tribunaux et pourront librement se présenter devant eux. Aucune expropriation ne pourra avoir lieu sans publicité préalable et indemnité.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes pourront sur le territoire de l'autre être expropriés de leurs biens immeubles, même temporairement, dans la poursuite de leurs affaires ou pour ester en justice, ils auront le recours libre et facile aux tribunaux et pourront librement se présenter devant eux. Aucune expropriation ne pourra avoir lieu sans publicité préalable et indemnité. Aucune expropriation ne pourra avoir lieu sans publicité préalable et indemnité.

Article 9

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes pourront sur le territoire de l'autre, en ce qui concerne la protection légale et générale de leur personne et de leurs biens, mener un traitement identique.

En outre, ils auront libre et facile accès auprès des tribunaux et pourront ester en justice aux mêmes conditions que les nationaux, sous réserve des dispositions relatives à la *caution judicatum solvi* et à l'assistance judiciaire gratuite qui seront réglées par la législation locale ou par règlements ou qui pourront faire l'objet d'une convention spéciale entre les deux parties.

Article 10

En matière de statut personnel, c'est la loi pour toutes les questions concernant le mariage, la séparation légale, le divorce, la séparation de corps, la dot, la paternité, la filiation, l'adoption, la capacité des personnes, la tutelle et curatelle, l'interdiction, l'état civil, les successions testamentaires et *ab intestat*, les partages, les testaments, et en général, pour tout le droit familial, les ressortissants des parties contractantes seront soumis aux compétents des tribunaux nationaux et autres autorités nationales auxquels tous les pays sont soumis eux-mêmes ressortissants.

La présente disposition ne porte pas atteinte aux droits acquis ou éventuels que pourront invoquer, en plus quand ils seront dans leurs pays respectifs, de recevoir et recueillir des preuves relatives aux questions soumises à la compétence des tribunaux nationaux et autres autorités nationales susmentionnées.

Article 11

Les deux parties contractantes s'accordent réciproquement le traitement des fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière, consuls généraux, consuls et vice-consuls, dans les places de commerce de leurs pays respectifs et sont admises sur un pied d'égalité dans un autre État.

Sur les territoires respectifs, les fonctionnaires consulaires en titre et admis recevront à charge d'une parfaite réciprocité, le traitement consacré par les règles du droit international public général.

Article 12

La présente convention entrera en vigueur un mois après la date de l'échange des ratifications et aura la durée d'un an. Si elle n'est dénoncée par l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes au moins six mois avant l'expiration de ladite période d'un an, elle restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit dénoncée, cette dénonciation devant produire ses effets qu'après l'expiration d'un délai de six mois.

Elle sera ratifiée et les ratifications seront échangées à Angora, aussitôt que faire se pourra.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Constantinople, le 28 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) Dr. ADNAN
(L.S.) KRAL.

Procès-verbal

Au moment de procéder à la signature de la Convention d'établissement entre la Turquie et l'Autriche, les plénipotentiaires soussignés sont tombés d'accord pour faire les déclarations suivantes :

1. Il est entendu par le terme « emprunt forcé » mentionné à l'article 6 toute imposition ou contribution générale dont la Autriche ou la Turquie ordonnerait ultérieurement.
2. Les termes « sociétés anonymes ou autres » mentionnés à l'article 7, alinéa 2, comprennent les sociétés en commandite et l'assurance.

   Les dispositions prévues par les susdits articles de la présente convention pour les ressortissants des parties contractantes pourront être étendues par accord spécial, aux sociétés acquérant sur les territoires de l'autre partie contractante la nationalité ou une catégorie spéciale en vertu de la législation locale.
4. Les dispositions contenues dans l'article 10 ne portent pas atteinte aux droits locaux acquis ou à acquérir sur les ressortissants des parties contractantes visées par ledit article de la convention en question.

Fait en double à Constantinople, le 28 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) Dr. ADNAN
(L.S.) KRAL.

3)

Convention de commerce entre la Turquie et l'Autriche

Le Gouvernement de la République Autrichienne et le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie, désirant conclure une convention de commerce, ont résolu de conclure une convention, et à cet effet, ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le Président de la République Turque : Le Dr Adnan Bey, délégué du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Constantinople et Député de Constantinople à la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie ;

Le Président de la République Autrichienne : M. Auguste Kral, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Sofia ;

Lesquels après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

Article 1

Il y aura entre les territoires des parties contractantes liberté réciproque de commerce et de navigation. En conséquence, les parties contractantes s'engagent à n'entraver entre leurs territoires respectifs par aucune prohibition ou restriction d'importation, d'exportation ou de transit.

Toutefois les hautes parties contractantes se réservent le droit d'établir des prohibitions et restrictions pour les importations et exportations :

1. Pour réserver des fournitures indispensables à la vie alimentaire et à sauvegarder la vitalité économique de la nation ;
2. Pour les raisons de sécurité de l'État ;

3° Pour les motifs de police sanitaire ou en vue de la protection des animaux et des plantes contre les maladies, les insectes et parasites nuisibles et d'une façon générale dans l'intérêt de la santé publique conformément aux principes et usages internationaux adoptés à ce sujet ;

4° Pour les mêmes raisons que celles visées au 3° ci-dessus ;

5° Exceptionnellement aux mêmes charges, exigences, prohibitions ou restrictions que celles prévues au paragraphe précédent, concernant la quarantaine, ou visant le transport de substances explosives, inflammables ou dangereuses à l'intérieur des marchandises ou engins similaires ;

6° Pour empêcher exportation d'un animal ou d'un animal sauvage.

Les parties contractantes contractantes se réservent le droit de prohibitions ou restrictions à l'importation et à l'exportation qui pourraient s'appliquer à l'importation ou à l'exportation de toutes les marchandises quelconques à destination ou en provenance de leurs territoires respectifs.

Article 2

Les parties contractantes s'engagent à accorder au trafic de transit sur leurs voies de communication, y compris les ports et aéroports, aux passagers, bagages, marchandises et navires de toute sorte, venant des autres pays et allant à ces pays, un traitement non moins favorable que celui qui serait accordé à ces mêmes objets s'ils avaient emprunté leur voie de communication dans leur parcours total depuis leur point d'origine jusqu'à leur point de destination finale.

Les règlements de toute nature relatifs au transit, y compris les formalités douanières, ne devront pas être inutilement gênants.

Aucune distinction ne sera faite entre les navires, bateaux, aéronefs, passagers et marchandises, suivant le point de départ ou d'arrivée, la nationalité des navires, aéronefs, bateaux, passagers ou marchandises, le lieu d'origine, de départ, d'entrée, de sortie ou de destination finale, ou suivant les circonstances relatives à la propriété des marchandises, navires, bateaux, aéronefs ou autres moyens de transport.

Les taxes imposées pour l'exercice du transit devront être raisonnables, compte tenu des conditions de la navigation.

Les parties contractantes ne prendront aucune mesure limitant le transit des voyageurs et des marchandises pour des raisons de :

a) Priorité de service ;

b) Mesures de contrôle douanier, sanitaire ou vétérinaire, ou mesures destinées à prévenir les fraudes ;

c) Défaut de conformité aux formalités douanières, à la législation ou aux règlements de police de l'État.

Article 3

Les navires battant le pavillon de l'une des parties contractantes auront le droit de pénétrer dans les ports de tout point de la côte de cette partie contractante qui sont ouverts au commerce international et d'y faire escale, sous réserve des dispositions de la présente convention. Ils jouiront, dans les ports et les eaux territoriales de cette partie contractante, des mêmes privilèges que les navires nationaux, notamment en ce qui concerne les facilités de navigation et les droits et taxes de toute nature perçus au nom ou au profit de l'État, de ses agents, des services publics ou d'organismes privés.

Les navires de chacune des parties contractantes auront le droit de charger ou décharger, dans les ports et aéroports ouverts au commerce international situés sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, les marchandises de toute provenance ou à destination de tout pays, par tous les modes de navigation autorisés par la législation douanière de cette partie contractante.

Les navires de chacune des parties contractantes seront admis, dans les ports et aéroports ouverts au commerce international situés sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, à charger ou décharger des marchandises pour un autre port ou aéroport du territoire de cette partie contractante, sous réserve que les navires ou aéronefs satisfassent aux conditions requises pour le cabotage national.

Les navires de chacune des parties contractantes pourront, dans les ports et aéroports ouverts au commerce international situés sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, prendre des passagers à destination d'un autre port ou aéroport du territoire de cette partie contractante, sous réserve que les navires ou aéronefs satisfassent aux conditions requises pour le cabotage national.

Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliqueront pas à la navigation côtière et à la navigation intérieure, qui demeurent réservées à la législation de chaque partie contractante.

Les navires de chacune des parties contractantes jouiront, dans les ports et aéroports ouverts au commerce international situés sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, des mêmes facilités pour l'entrée, la sortie, le séjour et l'escale que les navires nationaux, notamment en ce qui concerne les facilités de navigation et les droits et taxes de toute nature perçus au nom ou au profit de l'État, de ses agents, des services publics ou d'organismes privés.

Les navires de chacune des parties contractantes auront le droit de charger ou décharger, dans les ports et aéroports ouverts au commerce international situés sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, les marchandises de toute provenance ou à destination de tout pays, par tous les modes de navigation autorisés par la législation douanière de cette partie contractante.

Les navires de chacune des parties contractantes seront admis, dans les ports et aéroports ouverts au commerce international situés sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, à charger ou décharger des marchandises pour un autre port ou aéroport du territoire de cette partie contractante, sous réserve que les navires ou aéronefs satisfassent aux conditions requises pour le cabotage national.

Les navires de chacune des parties contractantes pourront, dans les ports et aéroports ouverts au commerce international situés sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, prendre des passagers à destination d'un autre port ou aéroport du territoire de cette partie contractante, sous réserve que les navires ou aéronefs satisfassent aux conditions requises pour le cabotage national.

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Les navires de chacune des parties contractantes jouiront, dans les ports et aéroports ouverts au commerce international situés sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, des mêmes facilités pour l'entrée, la sortie, le séjour et l'escale que les navires nationaux, notamment en ce qui concerne les facilités de navigation et les droits et taxes de toute nature perçus au nom ou au profit de l'État, de ses agents, des services publics ou d'organismes privés.

Les navires de chacune des parties contractantes auront le droit de charger ou décharger, dans les ports et aéroports ouverts au commerce international situés sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, les marchandises de toute provenance ou à destination de tout pays, par tous les modes de navigation autorisés par la législation douanière de cette partie contractante.

Les navires de chacune des parties contractantes seront admis, dans les ports et aéroports ouverts au commerce international situés sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, à charger ou décharger des marchandises pour un autre port ou aéroport du territoire de cette partie contractante, sous réserve que les navires ou aéronefs satisfassent aux conditions requises pour le cabotage national.

Les navires de chacune des parties contractantes pourront, dans les ports et aéroports ouverts au commerce international situés sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, prendre des passagers à destination d'un autre port ou aéroport du territoire de cette partie contractante, sous réserve que les navires ou aéronefs satisfassent aux conditions requises pour le cabotage national.

Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliqueront pas à la navigation côtière et à la navigation intérieure, qui demeurent réservées à la législation de chaque partie contractante.

Article 4

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes seront admis à faire valoir eux-mêmes leurs droits devant les tribunaux de l'autre partie contractante, sans autre condition que celle imposée aux nationaux, et auront, pour leurs personnes et leurs biens, la même protection légale que les nationaux.

Les navires et les marchandises ne seront pas astreints à des droits ou taxes plus élevés que ceux auxquels sont assujettis les navires et les marchandises nationaux.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes seront admis à exercer, sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, le commerce, l'industrie, la profession ou la navigation, soit personnellement, soit par l'intermédiaire de représentants de leur choix, dans les mêmes conditions que les nationaux.

Les sociétés constituées conformément à la législation de l'une des parties contractantes et ayant leur siège social sur le territoire de cette partie contractante seront admises, pour l'exercice de leurs activités, à bénéficier, sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, du même traitement que les ressortissants de cette dernière partie contractante, sous réserve des dispositions législatives et réglementaires en vigueur dans ce pays.

Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliqueront pas à la navigation côtière et à la navigation intérieure, qui demeurent réservées à la législation de chaque partie contractante.

Les parties contractantes se réservent le droit de prohibitions ou restrictions à l'importation et à l'exportation qui pourraient s'appliquer à l'importation ou à l'exportation de toutes les marchandises quelconques à destination ou en provenance de leurs territoires respectifs.

Article 5

Sous réserve des dispositions relatives à la navigation côtière et à la navigation intérieure, les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes seront admis à faire valoir eux-mêmes leurs droits devant les tribunaux de l'autre partie contractante, sans autre condition que celle imposée aux nationaux, et auront, pour leurs personnes et leurs biens, la même protection légale que les nationaux.

Les navires et les marchandises ne seront pas astreints à des droits ou taxes plus élevés que ceux auxquels sont assujettis les navires et les marchandises nationaux.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes seront admis à exercer, sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, le commerce, l'industrie, la profession ou la navigation, soit personnellement, soit par l'intermédiaire de représentants de leur choix, dans les mêmes conditions que les nationaux.

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Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliqueront pas à la navigation côtière et à la navigation intérieure, qui demeurent réservées à la législation de chaque partie contractante.

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Article 6

Les navires battant le pavillon de l'une des parties contractantes, qui sont ou seront chargés en tout ou en partie de marchandises qui sont, ou seront, la propriété de ressortissants de l'autre partie contractante, ou de sociétés constituées conformément à la législation de cette dernière partie contractante et ayant leur siège social sur le territoire de cette partie contractante, ou de marchandises qui sont ou seront la propriété de ces ressortissants ou de ces sociétés, ne seront pas retenus dans les ports de l'autre partie contractante, ni soumis à aucune mesure de contrainte, ni à aucune formalité, pour des motifs d'ordre économique, sauf dans les cas prévus par la législation douanière de cette dernière partie contractante.

Les navires battant le pavillon de l'une des parties contractantes, qui sont ou seront chargés en tout ou en partie de marchandises qui sont, ou seront, la propriété de ressortissants de l'autre partie contractante, ou de sociétés constituées conformément à la législation de cette dernière partie contractante et ayant leur siège social sur le territoire de cette partie contractante, ou de marchandises qui sont ou seront la propriété de ces ressortissants ou de ces sociétés, ne seront pas retenus dans les ports de l'autre partie contractante, ni soumis à aucune mesure de contrainte, ni à aucune formalité, pour des motifs d'ordre économique, sauf dans les cas prévus par la législation douanière de cette dernière partie contractante.

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Article 7

Tous les produits du sol ou de l'industrie originaires et provenant de l'un des territoires de l'une des parties contractantes qui sont importés sur le territoire de l'autre, et pour lesquels des taxes sont établies sur l'importation ou sur l'exportation, seront soumis pendant la durée de la présente convention au traitement de la nation la plus favorisée. Notamment, si par exception, et dans des cas, et à des conditions autres que les plus favorisés, des droits autres ou plus élevés que ceux payés par les produits ou les marchandises de la nation la plus favorisée.

Les exportations à destination de l'une des parties contractantes ne seront pas grevées, par l'autre de droits ou taxes autres ou plus élevés que ceux perçus à l'exportation des mêmes objets dans le pays le plus favorisé à cet égard.

Article 8

Chacune des parties contractantes pourra exiger, pour établir le pays d'origine des produits importés, la présentation d'un certificat d'origine constatant que l'article importé est un produit original et dont le pays auquel il doit être considéré comme tel, étant donné les relations commerciales.

Les certificats d'origine, établis sous la forme que les parties contractantes se communiqueront ultérieurement, seront délivrés par les autorités compétentes en cette matière par la Chambre de Commerce, le Consul ou l'Expert, soit par tout autre organe ou représentant du pays d'où la marchandise est censée provenir. Le pays d'importation pourra exiger l'égalisation de ces certificats par le consul du pays destinataire.

Les échantillons sans valeur commerciale, importés d'un pays dans l'autre, ne seront pas soumis à des droits de douane.

Article 9

Les dispositions de l'article 7 ne s'appliquent pas :

1. Aux privilèges accordés ou qui pourraient être accordés ultérieurement par l'une des parties contractantes à certains États limitrophes, afin de faciliter le trafic de frontière avec ces pays ;
2. Aux avantages ou faveurs spéciales résultant ou pouvant résulter de traités de tarifs ou d'accords conclus ou à conclure entre l'une des parties contractantes, d'une part, la Turquie et les pays qui sont tributaires de l'Empire ottoman, d'autre part ;
3. Aux facilités spéciales que l'Autriche-Hongrie a la faculté d'accorder ou d'appliquer à l'article 29 du traité de Berlin, du 13 juillet 1878, ainsi qu'aux dispositions qui seront appliquées dans le cas prévu à l'article 1er de la déclaration annexée à ce traité.

Article 10

Les parties contractantes s'engagent à ne prendre sur leurs territoires, en ce qui concerne les droits, taxes et autres charges quelconques, aucune mesure prohibitive ou restrictive de l'importation, de l'exportation ou du transit, qui ne soit également applicable à toutes les autres nations.

Article 11

Les droits et les taxes intérieurs perçus par l'un ou l'autre des États, des provinces, des communes ou d'autres corps publics, ne pourront grever directement ou indirectement la production, la fabrication ou la consommation d'un article sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes, de manière à établir une différence entre les produits, marchandises ou objets de l'autre partie contractante, et les produits nationaux ou les produits ou marchandises de même espèce.

La présente disposition n'empêchera pas la Turquie de continuer à percevoir, dans les mêmes conditions d'égalité entre ses ressortissants et ceux de l'Autriche-Hongrie, les droits de consommation indiqués dans le tableau annexe à la présente convention (Annexe C), pour les produits et marchandises qui y sont énumérés.

Article 12.

Le trafic des marchandises par chemins de fer entre les parties contractantes s'effectuera sous le régime de la Convention internationale sur le trafic par Chemins de Fer du 14 octobre 1890 avec toutes les conditions et suppléments introduits d'un commun accord par tous les États faisant partie de cette convention.

Les parties contractantes auront soin, en tout ce qui dépendra d'elles, à ce que les taxes perçues, tant à raison des voyageurs que des marchandises, soient aussi peu élevées que possible.

Les administrations des chemins de fer des parties contractantes prendront toutes les mesures nécessaires pour garantir exactement l'exécution des conventions entre les deux pays.

Les wagons vides destinés à servir au transport des marchandises, utilisés dans le commun intérêt entre les parties contractantes et pour les trains, seront soumis aux dispositions de l'article 6 du règlement international du 14 octobre 1890 sur le service des Wagons et à ses protocoles et conventions supplémentaires. Les taxes sont soumises aux prescriptions tarifaires et conventionnelles des Voitures et Wagons dans la communication internationale et aux dispositions et conventions supplémentaires.

Il est entendu que toutes les dispositions restées en dehors de la présente convention seront appliquées strictement dans tous les cas où le contrat conclu entre les parties contractantes ne contiendra pas de dispositions spéciales.

Article 13

Les personnes, bagages et marchandises, qui auront passé sur le territoire d'une des parties contractantes pour être expédiés par un autre chemin de fer à destination d'un point situé sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, seront pris en charge sur les chemins de fer de l'autre partie contractante dans les mêmes conditions que pour l'expédition sans interruption de transport. Les objets postaux grevés ou non par des droits, ainsi que les personnes, bagages et marchandises passant d'un pays à un autre pays que celui par lequel ils transportés dans les wagons sont admis sans changement de direction.

Article 14

La présente convention entrera en vigueur dix jours après la date de l'échange des ratifications et restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit dénoncée par l'une des parties contractantes. Si cependant elle n'est pas dénoncée par l'une des parties contractantes au moins six mois avant l'expiration de chaque période annuelle, elle restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit dénoncée, cette dénonciation ne devant produire ses effets qu'après l'expiration de la période.

Article 15

La présente convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications seront échangées à Angora aussitôt que faire se pourra.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Constantinople, le 28 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) DR ADNAN
(L.S.) KRAL

ANNEXE A.

Carte de légitimation

POUR VOYAGEURS DE COMMERCE.

Le ... arc ...

No ... le ... carte

(Armoiries)

Valable pour des voyages à ... étranger

au nom, prénom et nom de famille

Fait à ...

le ..., vu et accordé

Sceau ...

(Autorité compétente)

(Signature)

Il est certifié par le porteur de la présente carte ... jouissant ... les gratifications ... sont payées ... sera ... voyageur de commerce, sous la ... à ... dans le rayon ... (qualité de voyageur de commerce).

Le porteur de la présente carte est autorisé à déclarer ... conformément à la loi ... sur les gratifications des voyageurs de commerce, les échantillons ... les échantillons sont taxés ... gratifications ... sur le ... de commerce ... fustre.

Supplément au Porteur

Âge ...

Taille ...

Signes particuliers ...

(Signature)

Avis

... titulaire de la présente carte ... pour ... cet effet les marques ... ou autres ... pour le compte ... la taxation spéciale ... Il ... les taxes ordinaires ... Il sera ... taxes ... dispositions ... gratifications ... État.

ANNEXE B.

Il est certifié que M. ..., porteur de la présente carte, désirant se rendre avec ses marchandises, ses échantillons et ses recherches, pour les ressortissants à trois actions ... Turque pour les ressortissants turcs en Autriche, est domicilié à ..., et qui est tenu d'acquitter les taxes et impôts égaux pour l'exercice de son commerce ou industrie.

Le présent certificat est valable pour ... délai de ... mois.

Lieu, date, signature, sceau de l'autorité qui a établi le certificat.

ANNEXE C.

Taxes de Consommation.

Thé	40	piastres par kilog
Café	20	
Pétrole	0	, ,
Riz	0	, ,
Margarine et margarine et autres graisses animales	80	, ,
Bougies de stéarine	30	, ,
Savon ordinaire	5	, ,
Sacs neufs et usagés	5	, ,
Épices	50	, ,
Allumettes		, la boîte de 60 allumettes.
Allumettes de gros ...	1	, la boîte de 60 allumettes.
Papier à cigarettes	1	, 50 feuilles.
Briquets	25	, par briquet.
Sucre	17	, par kilog.
Chocolats		
Biscuits		
Lait concentré	Soumis à une taxe de consommation d'après le pourcentage du sucre contenu.	
Confiserie et glucose		
Boissons fortement alcooliques, gazeuses et non alcooliques		
Toutes autres produits sucrés		
Tabac	40	piastres par kilog

Procès verbal 1

Au moment de procéder à la signature de la Convention de Commerce entre la Turquie et l'Autriche les parties contractantes se sont mises d'accord pour faire les déclarations suivantes :

Il est entendu que les dispositions de l'article 17 (4) et de l'article 3 ne sont applicables aux taxes et impôts existant actuellement qu'à ceux à créer dans l'avenir.

Vu que la taxe de balance commerciale accordée aux produits autrichiens et le taux des droits de douane ... la plus favorisée ... contractantes consistent ... et ... pour compte ... taxes ... Il sera ... taxes ... dispositions ... gratifications ... État.

Fait en double exemplaire à Constantinople le 28 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) Dr. ADNAN
(L.S.) KRAL

Procès-verbal 2.

Au cours de la discussion de l'article 7, la délégation turque ayant demandé des faveurs spéciales pour certains articles d'exportation turcs, il a été convenu d'accorder à la délégation autrichienne l'avantage que ces articles exemptés de droit entrent en Autriche et que la restriction probable n'y ait pas le changement dans cette chose.

Fait en double à Constantinople le 28 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) Dr. ADNAN
(L.S.) KRAL

No. 52

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald (Received March 11)

(No. 88)

Sir, Constantinople, March 9, 1914.

SINCE the late Grand Vizier's death on the 5th instant the question of the Turkish reply to the Powers' latest note regarding the proposed reforms in Asiatic Turkey has been under consideration by the Ottoman Council of Ministers, and I have the honour to report that the answer was finally agreed upon at a meeting held yesterday afternoon.

2. Previous to the meeting at which the above-mentioned decision was arrived at, the Grand Vizier had had an audience of the Sultan, and had subsequently had a conversation with the German Ambassador, who had called upon him at the Sublime Porte. It is believed that the Grand Vizier's object in seeking this interview with the German Ambassador was to ascertain whether the latter had any fresh instructions from his Government which might help to facilitate a settlement of the reform question.

3. Prince Said Halim, who succeeded the late Grand Vizier, is a man of considerable ability, and is generally regarded as a strong character. He is, however, a Turkish patriot of the old school, and is not likely to be disposed to make any concessions to the Powers which he may consider to be incompatible with the dignity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. He is also a man of very pronounced views, and is not in the habit of changing his opinions when once he has formed them. It is, therefore, not to be expected that he will show any greater readiness to meet the wishes of the Powers in the matter of reforms than did his predecessor.

4. The Turkish reply to the Powers' latest note on the reform question was communicated to the Russian Ambassador by the Grand Vizier on the 6th instant, and to the other Ambassadors by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the following day. It is understood that the reply is couched in very conciliatory terms, and that it contains a number of concessions to the views of the Powers. It is also said to be accompanied by a memorandum containing counter-proposals, which, however, are not considered to be unreasonable.

5. On the 7th instant the Council of Ministers met to consider the reply, and it was finally agreed upon at a meeting held on the following day at the Sublime Porte under the presidency of the Grand Vizier. The Ministers who took part in the deliberations were the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of War, the Minister of Marine, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Public Instruction, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Commerce, and the Minister of Public Works. The Sultan was present at the commencement of the meeting, and remained for about an hour. The Council sat for about three hours, and the reply was finally agreed upon at about 5 p.m. It was then submitted to the Sultan, who approved it, and it was subsequently communicated to the Ambassadors.

6. On the 28th ultimo, and on several subsequent occasions, the Grand Vizier had discussed the graver issues involved in the reform question with the Ambassadors of the Powers, and it is understood that the reply which was finally agreed upon on the 7th instant was drawn up in accordance with the views which had been expressed by the Ambassadors on the occasion of these discussions. The way for the settlement of the question was thus prepared, and it is generally believed that the reply will be found to be satisfactory by the Powers.

7. The Turkish Parliament, which was prorogued on the 28th ultimo, is to meet again on the 24th instant, when it will have before it a number of important questions, including the reform question. The Assembly will, however, be asked to deal with the latter question in secret session, and it is probable that the discussion will be a long one.

8. The Grand Vizier's illness, which was at first thought to be of a very serious character, proved to be of short duration, and he was able to attend the Council of Ministers on the 7th instant. He died suddenly on the following day, and his death has caused much regret in official circles, as he was generally regarded as a strong man, who was likely to be able to cope successfully with the difficulties which beset the path of the Government. His funeral took place on the 9th instant, and was attended by the Sultan, the Ministers, the Ambassadors, and a large number of officials and notables. The Sultan was represented by Ghazi Mouktar Pasha, who was accompanied by a number of Aides-de-Camp. The Ambassadors and Ministers were received at the entrance to the mosque by Ghazi Mouktar Pasha, and were conducted to their seats by Aides-de-Camp. The Sultan's representative and the Ambassadors and Ministers then left the mosque, and were followed by the coffin, which was carried by officers. The procession then moved slowly through the streets to the railway station, where the coffin was placed on board a special train, which left for Konia at 2 p.m. The Sultan, the Ministers, the Ambassadors, and a large number of officials and notables followed the coffin to the railway station, and remained there until the train had left. The Sultan's representative and the Ambassadors and Ministers then returned to the mosque, and the funeral service was concluded. The Sultan's representative and the Ambassadors and Ministers then left the mosque, and were followed by the coffin, which was carried by officers. The procession then moved slowly through the streets to the railway station, where the coffin was placed on board a special train, which left for Konia at 2 p.m. The Sultan, the Ministers, the Ambassadors, and a large number of officials and notables followed the coffin to the railway station, and remained there until the train had left. The Sultan's representative and the Ambassadors and Ministers then returned to the mosque, and the funeral service was concluded.

* Not printed.

3rd March for official orders from Angora. Having received them, they went late at night to the palace and informed the Caliph of his deposition. Afterwards they were allowed time to make the preparations for departure. In the early hours of the morning of the 4th March it happened that a torpedo concerned to the Feast of the Ascension of the Prophet) he with his son and other members of his immediate family were hurried off by motor-car to the station of Catalja on the railway between Constantinople and the Bulgarian frontier. Up to the evening of the 5th March it was not certainly known what had become of them. It is asserted that they were placed in the Simplon express train but the foreign guests were to proceed to Berne, but nothing is publicly known as to the arrangements made.

11. It is too soon to judge of the effect of this last stroke of the Angora government. There is undoubtedly much disaffection in Constantinople. Even the Young Turks in their hearts will have been stirred when on the 3rd March students carrying a green coverlet from a shrine in Stamboul and in the streets crying "O Caliph, whither art thou going?" The Angora newspapers are at present opposed to the decrees of Angora. Should Islamic people think to follow their example they have had their warning against flight, that is from Europe, that an affront is to be made to the Law of Islam, that it is an offence against that law to exercise the reforms, and that Christian courts will be set up by the Lausanne treaty without reference to the Assembly, are the reasons given in various places to justify Constantinople. It is a proof of the despair of Conservatives that even Ali Kemal Bey, the editor of the once strongly Islamic Turkish paper of Constantinople, has unexpectedly found a road.

12. The rest of the private affairs of the Caliph's numerous relatives promises to cause a serious problem before the royal ladies are finally shipped. It was anticipated that certain ladies would be granted to the Caliphate, however, speaks only of travelling expenses and, unless this term is widely construed, it will fall hard on many of the family, for whom exile has meant ruin. There are believed to be a great number who are practically without any personal fortune.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 2180 448 44] No. 53.

Italian Ambassador to Mr MacDonald. (*Received March 10.*)

(Translation.)

His Italian Ambassador presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to enclose herewith, for the information of His Excellency, a translation of a telegram which he has received from his Government, and to transmit to His Excellency a translation at Paris the reports he has asked for as to the procedure to be followed by the powers in the question of the Caliphate, so that the two Governments may be able to concert their action as soon as two or three great Powers shall have agreed to do so.

Italian Embassy, London,
March 5, 1924.

[E 2230 1752 44] No. 54.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Mr MacDonald. (*Received March 12, 1924.*)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 11, 1924.

THERE is general disapproval in vernacular press and in Egyptian circles of proclamation of King Hussein as Caliph. His pretensions are characterised as arrogant and absurd and are attributed in some quarters to British instigation.

Prayers were offered for Abdul Megid last Friday in most of the mosques, including Azhar. In one important mosque omission of prayer caused protests among congregation.

General tendency is to express sympathy with Abdel Megid and resentment against Mustafa Kemal and Turkish Government, and a proposal by Ulama to refuse to recognise latter's action pending convocation of a Moslem Congress in Cairo has received marked popular support.

There is also some talk of restoration of Caliphate to Egypt in which connection King Fuad has been mentioned.

(Repeated to Beirout, Jerusalem, Constantinople and Bagdad.)

[E 2298 1752 44] No. 55.

Great Britain, King Hussein of the Hedjaz and the Caliphate. Memorandum on British Communications to King Hussein.

ON the 1st October 1914 Lord Kitchener in his second message to Shereef Abdulla, wrote:

"It may be that a Mohammedan race will assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina and so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now occurring."

On the strength of this message, Abdulla, on the occasion of King Hussein's coronation in November 1916, sent His Majesty's Government a message of congratulation which was conveyed to Jeddah, Bassorah and Cairo by Colonel Wilson at Jeddah, conveying thanks of His Majesty's Government for "the good will expressed in the message to the Caliph." When pressed on the point by Colonel Wilson Abdulla admitted, over the telephone, that he intended to convey a message to Shereef Hussein as Caliph, and quoted the text of Lord Kitchener's message with sufficient accuracy.

"That message does not, of course, mean that His Majesty's Government attach more than the purely spiritual importance to the Caliphate would be dealt with in a certain manner by Moslems themselves. But the above mentioned above shows how dangerous it would be to give official offence to the Caliph by His Majesty's Government at this juncture, and that will increase as we approach the peace settlement."

A possible interpretation of Lord Kitchener's message was conveyed by His Majesty's Government to Shereef Hussein in a formal declaration in the name of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (No. 273 of the 11th April, 1915) to Sir H. McMahon:

"His Majesty's Government consider that the question of Caliphate is one which must be decided by Muhammadans themselves, without interference of non-Moslem Powers. Should it be found necessary to decide for or against Caliphate, that decision would, therefore, naturally be expected by His Majesty's Government, but the decision must be left entirely to Moslems themselves."

This declaration evoked a long memorandum dated the 6th May, 1915, from Sir Ali Haidar, Grand Kadi of the Sudan, which he argued that Shereef Hussein was the best available candidate for the Caliphate and that if he received substantial support from His Majesty's Government, he had good prospects of obtaining recognition from a majority of Sheiks of the Sanusi.

In July 1915 Mr. Storrs' letter to Sir H. McMahon, Shereef Hussein demanded that "England should approve of the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate of Islam" (p. 40). At this time was also kept strongly urged by Lord Kitchener's message and stimulated by Sir Mark Sykes' forthcoming, but it appears that it was also prompted, as he was also informed by the Nationalist Committee at Damascus. From Mr. Storrs' statement of October 1915 mentioned that, when he was starting at Port Said to spend the winter of 1914-15, before the first Turkish attack on the Canal, he found that the civilian committee there had already secretly elected Shereef of Mecca as Caliph. On receiving a telegram to Rashad, the Sultan of Turkey. Our first action therefore, after learning that society was that we must at all costs to Shereef of Mecca, and to procure his allegiance on behalf of the efforts of our party are recommended our allegiance to Rashad."

He further stated that one of the final aims of the Arab party was that "Shereef Hussein of Mecca would be Caliph and Sovereign of the new empire."

In conversation with General Clayton he added that—

"The members of the society had taken a solemn oath on the Koran that they will enforce and establish an Arab Caliphate in Arabia, Syria and Mesopotamia at all costs and under any circumstances sacrificing for this object all their efforts and property and if need be, their lives."

The fact was thus seemingly established, that Sherif Hussein before opening negotiations with the Turks was already in touch with the British Government, and that he was determined to secure the best terms he could for himself and his family at any rate. Some days later Hussein wrote to Abdullah asking for a further message for settlement.

On the 6th August Sir M. McMahon sent the Sherif, through Abdullah, the following message, which Hussein received on the 9th August:—

"His Majesty's Government have received your letter of the 2nd August, and understand clearly the contents. Before replying I wish to point out that I am only authorised to conduct negotiations with persons who are definitely recognised as the leaders of the Arab race, and I am therefore unable to enter into any correspondence with you regarding the Caliphate, which question will be settled in accordance with the wishes of the Moslem world."

On the 9th August Abdullah wrote to Aziz Ali Egypt, and Sir R. Wingate protested against the offer of the Caliphate to the Sherif of Mecca. Sir R. Wingate wrote:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

Aziz Ali replied on the 10th August:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 11th August Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 12th August Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 13th August Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 14th August Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 15th August Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 16th August Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 17th August Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 18th August Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 19th August Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 20th August Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 21st August Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 22nd August Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 23rd August Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 24th August Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 25th August Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 26th August Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 27th August Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 28th August Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 29th August Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 30th August Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 31st August Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 1st September Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 2nd September Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 3rd September Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 4th September Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 5th September Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

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"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 4th December Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 5th December Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 6th December Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 7th December Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 8th December Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 9th December Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 10th December Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 11th December Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 12th December Sir H. McMahon replied to Sir R. Wingate:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch, and that the Arabs will not support your candidature. Moreover, the Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance. The Caliphate is a purely religious question, and has no political significance."

On the 13th December Sir R. Wingate wrote to Sir H. McMahon:—

"I am convinced that the Caliphate question is a most dangerous one for us to touch,

the Sherif's announcement (regarding his assumption of kingship and "religious chiefs") in the draft telegram also said that—

"Religious supremacy in Islam is a question which His Majesty's Government have repeatedly declared is one to which Moslems alone must decide for themselves, therefore comment upon it beyond expressing a hope that I could clearly point out to the Hejaz the advisability of the announcement of the Mecca manifesto being postponed, as it gives rise to undesirable criticism."

Sir H McMahon assented to the Sherif's communication with this telegram but the Foreign Office answered very coldly.

On the 1st November, 1916, Sir H McMahon informed the Foreign Office that a telegram had been received by the Sherif's agent at Cairo from the Emir Abdulla, the Sherif's second son, announcing that Hussein had assumption of the title "King of the Arabs" had been communicated to the foreign Missions of the Allied Powers and to the Moslem Powers and that "As to the Caliphate they (the people of the Hejaz) will follow whatever decision the Moslems agree upon."

It should be noted that in these telegrams the assumption by the title of King was never mentioned as "religious leadership."

On the 1st April, 1917 Colonel Wilson reported that Friday prayers in the mosques of Mecca had been changed in addition to the Caliph "the Sultan of Constantinople was now prayed for by name as King of the Arab Countries."

On or about the 3rd January, 1918 Major K Cornwallis, of the Arab Bureau, lunched in the guest-house of Mecca, was visited by the Emir Abdulla. The Emir regretted Major Cornwallis's absence and said to Cornwallis in the course of conversation that the Emir's father was to discuss the question of proclaiming King of the Arabs. Major Cornwallis having remarked that the King would be well advised to proceed with caution, Abdulla replied that King would be well advised in the matter. Cornwallis replied that he was not interested in the matter further than that the Arabs would have to stand or fall by their own unaided efforts.

On the 6th February, 1918 Cornwallis reported that it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to start coffee-shops, such a step as King Hussein's proclamation of Caliphate would have an effect on the minds of British Moslem subjects of Hejaz would not have His Majesty's Government's approval. He discussed the proposal at length and the intention of taking action with the knowledge and approval of His Majesty's Government.

The Arab Bureau reassured Major Cornwallis on this point and added that the Government of India's sympathies were with Hussein, and that precautions were being taken to prevent Indian Moslems from making the two or three pilgrimages necessary.

On August 1919 when King Hussein was being pressed by Caliphate mission in Syria, pressure was put on Hejaz by French Government in connection with the Conference at the Peace Conference at Arab Bureau was moved to Cairo, 1919.

As soon as Hussein had always seemed to envisage King Hussein's appointment to Caliphate, and Hogarth always pointed out that he was well aware that Moslem world would not look favourably on any claim by Hussein to Caliphate. He also stated, however, that he had a secret wish to be elected by a council of Moslem people at Mecca. We have recently learnt from King that Mecca people at Al Kibla were urging Hussein to accept Caliphate. Extracts from other Arabic newspapers in the Hejaz which were in accord with the Caliphate."

On the 31st August, 1919 British agent Jeddah wrote to King Hussein urging him to issue a statement to the effect that Great Britain should not be opposed to any Moslem Caliph.

The correspondence which passed between the British agent Jeddah and the King was discussed after the 24th August 1919, referred to by

High Commissioner's exact letters at the beginning of their negotiations (Colonel Wilson's) caused much remarks that Great Britain's attention is to secure the Arab Caliphate, (Lyons Excellency (the British agent, Jeddah) now says "Do not write Emir's Mamun."

However as the result of this correspondence King Hussein caused the proclamation, of which the following is a translation to be published in "Al Kibla" on the 17th August 1919

"A Second Proclamation from the Office of the Secretary of the King's Bureau.

Desiring to express their goodwill many prominent persons have been addressing My Lord and Master the Illustrious King, with all of Emirs Mountains. As this title is synonymous with that of the Caliphate the assumption of which is the prerogative of the Moslem world we are constrained to refuse. All the other than that given to the King by the country as stated in "Al Kibla No. 237, 9th Rabi el Awa 1337."

W J CHILDS.

Foreign Office March 12, 1924

[E 2341 1752 44] No 56

Mr. Lindsay to Mr MacDonald (Received March 17)

No 200

Sir, *Constantinople, March 8, 1924*

ADNAN BEY called on me to-day to explain the telegraphic correspondence which had just taken place between Mustafa Kemal Pasha on the one hand, and Syukrat Ali, Indian Moslem Abdul Hamid Khan of Egypt, on the other, regarding the abolition of the Caliphate. Abdul Hamid Khan, who is a member of the Hizbeh Watan.

These two gentlemen had sent telegrams to Mustafa Kemal, the purport of which Adnan Bey did not know. They would however clearly amount to the same as the telegram which Mustafa Kemal has answered and to which I shall refer below. Mustafa Kemal's answer to Syukrat Ali and Abdul Hamid Khan were labouring from the misconception that Indian Moslem opinion was greatly agitated at the possible answer that the Government might take this week was a purely hypothetical one to the Turkish people for whom the Caliphate had been a cause of embarrassment and responsibility in their internal affairs and foreign relations. In the hope of the Caliphate was found that it was not left to continue possibly to cause disagreement at Ankara and to bring about the Islamic Republic over the whole world. The collapse of the Caliphate proved that this supposition was impossible, and the right decision of the Caliphate lost for the present. There was therefore nothing contrary to Islam in the action taken. These remarks may be regarded to the institution.

3 Adnan Bey said that this exchange of telegrams might come to the knowledge of the British authorities and give rise to their anxiety. I exaggerated representations had therefore been made to the Turkish Government. I replied that as soon as I was made aware of the representations from Angora I had spoken to Tewfik Pasha towards His Majesty's Government. On behalf of the Turkish Government may therefore confirm the report mentioned in my despatch No 156 of the 27th February, paragraph , that, with respect to the Moslem regeneration as they intend to exploit the abolition of the Caliphate as proving that pan-Islamism is dead, and that Great Britain henceforth has no reason to fear in the future the troubles her Mahommedan dependencies which it has caused in the past.

I have, &c

W C LINDSAY

[E 2343/32 44] No 57

Mr Lindsay to Mr MacDonald —(Received March 17)

(No 201)

Sir, *Constantinople March 12, 1924*

WITH reference to my telegram No 156 of the 10th March, I have the honour to report that on the 5th March Ismet Pasha presented the resignation of his Cabinet and was immediately requested by the President of the Republic to form a new Government

2. It has been stated that a motive to provide a plausible ground for Ismet Pasha's summary dismissal would be found in the fact that by the Assembly he would be called to account for his responsible and strong opposition to the Treaty of Lausanne.

3. Whatever the motive, the dismissal was received with a sort of relief by the Assembly, which was only too glad to get rid of the Government of the first Grand Vizier of the Republic, who had become a thorn in the side of the Assembly.

4. The statement that Ismet Pasha was dismissed by Mustafa Kemal was received in the Assembly with cheers, and was greeted with loud laughter by the Opposition. The Opposition party is most active in efforts to show that Ismet Pasha's dismissal was only brought about by the pressure of the Opposition. We have had information that the Assembly is very angry with Ismet Pasha for having allowed himself to be dismissed by Mustafa Kemal, and for having failed to assert the authority of the Assembly.

5. The new Ministry was constituted as follows:

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs	Ismet Pasha
Minister of Religious Affairs	(not appointed)
Minister for Home Affairs	Fethi Bey
Minister of War	Kiazim Pasha
Minister of Finance	Ali Hikmet Bey
Minister of Justice	Seyid Bey (Deputy for Trebizond)
Minister of Public Instruction	Hamdi Bey
Minister of Public Works	Zekai Bey (Deputy for Angora)
Minister of Commerce, Agriculture and Communications	Yussuf Kemal Bey
Minister of Evkaf	Vassif Bey
Minister of Public Health and Social Assistance	Dr. Refik Bey
Minister of Reconstruction	Ibrahim Bey

6. Of these Ministers, two of the former Ministry, Mustafa Fevzi Pasha and Yussuf Kemal Bey, have been dismissed. Rauf Bey, who was one of the three who resigned on the 3rd instant, remains Minister of Marine.

7. None of the foreign Ministers, with the possible exception of Mustafa Kemal himself, have had any experience of foreign affairs, and the Cabinet as a whole is generally looked upon as a weak one. Ismet Pasha is usually reported to be the strongest Minister, and he will probably be the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is said that Mustafa Kemal himself will control the Ministry of Justice by means of Vassif Bey, who is a personal friend of his, and who is very much in his confidence.

8. Of the new Ministers Zekai Bey is known to be a strong, even an important personality. He is said to be honest. He studied at Berne and is said to be a Socialist. He is a Deputy for Angora, and represented Constantinople in the Assembly in the first Parliament of the Republic. He is a friend of the Grand Vizier's, and is said to be a strong supporter of Ismet Pasha. He is said to be a man of ability, and to be a hard worker. He is not known to have any political ambitions. He is said to be a man of strong character, and to be a man of strong will. He is said to be a man of strong character, and to be a man of strong will. He is said to be a man of strong character, and to be a man of strong will.

9. Yussuf Kemal Bey is a Deputy for Trebizond. He is said to be a man of strong character, and to be a man of strong will. He is said to be a man of strong character, and to be a man of strong will. He is said to be a man of strong character, and to be a man of strong will.

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172. Ibrahim Bey is a Deputy for Treb

[E 2356 1333 44] No. 55

Sir Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald (Received March 14)

(No. 224)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 4, 1924*

IN my despatch No. 81 of the 29th February I reported as between the Russian and Turkish Governments, I had no doubt that the Soviet Government Commissariat for Foreign Affairs would be fully prepared to take the necessary steps to have them expelled.

Having regard to the presence at this moment in Paris of Mustafa Kemal and his Government, I have thought it desirable to refrain from taking any action in the matter pending the receipt of your instructions, which I trust may be forthcoming by the time this despatch reaches you. I have also refrained from bringing the matter to the notice of the Egyptian Government, as I am anxious to avoid any step which might tend to increase the difficulties of the Egyptian Government in their negotiations with the Soviet Government.

I have, however, been informed by the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires here that the Egyptian Government have already taken steps to expel the Soviet Trade Delegation from Egypt. His Excellency has also informed me that the Egyptian Government have had under consideration the question of the withdrawal of their Diplomatic Representative from Moscow, but have come to the conclusion that it would be inadvisable to take this step at the present moment, as they are anxious to maintain relations with Soviet Russia in order to be able to give effective support to the Turkish Government in the event of the latter finding it necessary to take any action against the Soviet Government.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

[E 2358 1752 44] No. 60

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald (Received March 17)

(No. 241)

Sir, *Pera, March 12, 1924*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, reporting on the Turkish Republican Party Congress which has just concluded its sittings at Angora.

2. Mustafa Kemal Pasha opened the Congress with a speech which was attended by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Public Instruction, Public Works, Agriculture, Finance, Justice, Commerce, Communications, Marine, and Evkaf, and by the Prime Minister. The Congress proceeded to elect a Committee of Inquiry into the Administration of the Republican Party, and then adjourned until the 1st March, when the Committee will report. It is expected that the Congress will be closed on the 4th March.

3. The first day's proceedings were devoted to the reading of telegrams and letters from the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne, from the Governors of the Turkish provinces, and from the Turkish Republican Party Organizations throughout the country, all of which expressed confidence in the Government and approval of their action at Lausanne. The Delegation's telegram, which was read by Ismet Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is reported to have been received with great enthusiasm by the Congress, and to have been greeted with cries of "Long live Ismet Pasha!" "Long live the Victorious Commander-in-Chief!" and "Long live the Saviour of the Fatherland!"

4. Mustafa Kemal Pasha replied in a short but not unimportant speech, the gist of which has been reported correctly in the Turkish Press. The following passage from the speech is noteworthy as showing the importance which he attaches to the Treaty of Lausanne:—

"The Treaty of Lausanne is a document which will be a source of pride to the Turkish nation for many years to come. It is a Treaty which has been signed by the Great Powers, and which has been ratified by the Grand National Assembly. It is a Treaty which has been registered by the League of Nations. It is a Treaty which has been welcomed by the whole world. It is a Treaty which has been hailed by the Turkish nation with the greatest joy and satisfaction. It is a Treaty which has been received with the greatest enthusiasm by the Turkish people. It is a Treaty which has been welcomed by the whole world. It is a Treaty which has been hailed by the Turkish nation with the greatest joy and satisfaction. It is a Treaty which has been received with the greatest enthusiasm by the Turkish people."

5. The Congress has also received telegrams from Turkish Republican Party Organizations in Egypt, India, and elsewhere, expressing their sympathy with the Turkish Republic and its struggle for national independence.

6. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's speech, which was not unduly long, was devoted mainly to a review of the work accomplished by the Republican Party since the Congress of 1923, and to a statement of the principles which should guide the Party in the future. He dwelt at length on the importance of maintaining the unity of the Party, and on the necessity of avoiding the formation of any opposition Party. He also referred to the question of the Caliphate, and to the recent abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, which he described as a measure of great importance, and one which would be of benefit to religion itself.

7. After referring to the question of the Straits, Mustafa Kemal Pasha made the following statement, which has been reported in the Turkish Republican Press:—

"Almost all the nations have in the course of the centuries had disputes with Turkey. The United Soviet Republics have had no such disputes with Turkey. The attitude of the Soviet Government in the Straits question is a proof of this. The existence of those engagements as well as that of the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Government will be a guarantee for the strengthening of the fraternal sentiments which unite the two nations."

8. This is followed by reference to the Peace Treaty which, after years of struggle for and perseverance in upholding the rights of Turkey, the conclusion of the two treaties with the Soviet Republics, Turkey, the ancestor of the Turkish nation whose power and existence are the basis of the Presidency of the Union of Soviet Republics.

9. Mustafa Kemal Pasha replied in a short but not unimportant speech, the gist of which has been reported correctly in the Turkish Press. The following passage from the speech is noteworthy as showing the importance which he attaches to the Treaty of Lausanne:—

"The Treaty of Lausanne is a document which will be a source of pride to the Turkish nation for many years to come. It is a Treaty which has been signed by the Great Powers, and which has been ratified by the Grand National Assembly. It is a Treaty which has been registered by the League of Nations. It is a Treaty which has been welcomed by the whole world. It is a Treaty which has been hailed by the Turkish nation with the greatest joy and satisfaction. It is a Treaty which has been received with the greatest enthusiasm by the Turkish people. It is a Treaty which has been welcomed by the whole world. It is a Treaty which has been hailed by the Turkish nation with the greatest joy and satisfaction. It is a Treaty which has been received with the greatest enthusiasm by the Turkish people."

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[E 2334 448 44] No 64

Mr MacDonald to Mr Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No 42)
(Telegraph) *Foreign Office March 19 1924*

YOUR telegram No 57 of 10th March. I realise that if some settlement of Turkish question is to be reached before Parliament rises for Easter it is necessary that we should be in a position to address Conference on this question by 28th March. The Irish Free State Bill will not be finally disposed of in House of Lords before 27th March, and it is hoped that Parliament will rise for Easter on 28th March. Meanwhile, I am anxious that no opportunity should be lost of making progress with the Turkish question, and I am therefore willing that you should, if you think it desirable, inform Ismet Pasha that I am prepared to receive him in London for discussion of the question, provided that he can arrive here not later than 25th March. I am sending a copy of this telegram to Sir H Rumbold at Paris, and I shall be glad if you will inform him that I am willing that he should, if he thinks it desirable, inform M Poincaré to the same effect.

I am, &c
J RAMSAY MacDONALD

[E 1432 634 44] No 65

Mr Macdonald to Mr Peterson (Prague)

(No 17)
Sir, *Foreign Office March 19 1924*

Your despatch No 22 of the 31st January and the telegram of the supply of arms and munitions to Turkey, and in particular the question of the efforts to be made by His Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of the French Government in the proposed attempt to secure an agreement at the Paris meeting with a view to putting an end to the export of arms and munitions to Turkey. I am very glad to have your views on this question, which I have carefully considered before arriving at the decision which I have now taken to postpone for the present any further efforts to carry out this policy.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government feel that it would not be right to ask the British Parliament to carry out a policy which appears to them of doubtful wisdom. They accordingly propose to leave the export of arms and munitions to Turkey from this country entirely free, and to refrain from any further efforts to secure the co-operation of the French Government in the matter.

I am, &c
J RAMSAY MacDONALD

[E 1432 634 44] No 66

Mr MacDonald to Mr Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No 30)
Sir, *Foreign Office March 19 1924*

WITH reference to Mr Oliphant's private letter to Sir H Rumbold of the 21st ultimo, I transmit to you herewith copies of the Note I addressed on the 19th instant to the Turkish Government for the concession for the establishment of a port of entry in Turkish territory at the head-quarters of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for the export of arms to Turkey. I transmit to you herewith copies of a despatch which we have addressed

to His Majesty's diplomatic representatives at Paris, Rome, Washington, Tokyo, Brussels and Prague to get them to make a copy of a letter which is addressed to the Board of Trade on this question.*

2 You will observe that His Majesty's Government have been reluctantly forced to abandon their efforts to obtain an agreed policy in this matter, and I have therefore, I propose to announce in the House of Commons on the 24th instant that the export of arms to Turkey from this country will be free, but that we shall refrain from any further steps in the matter.†

I am, &c
J RAMSAY MacDONALD

[E 1432 634 44] No 67

Mr MacDonald to Mr Phipps (Paris), No 10 and Sir R Graham (Rome) No 20, Sir H Rumbold (Washington) No 18, Sir [illegible] (Brussels) No 10, and Sir [illegible] (Tokyo) No 12, (Information only)

Sir *Foreign Office March 19, 1924*

WITH reference to Lord Crewe's despatch No 12 of the 22nd January and the question of the proposal to prohibit the export of arms and munitions to Turkey, which was the subject of discussion at the French Government's request, I have carefully considered the views which have been expressed by the French Government in favour of the proposal, and I have also given full consideration to the arguments which have been put forward by His Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Rome, Washington, Tokyo, Brussels and Prague against the proposal. I have come to the conclusion that, for the reasons which have been given by the latter, the proposal would be inopportune at the present moment, and I have decided that it should not be pressed further at the present time.

I am, &c
J RAMSAY MacDONALD

[E 1432 634 44] No 68

Lord Curzon to Board of Trade

Sir *Foreign Office, March 19 1924*

WITH reference to previous correspondence ending with your letter of the 17th January last, I am directed by Secretary Mr Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to transmit to you, for the consideration of the Board of Trade, copies of despatches which have been addressed to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Rome, Washington, Tokyo, Brussels, Washington, Prague and Belgrade, inviting them to make representations to the Governments to which they are accredited in support of the proposal which was recently put forward by His Majesty's Government that the export of arms to Turkey should be prohibited.†

2 The Board will observe that His Majesty's Government have now decided not to proceed further with this proposal, and that they will shortly announce in the House of Commons that the export of arms to Turkey will be free, but that they will refrain from any further steps in the matter.

I am, &c
G CURZON

[E 2545/634/44] No. 69

Mr. Phipps to Mr. MacDonald (*Received March 22*)

(No. 650)

His Majesty's Minister at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note to Monsieur Le Foreign Affairs respecting the intention of His Majesty's Government to remove the embargo on the export of arms and munitions to Asia Minor.

Paris, March 21, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 69

Mr. Phipps to M. Poincaré

Paris, March 21, 1924.

M. le Président du Conseil,

On the 16th of January Your Excellency was so good as to address a note to His Majesty's Ambassador regarding the question of the export of arms and munitions to Turkey.

I now have the honour to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has instructed me to inform His Majesty's Government that, while necessarily desiring to go forward in every way with Your Excellency's proposal, they would prefer not to take any action at present in the matter. They nevertheless feel themselves obliged to point out that the question of the export of arms and munitions to Turkey is one which affects the interests of several of the Allied Governments, and that it would be desirable to secure a precise and uniform application to Article 8 of the Protocol annexed to the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, of the arrangement concluded at the Washington Conference of 1921. His Majesty's Government therefore propose to remove the embargo on the export of arms and munitions from the United Kingdom to Turkey which has hitherto been in force.

I have the honour to add that His Majesty's representatives at Rome, Washington, Brussels, Tokio and Prague have been instructed to give similar information to the Governments to which they are accredited.

I have &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

E 2586/210/44 No. 71

M. Loraine to Mr. MacDonald—(Received March 24)

(No. 244)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 10, 1924.*

No event has occurred in this country more important with a view to the very near future than the question of Anglo-Angora relations.

As long as the Turkish press publishes articles hostile to the Allies, the Government cannot undertake the treaty with Constantinople. Mustafa Kemal knows, since the change of Cabinet a week ago and the vote of the Assembly on the 3rd instant, how to attribute the growing conviction that Angora is the capital. Yet Assembly will not be Constantinople-minded, would maintain what it has done, and is prepared only gradually to prevail for more than a few years.

Opinion here is fairly unanimous that Angora is principally bent on Angora itself, and without the slightest wish to cry with the wolves of the Constantinople press against the removal of the capital, I am convinced from what I have seen during the interesting days which have elapsed since the Assembly vote that Ankara or Angora, as it is now called, has been chosen by Mustafa Kemal principally because it is the most Turkish and the most Asiatic town, and to Asia they ought to return, for otherwise there is no clear line between Turkey and Europe as conceived with reason by the founders of the Turkish Empire. There is natural hostility against foreigners, especially Europeans, and the Deputies of Angora claim, for various ways, electricity and other material benefits of European civilisation, but they propose to bring their plans to execution in Angora itself within the framework of a Turkish not a European culture, the principles of autocracy, and they do not understand that have accepted from a small band of Deputies, who likewise want to function in a Turkish atmosphere, their present tame mentality or mission urged, and resume progress in a manner to attract the Angorians.

4. From this state of affairs emerge partly abstract arguments of a more practical character. I do not think the Government must always be under the impression of European military pressure, and I say that Angora would be free to keep out of the new State nought but its own regard as most suitable. Again it was Ataturk and Constantinople which decided, little more than a year from the prostration of the latter, that Christian and Turk could live together in Turkey in a more even balance than hitherto between the interests of Asia and those of Christian people between town and country and between the small and the small. These views would be likely never to have been put to Angora.

5. These views are held by the adversaries of Angora Turkey regret as they will each in the future be a matter less effective than they would be if they were united. Assembly should have been taken to Angora instead of the Bosphorus.

6. The power of assembling all the forces of the nation, to which we attribute the success of Mustafa Kemal in the struggle against the Allies, is based on the appearance of the Ottoman Empire for the very reasons the Christian element in the country is disappointed, and is likely the more to come to it the older it gets. Its character is more Asiatic. Still no importance should be attached to the desire of the people to get rid of the fleshpots of Constantinople. Emphasis is given to the stages of the Republic's development by the types of houses. There is acute economic distress, but only a small proportion of better-class population is for the present Government, short of a revolution. The masses, however, consistently confer assent upon the Government from Angora, and the Assembly would not dare to attack it, I am sure, from fear of the consequences they never could control, but is ascribed to power Angora maintains that gives Constantinople to Angora.

7. The foregoing may explain briefly the chief views, I should almost say sets of opinions current, and I proceed to state as briefly and completely possible what the point at issue is. That is that the question of Angora versus Constantinople is a question for the Allies to consider as a purely political conflict between various systems of foreign policy which may be in the course of development in Turkey, whatever views the Allies may themselves entertain on the subject. The future of the Turkish State, and of the position of the capital, is only one of the important questions which will confront the Allies in the course of peace negotiations, and we believe the advice or European Governments to Greece, before the recent elections, to postpone any decision until the return and views of the Ambassadors to Turkey could be obtained, if the capital was at Constantinople or by putting forward other reasons of this character. As to what the attitude of the Allies would be, such as he mentioned, assuming it to be correct—viz., that the capital should be at Angora—I have no idea with certainty of obtaining precise views on this question at the present moment, but I should say that Constantinople will not be the capital of Turkey for several months to come. Unofficially His Majesty's Government have to hear what they wish their representative to do within a very few days.

8. In my previous despatches I have briefly touched on the advantages or otherwise which we at present have in the transaction of business with the Turkish Government. Ataturk Bey, however, is not to be thought of. Mr. Sty[illegible] Foreign Affairs is a very agreeable, good-natured person with whom one can very well get on, capable of seeing another person's point of view. I do not wish to overestimate his services as means of communicating with the Government at Angora. What we

communicate to him in writing I have to let that I will transmit to the Ministry, these written observations which we receive from him for submission to the Argentine Government, but I have to request that I may receive their definitive verbal arguments with as little delay as possible, in order that I may be able to communicate them to my Government by the first opportunity.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

91

'E 2588/32/44' No. 71

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald (Received March 24.)

(No. 247)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 10, 1924.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 102 of the 26th February, I have the honour to state that the first National Assembly has set aside one day a week, Sunday, for the consideration of the draft Constitution of the Turkish State, i.e. It was at the same time decided by the Assembly to adopt the Constitution article by article.

2. On the occasion of the Ghazi's first appearance in the Assembly, Jelal Noury Bey, Minister of Public Instruction, made a statement that his Committee had drawn up rules based for the present on the sovereignty of the nation and the separation of the Powers. The Constitution, however, was based not on the separation of the Powers but on the "predominance" of the President of the Republic, who could not dissolve the Assembly but could take ordinary sovereign decisions without consulting the Assembly. The Committee had considered other constitutions among which were those of the United States of America and Switzerland as models which it had followed.

3. Certain Deputies objected to the draft when it was first read, and some of them proposed that it should be sent back to the Committee. The principal objections raised to the draft were that it conferred powers on the Ghazi, namely, the right to dissolve the Assembly, to appoint the President of the Republic, the rights of dissolution and veto, and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The latter proposal was strongly opposed, but it was finally decided to refer the draft Constitution, with the exception of the articles dealing with the Presidency, to the Committee.

4. Many of the articles have been discussed, but generally without opposition. Article 7 was the most controversial. It was originally drafted that the Grand National Assembly should be the only legislative power in the State, but it was finally decided that the Executive power should be exercised by the Assembly through the Ministry responsible to it. Article 9 was also the subject of much discussion, but was finally passed without amendment.

5. Article 10 provides that the capital of the State is at present Angora. Some Deputies proposed that Constantinople should be the capital, but the majority of the Assembly were opposed to this.

6. The Assembly has decided that the Ministry shall be responsible to the Assembly, and that the Ministry or individual Ministers can be overthrown by a vote of no confidence. The Ministry is also responsible to the Ghazi, who can dismiss it at any time.

7. Article 23 provides that the Assembly shall meet every year on the 1st November, but that it may be convoked at any time by the Ghazi or by one-fourth of the members of the Assembly. Article 24 provides that elections shall take place every four years, but that the Assembly may decide to hold elections before the expiration of this period.

8. Article 26 provides that the Assembly shall have the right to initiate legislation, but that the Ministry shall have the right to introduce Bills. Article 27 provides that the Assembly shall have the right to interpellate the Ministry, and to pass votes of confidence or no confidence in the Ministry. Article 28 provides that the Assembly shall have the right to appoint Commissions of Inquiry.

9. Article 29 provides that the Assembly shall have the right to declare war, and to ratify treaties and conventions. It is generally understood that the Assembly will not have the right to ratify treaties, but that this will be done by the Ministry. Article 30 provides that the Assembly shall have the right to grant pardons and to commute sentences.

10. Article 31 provides that the Ministry shall have the right to issue decrees having the force of law when the Assembly is not sitting, but that these decrees must be submitted to the Assembly for approval when it next meets. Article 32 provides that the Ministry shall have the right to conclude provisional commercial agreements with foreign Powers, but that these agreements must be submitted to the Assembly for approval when it next meets.

11. Article 33 provides that the Assembly shall have the right to declare martial law, and to mobilize the army. Article 34 provides that the Assembly shall have the right to declare a state of siege.

12. Article 35 provides that the Assembly shall have the right to declare a state of siege.

13. Article 36 provides that the Assembly shall have the right to declare a state of siege.

14. Article

7 The possible regard [illegible] to the last article of the draft Treaty may [illegible] to consist of two parts. One to this which states that sovereignty [illegible] to the latter, appears to have given [illegible] The article as it stands does not [illegible] the form which it was submitted after a Treaty had suggested that other articles conflicted with the principle [illegible] appeared to some great [illegible] Turkish statesman pointed out that [illegible] afford to admit that to sustain or uphold the principle of a most [illegible] sovereignty

8 At the [illegible] was drafted providing that every Turk above 30 years of age was eligible for the office of Deputy, was [illegible] by existing Turkish laws. The Deputies appointed to get [illegible] very interesting question of [illegible] connection with the [illegible] Treaty. A good deal of uncertainty [illegible] as to whether the Assembly by [illegible] article could [illegible] at once or [illegible] gradually and [illegible] the [illegible] have [illegible] later [illegible] The point will [illegible] to be [illegible] [illegible] secured [illegible] but [illegible] nothing show what is to [illegible] the Assembly as between [illegible] years, however [illegible] Deputy was declared [illegible] [illegible] would become void

9 The Sheikh-ul-Islam [illegible] to the Palace to [illegible] Deputy was [illegible] for two reasons. Not [illegible] that [illegible] should [illegible]

10 The [illegible] 16 was slightly [illegible] the language [illegible] might [illegible] a phrase expressive [illegible] Deputies [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible] with the most [illegible] [illegible]

11 Article 7 was [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] Assembly parliamentary [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] respect [illegible] [illegible] stated, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

'Note, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The general attitude in Constantinople and, so far as I know, elsewhere is one of [illegible] indifference or sullen resignation, bred of assistance and fear of further [illegible]

It is more interesting for the moment to consider the effect on the minority of the certain [illegible] to which the decision of the Assembly has given rise [illegible] The Angora Government have [illegible] somewhat to their position [illegible] to know that they are very anxious to effect [illegible] the amount of mess from outside which is put [illegible] Chicago. On the other hand, they wish to avoid any [illegible] the [illegible] of any [illegible] press. The result is that direct reports [illegible] are [illegible] prompt not to appear, the papers when they arrive [illegible] they [illegible] accounts of [illegible] Europe or Constantinople, which [illegible] Government, but [illegible] post

[illegible] but [illegible] statements in the press of European countries with [illegible] to prevent [illegible] across the [illegible] Governments of those countries are [illegible] seeking to exploit the [illegible] arising from the [illegible] interest. It is [illegible] enough that [illegible] should suppose [illegible] Government [illegible] to [illegible] King Hussein. It is rather [illegible] that [illegible] Charge d'Affaires suggesting that [illegible] hospitality should be [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible], and [illegible] has been invited to Rome, should [illegible] as an [illegible] of [illegible] French or Italian Government as opposed to [illegible] for reasons [illegible]

3. The [illegible] measures which [illegible] have [illegible] so far were [illegible] courteous [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] precautionary [illegible] What [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to see [illegible] [illegible] King Hussein [illegible] by Mustafa Kemal to Ali Fuad Pasha and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

possible. The Senate were not to be elected from a list prepared by an Opposition group. Fazil Bey of Dersim was elected Secretary-General, in fact the more significant as he was not a member of the Party. He was in touch with the Opposition.

It was known that the Opposition were responsible for this successful campaign, working principally with the veto on the proposed appointment of the deputies. Others wanted the right of dissolving the Assembly as proposed in the draft Constitution. Rumours of a Senate crisis began to circulate and a controversy arose as to whether it was to be called together as a Presidential or Ministerial body, especially in the event of being dissolved except by its own act. In the end, however, the Constitutionalists were successful in their strong efforts were made to effect a compromise. The proposals were: (1) that the Senate should be convened in extraordinary session by the President of the Republic on the 21st–22nd March. This session would appear to have taken place at Mustafa Kemal's residence, but it is stated with the Senate's authority that (2) on the 1st March the Senate would be convened in ordinary session and that the Assembly would not be dissolved before the 1st March, when the Senate would be free to act as it thought fit. Some Senators would like to see the Assembly dissolved, but the majority are said to be in favour of the Assembly remaining in session. Fourteen members of the Republican Party have resigned from the Senate, and it is rumoured that Senators will be appointed in their places. Other Senators who will be appointed are Ministers, Secretaries of State, University professors and others who will be selected for their services to the Republic.

On the 1st March the draft Constitution was presented to the Assembly. The Assembly appointed a Committee of 15 to consider it. It was then given to the Press, and on the 3rd March was published in the Official Gazette. The Committee of 15 met on the 4th March and elected Yunus Nadi Bey as President. The Committee has been sitting daily since then, and has completed its work. It is understood that the Committee has made a number of changes in the draft Constitution, but the nature of these changes is not known. The Committee's report will be presented to the Assembly on the 10th March, and the Assembly will then proceed to discuss the Constitution article by article. It is expected that the discussion will last about a week, and that the Constitution will be passed by the Assembly on the 17th March.

The Constitution will then be published in the Official Gazette, and will come into force on the day of publication. It is expected that the Constitution will be published on the 18th March.

The Constitution will provide for a unicameral legislature, consisting of a single chamber, the Grand National Assembly. The Assembly will be elected by universal suffrage, and will have the power to make laws, to control the executive, and to appoint the President of the Republic. The President will be elected by the Assembly for a term of four years, and will be eligible for re-election. The President will have the power to dissolve the Assembly, but only with the consent of the Senate. The Senate will consist of 50 members, appointed by the President for life. The Senate will have the power to veto laws passed by the Assembly, but only once. The Assembly will then have the power to override the veto by a two-thirds majority.

The Constitution will provide for a Council of Ministers, consisting of a Prime Minister and not more than 15 other Ministers. The Ministers will be responsible to the Assembly, and will be liable to be removed by a vote of no confidence. The Prime Minister will be appointed by the President, and will be the leader of the majority party in the Assembly.

The Constitution will provide for a Supreme Court, consisting of a President and not more than 15 other judges. The judges will be appointed by the President, and will hold office during good behaviour. The Supreme Court will have the power to declare laws unconstitutional.

The Constitution will provide for a system of local government, consisting of provinces, districts, and communes. The provinces will be governed by governors appointed by the President. The districts will be governed by district officers appointed by the governors. The communes will be governed by elected councils.

The Constitution will provide for a system of taxation, consisting of income tax, property tax, and customs duties. The income tax will be levied on a progressive scale. The property tax will be levied on the value of real property. The customs duties will be levied on imports and exports.

The Constitution will provide for a system of education, consisting of primary schools, secondary schools, and universities. Education will be free and compulsory for children between the ages of 7 and 14. Education will be provided in the Turkish language.

The Constitution will provide for a system of military service, consisting of a standing army and a reserve. Military service will be compulsory for all male citizens between the ages of 20 and 45. The standing army will consist of 150,000 men. The reserve will consist of 500,000 men.

The Constitution will provide for a system of foreign relations, consisting of treaties, alliances, and diplomatic representation. Treaties will be made by the President, with the consent of the Senate. Alliances will be made by the President, with the consent of the Assembly. Diplomatic representatives will be appointed by the President.

The Constitution will provide for a system of amendment, consisting of a two-thirds majority in the Assembly and a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Amendments will be submitted to a referendum of the people.

The Constitution will provide for a system of transitional provisions, consisting of rules for the first election of the Assembly, the first meeting of the Assembly, and the first election of the President.

The Constitution will provide for a system of repeal, consisting of a list of laws repealed by the Constitution.

The Constitution will provide for a system of interpretation, consisting of rules for the interpretation of the Constitution.

The Constitution will provide for a system of amendment, consisting of a two-thirds majority in the Assembly and a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Amendments will be submitted to a referendum of the people.

The Constitution will provide for a system of transitional provisions, consisting of rules for the first election of the Assembly, the first meeting of the Assembly, and the first election of the President.

The Constitution will provide for a system of repeal, consisting of a list of laws repealed by the Constitution.

The Constitution will provide for a system of interpretation, consisting of rules for the interpretation of the Constitution.

In the meantime, Yunus Nadi Bey, chairman of the Constitutional Committee, and Jean Nouri, the *rapporteur* on the draft Constitution, have given an interview to the press on the 23rd March in which they stated that the Assembly, in drafting the Constitution, had been guided by the principle of having legislative and executive powers united in the Assembly, and had rejected the idea of a Senate with powers of veto. They also stated that the Assembly had rejected the proposal that the President should be elected by the people, and had decided that he should be elected by the Assembly. They also stated that the Assembly had rejected the proposal that the Constitution should be submitted to a referendum of the people.

Apart from the question of the Senate, there is much talk of other possible crises. It is known that the Assembly, by its own decision, will not be dissolved before the 1st March, when the Senate will be free to act as it thinks fit. The Assembly will then be dissolved, and a new election will be held. The Assembly will then proceed to discuss the Constitution article by article. It is expected that the discussion will last about a week, and that the Constitution will be passed by the Assembly on the 17th March. The Constitution will then be published in the Official Gazette, and will come into force on the day of publication. It is expected that the Constitution will be published on the 18th March.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 2984 448 44 No. 77

Mr. Heathcoat Mr. Lindsay Constantinople

No. 46.
Telegraphic. *Foreign Office, April 3, 1924*

TREATY of ... Council is ... following ... the ... members ... Constantinople ... Assembly ... second reading. ... Council ... Assembly ... Ankara ... Foreign Office ...

[E 3080 32/44] No. 78

Mr. Lampson Mr. Mellon (Received April 7)

(No. 285)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 2, 1924.*

I have ... Yunus Nadi ... Chief ... Minister ... Grand National Assembly ... Constitutional ...

... Assembly ... Council ... Ministers ... Assembly ... Council ... Ministers ... Assembly ... Council ... Ministers

E 3082 222 44 No. 79

Letter to Mr MacDonald (Received April 7)

Enclosure

Copy of letter to Mr Lindsay

Sir,

Sir,

*Sir,

Enclosure in No. 79

Extract from the "Journal d'Orient," Constantinople, of March 29, 1924.

UNE ZONE INTERDITE AUX ARMENIENS EN ANATOLIE.

LE Ministre de l'intérieur Feyzi bey a fait les déclarations suivantes au journal 'Yeni-Adam' sur la situation de la Cilicie :

'Tant au cours de la retraite que depuis notre dernière grande victoire remportée par nous, nous avons déclaré que tous les Arméniens avant été expulsés hors des frontières nationales, ceux qui étaient revenus ou les derniers seraient autorisés à rentrer dans leurs foyers. Quelle est votre opinion personnelle et quelles sont les mesures prises par le gouvernement à ce sujet ?

'Nous avons déclaré vouloir accorder aux Arméniens tout le territoire situé à l'est de la ligne qui, de Trébizonde, Samsoun, aboutit à Sivas, Ak-Sehir, Bilefke sur la Méditerranée. Le projet primitif consistait à y établir, sous le contrôle de la Société des nations, un foyer national pour les Arméniens. Mais par la suite nous avons jugé que cette question devait être tranchée par les Arméniens eux-mêmes et non par nous. Nous avons donc retiré notre proposition. Nous n'avons pas l'intention de leur imposer quoi que ce soit. Ceux qui désirent rentrer dans leurs foyers le peuvent librement. Ceux qui ne le désirent pas ne le font pas. Les Arméniens sont libres de choisir leur résidence où bon leur semble, à l'exception de la zone côtière qui s'étend de Mersina à Alexandrette.

'Nous avons pris des mesures spéciales à cet égard. Les Arméniens qui désirent rentrer dans leurs foyers ne sont pas astreints à demander un permis spécial. Ils peuvent se rendre où bon leur semble, à l'exception de la zone côtière susmentionnée. Ceux qui désirent s'établir dans cette zone doivent demander un permis spécial. Nous avons pris cette mesure parce que nous avons constaté que certains Arméniens, sous prétexte de rentrer dans leurs foyers, cherchaient à s'établir dans la zone côtière.

'Nous avons pris des mesures spéciales à l'égard des Arméniens qui désirent rentrer dans leurs foyers. Nous avons constaté que certains Arméniens, sous prétexte de rentrer dans leurs foyers, cherchaient à s'établir dans la zone côtière. Nous avons pris des mesures spéciales à l'égard des Arméniens qui désirent rentrer dans leurs foyers. Nous avons constaté que certains Arméniens, sous prétexte de rentrer dans leurs foyers, cherchaient à s'établir dans la zone côtière.

'Nous avons pris des mesures spéciales à l'égard des Arméniens qui désirent rentrer dans leurs foyers. Nous avons constaté que certains Arméniens, sous prétexte de rentrer dans leurs foyers, cherchaient à s'établir dans la zone côtière. Nous avons pris des mesures spéciales à l'égard des Arméniens qui désirent rentrer dans leurs foyers. Nous avons constaté que certains Arméniens, sous prétexte de rentrer dans leurs foyers, cherchaient à s'établir dans la zone côtière.

'Nous avons pris des mesures spéciales à l'égard des Arméniens qui désirent rentrer dans leurs foyers. Nous avons constaté que certains Arméniens, sous prétexte de rentrer dans leurs foyers, cherchaient à s'établir dans la zone côtière. Nous avons pris des mesures spéciales à l'égard des Arméniens qui désirent rentrer dans leurs foyers. Nous avons constaté que certains Arméniens, sous prétexte de rentrer dans leurs foyers, cherchaient à s'établir dans la zone côtière.

E 3111 423 44 No. 80

Mr Hubert to Mr Macdonald — (Received April 7)

(No. 50)

Sir, *Budapest, April 1, 1924*

WITH reference to Mr. Selby's despatch No. 61 of the 12th instant concerning the ratification of the treaty between Hungary and Hungary, I have the honour to report that I was informed yesterday by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged at Vienna on almost exactly a fortnight ago, and the treaty was entered into force some days later, M. Daruvary believing that it entered into force on

According to the Hungarian Constitution it is necessary that a treaty should obtain previous Parliamentary approval before it can be ratified. The treaty of peace, therefore, in the present case, before it was submitted to the Hungarian Assembly, but was ratified by decree.

I have &c.
T. B. HOHLER

E 3139 634 44 No. 81

Sir G. Grahame to Mr Macdonald (Received April 8)

(No. 294)

HIS Majesty's representative at Brussels presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 4th April respecting prohibition of the export of arms and munitions to Turkey.

Brussels, April 5, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 81

M. Hymans to Sir G. Grahame

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Bruxelles, le 4 avril 1924.*

J'AI l'honneur de recevoir la lettre en date de Votre Excellence en date de ce jour me demandant si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a été informé de la décision prise par le Gouvernement français d'interdire l'exportation des armes et munitions à destination de la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a été informé de cette mesure. Il n'a pas eu à prendre une attitude à l'égard de cette décision, les exportateurs belges n'ayant pas demandé d'autorisation à cet effet.

Je saisis &c.
HYMANS

E 3189 3189 44 No. 82

Mr Lindsay to Mr MacDonald (Received April 9)

(No. 70)

(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, April 5, 1924.*

ADVANCE BY speaking unofficially yesterday said that as he resided in Constantinople he was nearer to Baku affairs than Ismet. Last year he had been studying them, latterly as he was thinking of proposing to Angora to effect an approachement with Greece. It would be designed solely as a first step to appease Greek sentiment and would be the more necessary as a result of the exchanges of population on large numbers of Greeks and Turks must inevitably result in the near future in Greek territories. He was glad to know how such a rapprochement would be viewed in Great Britain. It would appear from the Ismet-Chicherin agreement that Russia, in some form or other, was in favour of Greek overtures.

I said you would appreciate the delicacy of his task but you might ask him what in his opinion was being effected at the cost of increased tension in another part of Europe.

He answered quite frankly that the Russian Government's object was to prevent Angora from entering into any combination which might be directed against Russia. He thought it possible that Turkish Government might wish to make a statement to His Majesty's Government in Europe. Even Greece appreciated the importance of these dealings but was somewhat engaged in with Bulgarian Government.

Would it be possible to suggest to naval attaché at Athens that Greece setting off Sultan Seamen against Soviets? I did not know enough about Greek navy to judge whether this idea was practicable. In any case I would have to submit it here with diffidence.

(Copy by bag to Sofia and Athens.)

E 3320 43 44

No 83

Mr Lindsay to Mr Macdonald — Received (April 11)

(No 307)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 10, 1924*

With reference to my despatch No 24 of the 1st March I have to report that the Swiss Steam Boat Company's service on the South Coast of Black Sea has been suspended by the Turkish authorities in consequence of the refusal of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration to grant the Company's request for the release of certain funds which had been deposited with the Administration by the Company as a guarantee for the due fulfilment of their contract with the Turkish Government.

2. The Company's agent at Samsun informed the Vice-Consul there that the Company had been compelled to suspend their service as the Ottoman Public Debt Administration had refused to release the funds deposited with them by the Company as a guarantee for the due fulfilment of their contract with the Turkish Government. The Company's agent at Samsun informed the Vice-Consul there that the Company had been compelled to suspend their service as the Ottoman Public Debt Administration had refused to release the funds deposited with them by the Company as a guarantee for the due fulfilment of their contract with the Turkish Government.

3. From the legal point of view, the Turkish Government appear to have completed the process of foreclosure of Mahsoor. They have indeed left the owners sufficient means of existence, but their attempts to sell it have not been successful. The owners of the steamers, on the other hand, have been unable to collect their debts from the Government, and have been compelled to suspend their service. The Company's agent at Samsun informed the Vice-Consul there that the Company had been compelled to suspend their service as the Ottoman Public Debt Administration had refused to release the funds deposited with them by the Company as a guarantee for the due fulfilment of their contract with the Turkish Government.

4. It remains to be seen what attitude the Turkish Government will finally adopt in the matter, whether they will insist on the payment of the amount claimed by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, or whether they will allow the Company to withdraw their deposit. The Company's agent at Samsun informed the Vice-Consul there that the Company had been compelled to suspend their service as the Ottoman Public Debt Administration had refused to release the funds deposited with them by the Company as a guarantee for the due fulfilment of their contract with the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 3321 32 44

No 84

Mr Lindsay to Mr MacDonald — Received April 14

(No 330)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 10, 1924*

In the first paragraph of my despatch No 28 of the 1st April I drew attention to the obstacle which the Grand National Assembly at Angora had suggested to the possibility of the Sultan's return to Constantinople. This obstacle was removed on the 3rd April, when the Assembly passed a vote of confidence in the Government by 148 votes to forty-two abstentions. The opposition was led by Ali Fuad Pasha, a former Minister of War, and Rauf Bey, a former Minister of Marine.

2. The debate arose on a draft law proposed by the Constitutional Committee, and the opposition attacked the clause of the Bill which gave the Government control of the army. The new party in opposition to the Assembly is known as the Progressive Party. They urged that the principle of supreme command

* Not printed.

must be retained by the Grand National Assembly itself. The discussions were heavy, especially on the first day, but the Turks are not violent orators. On the 7th April a solution was found in the following formula, which was agreed by a majority of 111 against 42, two members abstaining:

> "The office of commander-in-chief is vested in the moral personality of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and is exercised on its representative capacity by the President of the Republic. The organisation of the armed forces is entrusted in peace to the Chief of the General Staff in accordance with the relevant laws; in war the Chief Commander-in-Chief will be appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers."

3. The meaning of the above is that the control of the armed forces is vested in the Assembly, but that the actual command is exercised by the President of the Republic, who is also the Prime Minister. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace.

4. From the statements made in my despatch No 188 of the 1st March, 1924, it will be seen that it was then intended that the Chief of the General Staff should be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in time of peace, with supreme command in time of war. This intention has been abandoned, and the Prime Minister will be the Commander-in-Chief in time of peace, with supreme command in time of war. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace.

5. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace.

6. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace.

7. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace. The Assembly has also the power to declare war and make peace.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 3189 3189 44 No. 83

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No. 54)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, April 14, 1924*

YOUR telegram No. 70 of 5th April. Greco-Turkish *entente*.

You may assure Admiral Hall that His Majesty's Government would not otherwise than approve and welcome the principle and prospect of a rapprochement between the two countries. But as he is aware the Soviet Government have advised or forced them into which might have involved considerable modification of the position of naval facilities. You will keep in touch with Admiral Hall and assist him to the best of your ability in his efforts to secure the establishment of friendly relations, and will bear in mind that attention is to be given to internal development.

(Repeated to Athens No. 43 and Sofia No. 24.)

E 3462 210 44 No. 86

Mr. Lindsay to the Marquess of Curzon (Received April 18)

(No. 76)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, April 7, 1924*

MY telegram No. 74 proceeding telegram.

Upon which this reply is sufficiently important to justify my proceeding for consultation to Angora. Please repeat this to Angora urgently.

I shall try to start as soon as His Majesty's Government have replied and I hope to be back in a week.

I feel certain that the Angora Government will succeed in persuading the Kemalists to be reasonable, but I do not get a sufficiently definite impression from the Press telegrams and letters which I receive. Please therefore telegraph any further information which you may receive from Angora.

In the meantime it would be preferable to defer any immediate visit.

E 3474 222 44 No. 88

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 1)
Sir *Constantinople, April 10, 1924.*

WITH reference to my Despatch No. 2 of the 2nd April relative to reported massacres of Armenians in Cilicia, I have the honour to transmit herewith to Your Excellency a translation from the Turkish newspaper *Ileri* of the 5th instant, which contains the substance of a telegram from Angora relating to the treatment of Armenians in Cilicia. Measures continue to be taken by the Angora Government to put a stop to the evil practices complained of, and I have written to the Vali of Adana to ask him to report to me what steps he has taken in connection with the matter.

2. Although the Angora Government have issued orders that the Armenians who have returned to Cilicia are to be treated with consideration, it is to be feared that the Turkish officials and gendarmerie will find it difficult to prevent the ill-treatment of the Armenians by the Moslem population, who have suffered so much at the hands of the Armenians during the occupation of Cilicia by the French troops.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

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that these and other ancillary proposals to be recommended by transferring the families removed from their homes, the number of Christians in over-populated districts and to settle them on lands would not involve the displacement of more than 200,000 persons.

2. Although this report was widely reproduced in other papers, it excited little interest among the Turks, even the Nationalists, who are accustomed to hear heroic measures announced but to see few put into execution. Some little further attention has been directed to it in the last few days, owing to the publication of contradictory reports to the effect that the Minister of the Interior has denied the existence of any such scheme, or, on the other hand, that the Ministry of Reconstruction is studying a draft scheme regarding the resettlement.

3. Further excitement was caused by a scandal connected with the return to Constantinople of about a hundred and three Greek Armenians who contrived somehow or other to enter Turkey notwithstanding the general prohibition of the return of Armenians who had been exiled during the late war. Allegations and counter-allegations of bribery and corruption appeared in the Press. The matter was brought up some days ago in the Grand National Assembly by Hamid Bey, Deputy for Aidin, who asked the Minister of the Interior why the Greek Armenians had been allowed to return. The question of the return of the Armenians to Cilicia and the Vilayet of Aidin is a very delicate one, and the Minister of the Interior replied that he could not give any information on the subject. This reply gave rise to a discussion in the Assembly. It is said that a Commission of Inquiry, or a special administrative enquiry, is to be instituted into the Armenian question, but whether any later evidence has been discovered to support the allegations of bribery and corruption by bribing persons in high places, or whether the Government wish to shelve the matter, I do not know. I do not think that it will be long before the controversy is revived. Its real interest is threefold. Firstly, the question of the Minister of the Interior is involved. Secondly, it is said that the question of the return of Armenians is anything but an easy one to settle. Although I fear that the feeling aroused must prejudice the chances of any general amnesty being granted in the near future to enable fugitive Armenians to return, yet it is to be hoped that the Angora Government will not allow the question to get back and to force it out finally by the massacres and outrages of an alleged secret organisation. Greater facilities for the return of refugees would relieve the situation.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 3478 186 44 No. 89

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 130)
Sir *Constantinople, April 6, 1924.*

WITH reference to my Despatch No. 2 of the 5th March, I have the honour to state that the Grand National Assembly ratified on the 13th April a law for the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship signed on the 3rd March between Turkey and Persia.

2. It was at the time of the ratification of the treaty,* which was published in the *Journal d'Orient* of the 15th April, believed to be accurate, but I have not yet been able to procure a copy of the text.

3. As far as I have been able to ascertain, the treaty proves to be on the same lines as those already concluded between Turkey and certain other States. These lines were established in the agreed declarations at Lausanne. The German treaty more nearly resembles that concluded with Hungary than the treaties of friendship with Poland and Austria, for the same reason, that the negotiation of commercial and other questions was reserved instead of these being embodied in the treaty.

4. The declaration of the exchange of views between the German and the Hungarian treaties is that it has been agreed that the subsidiary conventions to be concluded at later dates should be so worded as to express mention is made of the necessity for dealing with the question of mutual assistance in judicial matters.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

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* See Enclosure in No. 91.

E 3544/324/44 No 90

Mr Lindsay to Mr MacDonald (Received April 22)

(No 82)
Telegraphic) *Constantinople April 22, 1924*

YOUR telegram No 58 and our private telegram of yesterday

When Adnan made communication reported in my telegram No 79 I confined myself to thanking him I made no suggestion of any date for negotiations and shall make none without instructions from you

Until today I took every opportunity of pressing Turkish Government to agree to earliest possible date for fresh negotiations, assuming that ratification would take place speedily Now I go slowly and perhaps their own hesitations about Indian Government reservation may cover some of the delay which now seems inevitable

I have allowed no suggestion to transpire here that I have been contemplating a visit to Angora

(Repeated to Bagdad No 15)

[E 3545/186/44] No 91

Lord Hardinge to Mr MacDonald — (Received April 23)

(No 292)
Sir *Berlin, April 17, 1924*

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of the treaty of friendship signed between Germany and Turkey

This will be left in the hands of Herr Stewart

I have, &c
D'ABERNON

Enclosure in No 91

Treaty of Friendship between Germany and Turkey signed at Angora on March 3, 1924

L'ALLEMAGNE, d'une part, et la Turquie, d'autre part, animées du désir d'établir et de consolider les liens de sincère amitié entre la République d'Allemagne et la Sublime Porte, et pénétrées de la nécessité de régler les relations entre les deux États sur des bases stables, territoriales, respectant et garantissant les droits de leurs nationaux respectifs, et résolues de conclure un traité spécial à cet effet, nomment pour leurs plénipotentiaires savoir

Le Président de la République d'Allemagne Son Excellence M H Freytag, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire d'Allemagne à Bucarest et

Le Président de la République turque Son Excellence Tewfik Kiamil Bey, Sous-Secrétaire d'État au Ministère des Affaires étrangères

lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes

ARTICLE 1er

Il y aura paix inviolable et amitié sincère et durable entre la République d'Allemagne et la République turque

ARTICLE 2

Les Hautes Parties contractantes sont d'accord pour établir les relations diplomatiques entre les deux États conformément aux principes du droit des gens Elles sont en outre d'accord pour que les représentants diplomatiques et consulaires et chargés de commerce soient admis dans leurs territoires respectifs conformément aux règles du droit international public général

ARTICLE 3

Les Hautes Parties contractantes sont d'accord pour régler les relations consulaires et commerciales entre leurs pays respectifs sur la base du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée, étant entendu toutefois que les ressortissants de chacune des Parties auront à se prévaloir dans certaines matières particulières par des conventions spéciales qui se réservent de conclure conformément aux règles du droit international public général sur la base d'un traitement réciproque

ARTICLE 4

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Constantinople dès que faire se pourra Il entrera en vigueur le quinzième jour après l'échange des ratifications

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux

Fait en double à Angora le 3 mars 1924

FREYTAG
TEWFIK KIAMIL

[E 3680/3680/44] No 92

Mr Rattigan to Mr MacDonald (Received April 28)

(No 329)
Sir *Constantinople April 22, 1924*

SAAK KHAN Mukhlis ed Dowleh, late Ambassador to Turkey called on yesterday morning to say good-bye, as replacement by another envoy had been arranged some time ago The immediate reason of his departure for Constantinople was a telegram from the Persian Foreign Minister, Isaak Khan was most friendly when Sayid Mustafa Sadik Effendi, secretary to the Legation, was sent to Teheran to select a successor to Reza Khan as commander-in-chief of the Persian forces and Minister of War Sayid Mustafa Sadik Effendi was well connected at Court and had all the world to be sorry for now Persian Ambassador to Turkey is Hassan Khan Pirnia, a nephew of the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is said to be a very clever man

2 The last reason for his leaving Constantinople now was that he believed some rather serious events were in progress in the last few days to be effected by Mustafa Kemal who was coming to visit Angora early in May, and he himself wanted to be on leave in order to avoid having to participate in which would force himself the alternative Persians were to be in the same place simultaneously

3 The Ambassador criticised severely the action of the Turkish Government in abolishing the Caliphate and expelling Abdul Medjid Khan and the members of his family He said that they were guilty of no crime against Turkey or Egypt and in Afghanistan and even Persia, who was affected by the resistance of the action, the discourteous and ungrateful form in which it was adopted were most unfavourably regarded As this Isaak Khan wanted to see the reconstruction of Turkey, and would greatly facilitate the dealings of His Majesty's Government with Angora especially as regards the Lausanne Treaty, which in this connection he felt very confident that Turkey would be most anxious to conclude terms with His Majesty's Government and would be willing to make sacrifices to attain them, since she was feeling fearless she wanted support from behind against Russia she would seek it from Great Britain, and he considered that it would be to the interest of Great Britain to

afford to and to favour the reconstruction of a strong Turkey against future Russian aggression.

4. Isaak Khan is a strong opponent of Mustafa Kemal's personal authority and also of his ambition. He is very closely watched by the Ghazi and it is feared that the capital removal indefinitely at Angora and that some day action for several months will transfer the Government to Constantinople or Smyrna.

5. I have thought it worth while to report these conversations because Isaak Khan is a shrewd and intelligent observer and many foreign envoys as His Majesty's Government will be anxious to express his opinions correctly. It must of course be recognised that at present Russian influence in Angora, backed by a powerful army, is paramount and that with this overwhelming force, his remarks are worthy of attention.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

E 3683 1100 44 No. 93.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—Received April 28.

(No. 334.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 23, 1924.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 85 of the 30th January I have the honour to state that on the 21st April the Grand National Assembly voted a law for the ratification of the treaty and annexed protocols concluded between Turkey and Austria.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Minister at Vienna.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 3685 3685 44] No. 94.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 330.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 24, 1924.*

A REPORT began to circulate several weeks ago that Mr. Fethy Bey, the Albanian Ambassador, on resigning his post in London, intended to proceed to Angora, but it was not until the end of last month that details as to Mr. Fethy's mission to Mustafa Kemal Pasha became known. From the information which has since reached me it appears that Fethy Bey was entrusted with a message from Ahmed Zogou, President of Albania, to the Turkish Government, but I am not yet in a position to say whether this message was verbal or written. It is, however, known that Fethy Bey's visit to Angora was for the purpose of discussing with the Turkish Government the question of the recognition of Albania by Turkey.

2. The Albanian Minister left Constantinople for Angora on the 15th April, and returned to Constantinople on the 21st April. He is reported to have had a long interview with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and to have left Angora on the following day for Albania.

3. Fethy Bey is reported to have stated that the Turkish Government had decided to recognise Albania, and that the Albanian Government would be informed of this decision in the course of a few days. Fethy Bey is also reported to have said that Albania would be represented at Angora by a Minister, and that Turkey would be represented at Tirana by a Minister.

4. I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Roumania should seek to consolidate her position with the Turks as in other directions at this juncture. What is rather more remarkable is that Turkey should have shown equal readiness to receive a Roumanian Minister, regardless of the fact that the state of war has not been regularly terminated. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was far less flattered by the alacrity displayed by Roumania in ratifying the treaty of amity of the Great Powers and Persia than by the willingness to send a Minister to Angora, which might be construed as a slight to Russia, but the point of importance in the matter seems to be that the reception of M. Filality's overtures can only be regarded as a deliberate display of unfriendliness towards Russia, possibly even a demonstration of solidarity with a minor Power threatened with Russian aggression.

6. As for M. Bratianu's visit, it is hardly conceivable that that statesman should come here just now with the sole object of seeing the girls of Galata at play taking the waters at Broussa. Reports that he will go to Angora have been contradicted, but the Turks are quite prepared to make a bid for his support. It is not impossible that M. Filality, who returned from Angora on the 22nd April, may have arranged for some meeting between his Prime Minister and one of more responsible Turkish statesmen.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

S. I understand that news has just been received that M. Bratianu has cancelled his visit to Constantinople on account of his wife's illness.

R. C. L.

E 3750 3750 44] No. 95.

Sir C. Barclay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 123.)

Sir, *Stockholm, April 23, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I learnt to-day at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the Swedish Minister in Constantinople has been instructed to negotiate a treaty of friendship which, they hope, will be concluded soon after the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Hungary signed at Constantinople on the 18th December last, and would be followed by negotiations for a commercial and consular convention and also for a convention regulating the rights of subjects of the respective countries.

I have &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[E 3906 210 44] No. 96.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 341.) Confidential.

Sir, *Constantinople, April 25, 1924.*

WITHIN the last week three of my colleagues have returned to Constantinople after paying visits to Angora.

2. My American colleague informs me that he asked whether he arrived at Angora to be received by the President, but was informed that his Excellency was at Admiral Bristol says he has no reason to suppose that the President was ill, but I have information to the contrary. The Admiral stayed only a couple of days at Angora and had conversations with most of the Ministers. He says he found them moderate men when spoken to and he considers that they are quite amenable to reason. It had not occurred to him that perhaps Ministers talking privately may take a far more reasonable attitude than in public or in action.

3. Admiral Bristol lived in his railway-car and was fairly comfortable. He recognises, however, the hard conditions of life for a European in the régime which he prescribes for his Naval officer who lives there. This goat-skin for every thirty days he spends at Angora is allowed ten days in Constantinople for recuperation.

4 M Filaty my Roumanian colleague went to Angora to present his letters of credence He would have gone to Constantinople before but the letters sent to him by his Government were not yet received from Bucharest His official reception by the President took place on Tuesday last M Filaty was shortly able to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequently had an interview with the President of the Council Ismet Pasha Both conversations were of a most friendly character and while the greater part of the time was devoted to generalities Ismet Pasha was not averse to discussing certain questions of interest to Roumania

5 This confirms the information which I received from another source to the effect that the President is a tremendous talker and can on occasion speak for several hours without pausing for breath The Angora correspondent of the Havas Agency who has been in Turkey for a long period from the days of the Young Turks and who has had many opportunities of seeing Ismet Pasha on intimate terms declares that he has never known him to speak for more than an hour at a time

6 Djelal Bey's visit to Angora was a short one and he started for Smyrna on the 17th April Nothing of importance transpired during his visit

7 Signor Montagna was received by Ismet Pasha on the 19th April and remained with him for about an hour and a half He considers the Pasha to be a man of strong character and of great ability He considers that the Pasha was fully aware of the difficulties which confront Turkey at the present moment and that he is anxious to avoid any complications with the Powers

8 Signor Montagna is impressed by the evidences of reconstruction everywhere in the physical aspect of the country outside Angora The railway to Konia is being pushed forward rapidly and the Ministers were given to understand that the line would be completed to Konia within two years from the present time Asphalt of the best quality has been discovered in the neighbourhood of Angora and a concession for working it has been granted to a French company Signor Montagna is also convinced that there is a great deal of mineral wealth in the country and that the development of this will be undertaken by foreign capitalists as soon as the political situation becomes more settled

9 Signor Montagna left Angora on the 20th April and returned to Constantinople by the Taurus Express He was accompanied as far as Eregli by Ismet Pasha who left Angora on the 21st April to attend the Lausanne Conference

10 Like M Filaty Signor Montagna was struck by the complete absence of motor traffic in Angora There is only one hotel there where it is possible to stay and food is

Signor Montagna took the whole of the party with him Every conceivable kind of article had been provided by the hotel keeper who was even to have sent Signor Montagna's own cook but the cook spoilt the whole day by drinking spirits at Mr Ellis Dunham-Massey's

I have, &c
R C LINDSAY

E 3912 3685 44 No 37

Mr Lindsay to Mr MacDonald (Received May 5,)

(No 35.)

Sir, *Constantinople April 21, 1924*

IN continuation of my despatch No 334 of the 23rd April regarding Turco-Roumanian relations, I have the honour to report that M Bratianu did not come to Constantinople after all On the night of the 19th/20th the Italian mail steamer arrived from Constanza there were no ordinary passengers on board but a Turkish press, knight and also specially sent envoy of the Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M Titulescu with reference to certain communications to which I had recently given expression

2 M Filaty the Roumanian Minister here assures me that he never was anything more than the bearer of a Memorandum dictated to him by M Titulescu at Easter and that he has no knowledge of what is suggested in it But I am assured on all sides that the visit has been made for the purpose of concluding a secret arrangement with the Angora Government

3 I have the honour to enclose herewith a telegram of the 17th April from the Press Bureau containing the gist of the message which Ismet Pasha is reported to have given to the representatives of the Turkish Press on the occasion of his visit to Angora

4 I have sent a copy of my despatch under reference to His Majesty's Minister at Bucharest with the corresponding No 34 to Athens a copy of this despatch

I have, &c
R C LINDSAY

E 3915 32 44] No 38

Mr Lindsay to Mr MacDonald Received May 7

(No 337)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 30 1924*

THE Grand National Assembly of Turkey adjourned on the evening of the 22nd April It is the first report that until the new Constitution is an event of importance there will be no Grand National Assembly Its powers are to be exercised by a new Turkey It has also been stated that previous suspension of the Assembly's sessions have occurred without any suspicions having been aroused but the present adjournment is of a character that the Assembly's sole repository of the powers pertaining to sovereignty passes to the Executive Committee to the exclusion of any authority to which such powers may be partially delegate

2 The motion for the adjournment was passed only after a somewhat acrimonious discussion The Kurdish and Lazistan Deputies voted in favour of the motion against Adrianople and Smyrna Although the motion was to terminate at noon of the day itself it was regarded as certain that the Assembly would not be reassembled in accordance with No 693 of the 20th April but that a new election would be ordered This was considered necessary in order to finish off outstanding business as quickly as possible The result was to throw the Assembly into a state of great confusion especially on the last day of the session It is impossible from the very

sketch of the proceedings telegraphed to Constantinople to form any complete idea of what was or what was left undone.

3. The Financial Law relating to the budget for the year 1924-25 had been adopted on the 30th April. Two items in the two following days nullified the whole of the last year's Treasury estimates (reported in my despatch No. 534 of the 23rd April), the adoption of the budget of the Exchequer and the rejection or rather refusal to discuss the Government of the proposed agreement with the Imperial Ottoman Bank to sheer off a proposal to create a Ministry of Marine, the adoption of a law relative to sanitary measures in shipping and the acceptance of a slight modification of the last proposal by the Government of the two persons to be exempted from the general interdict against Lausanne. They appear to have decided also, in voting at most on these two cases, not to declare the adoption of a law on the Ismid-Angora railways providing for a further expenditure of £T. 900,000 (spread over five years) for reconditioning the Anatolian Railway and a law for issuing one dollar notes (reported at Constantinople to twelve times the current amount).

4. Some of these matters are of special interest to His Majesty's Government and form the subject of separate despatches as soon as fuller information becomes available. For the present I need attempt to give a general idea of the position at Angora at the close of the session. In order to do this it is necessary to mention four particulars as to which have a special bearing on the general situation. The final budget estimates for the year beginning the 1st March 1924, show a deficit of over £T. 9,000,000 as between expenditure of £T. 14,000,000 and current revenue of £T. 4,000,000. The new law increasing the existing provisions for the foreign loan postponed until Turkey's balance sheets have been assessed. The Assembly's reasons for rejecting the Imperial Ottoman Bank scheme have been given in my despatch No. 534 of the 23rd April. Briefly, they were (1) a fear that the Government would not obtain sufficient control over the Bank's operations, and (2) a belief that the Bank would be able to exercise undue influence in the Assembly's financial policy. Both reasons are based on a misunderstanding of the Bank's position, but they are very difficult to remove. The Bank's position is that of a purely financial institution, which has no political interests in Turkey, and which has been willing to lend money to the Government on the security of the revenues which the Government has pledged to the Bank. The Bank's position is that of a purely financial institution, which has no political interests in Turkey, and which has been willing to lend money to the Government on the security of the revenues which the Government has pledged to the Bank.

5. The Assembly's refusal to sanction the proposed agreement with the Imperial Ottoman Bank creates a position of extreme difficulty for the Government. The Bank's position is that of a purely financial institution, which has no political interests in Turkey, and which has been willing to lend money to the Government on the security of the revenues which the Government has pledged to the Bank. The Bank's position is that of a purely financial institution, which has no political interests in Turkey, and which has been willing to lend money to the Government on the security of the revenues which the Government has pledged to the Bank.

6. The Assembly's refusal to sanction the proposed agreement with the Imperial Ottoman Bank creates a position of extreme difficulty for the Government. The Bank's position is that of a purely financial institution, which has no political interests in Turkey, and which has been willing to lend money to the Government on the security of the revenues which the Government has pledged to the Bank. The Bank's position is that of a purely financial institution, which has no political interests in Turkey, and which has been willing to lend money to the Government on the security of the revenues which the Government has pledged to the Bank.

7. Meanwhile, whatever the motive for the rejection of the Assembly, the Government has come to the conclusion that everything turns to Turkey's credit. Nothing was left undone to show alarm at the rejection of the proposal. Not a single voice was raised in the Assembly to express regret at the rejection of the proposal. Not a single voice was raised in the Assembly to express regret at the rejection of the proposal. Not a single voice was raised in the Assembly to express regret at the rejection of the proposal.

8. A review of these various factors in the situation at the close of the session suggests a foreign observer the question whether Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha will be prepared to remain during the next six months (best they may on constitutional basis, or whether they will choose the recess to take matters more completely into their own hands, and they have been reported to do.

9. For the time being, however, the second concerning the return of Turkish Armenians (see paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 516 of the 1st April) continues to excite far more attention than anything else. The Armenians themselves have been got

rid of, though there was not nothing to show that the return was irregular or their expulsion illegal. Two commissions have been set up to assess the claims of the latter at Angora and Constantinople. Offices were instituted to undertake the organization of police at Constantinople and Angora. These measures were clearly intended to appease the fears of the Muslim element of the latter. Ferid Bey, Heads of Angora, fought for his position, and this has become a great source of weakness to Ismet Pasha's Government, and it is doubtful whether he can remain at all events at the Assembly - has been superseded. Other accounts being current. It has also been suggested that a cheque for £T. 60,000 sent by the Agha Khan to Ferid Bey for the benefit of Turkish orphans was not properly accounted for. The Minister's instructions with have given rise to Ferid Pasha, and was accused of having at that time received resistance to the British Protectorate. The Shaikh-ul-Islam, Constantinople, expressing the fear that the Grey Kemal struggle for securing [illegible] these circumstances it is perhaps the most singular feature of the whole situation that neither Mustafa Kemal nor Ismet has shown any readiness to [illegible] the Soviet.

At the time of writing the [illegible] by the President of the Republic, but the complete text has not yet been published in Constantinople.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

(E 3918/3918/44)

No. 1.

Mr. Erskine to Mr. MacDonald (Received May 1.)

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Sofia, May 1, 1924.*

I HAD the honour to report in my last despatch that I was about to make a journey to the western parts of Bulgaria, and I have now the honour to report the results of my journey.

I left Sofia on the 21st April and returned on the 28th April. I travelled by motor car and visited the towns of Kyustendil, Dupnitza, Radomir, Pernik, Kustendil, Dupnitza, Radomir, Pernik, Kustendil, Dupnitza, Radomir, Pernik, K

[E 4101 185 44]

No. 98

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—Received May 12.

(No. 373.)

Sir,

Constantinople, May 7, 1924.

WITH reference to the second paragraph of my despatch No. 242 of the 12th March, I beg to report that one of the consequences of the adoption of the Angora flag has been a press campaign of five or six articles regarding the Straits and the Mixed Tribunals. This campaign was subsequently held over at the request of the Angora Press Bureau, but it has been revived in the last few days, owing to the publication in the Turkish Press of a statement said to have been made to Mustafa Kemal by a correspondent of the New York Herald. I enclose a copy of this statement as reproduced in the Ikdam of the 4th May.* I do not know whether it has actually appeared in the New York Herald.

2. The importance of the President's statement is enhanced by the fact that on at least two previous occasions, the predominant feature of the reports of the conduct of the Straits has been the attitude of foreign representatives to foreign press correspondents. On the first occasion, some three months ago, the Turkish authorities have since denied the truth of the allegations, but other Turkish authorities have themselves admitted the facts, and the reports were considered sufficiently serious to call for a formal reply from the Angora Government.

3. On the second occasion, a few days ago, the Turkish authorities were again compelled to issue a denial of certain reports which had appeared in the Press. For instance, it was reported that the French Vice-Consul had been expelled from Angora, and it was suggested that the Press Bureau was trying to force from Constantinople to Angora all correspondents who could not be relied upon to write in the sense desired by the Turkish Government. Similarly, reports appeared in the Turkish Press that the Italian Consul-General had been instructed to protest to the Angora Government against the alleged attempt of the Italian Press correspondents to leave Angora. The Italian Consul-General has, however, refrained from entering into any discussion with the Turkish authorities on the subject, and the matter is regarded as closed. It is believed that the Italian Government intend to withdraw their Consul-General from Angora.

4. The Press Bureau is also reported to have issued instructions to the effect that no correspondent is to be allowed to leave Angora without the permission of the Bureau. Some correspondents have been refused permission to leave Angora for Constantinople, and have been told that they must first go to Smyrna. Others have been told that they must first go to Eskishehir. Others, again, have been told that they must first go to Ismid. Others, again, have been told that they must first go to Ismid. Others, again, have been told that they must first go to Ismid

[illegible] period [illegible] April, as [illegible] Turkish newspaper [illegible] May [illegible] [illegible] to offer [illegible] to bring the [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

(B.)—Receipts.

Part	Services	estimated Revenue
		£T
	...ment taxes real property tax ...the a...	4390 500
	Stamp duty ...ress registration taxes ...ties	32 ...00
II	...ncome taxes ...ess ...stoms ...ne &	2817 000
IV	Monopolies ...salt ...cco ...motage ports ...e ...egraphs	16 14, 8
V	...ealth ...ilments schools, railways State printing press, &	10 ,000
VI	State property	4 ...80 000
VII	Miscellaneous	2 12 0
VIII	Recoveries	238 714
IX	...ous minor taxes ...tage ...e duties ...ards, games, ...mat... ...de &c	1 461 ...00
X	Extraordinary war ...ion and ...ue	2 ,000
		12 2 4 ,0
	Issues ...ish's estimate ...January 24 1924 was	12, 82 ,0

E 4374 1333 44 No. 10.

Mr ...ustace to Mr MacDonald.—(Received May 19)

(No. 336)

Sir, *Constantinople, May ... 1924*

With reference ... my ... No. ... of the 1st March ... reports ... ...ressmen ... have ... that the last ... has ... witnessed ... ... against Pressmen ... press. ... ... first ... ...

[E 4585 32 44] No. 108

Mr. ... to Mr. MacDonald (Received May ...)

(No. 147)

... May 21, 1924

Sir,

SINCE I wrote to you at No. 2[illegible] from Constantinople, I have had an opportunity of seeing Mr. ... and I have ... with him the question of the ... Mosul. I found him ... and ... to ... the ... country is at present in ...

When the Great National Assembly ... Mr. ... to ... Ankara, ... was instructed ... upon ... the ... of ... Mosul ... the ... Vilayet ... to ... Baghdad ... Basra ... Mr. ... was ... to ... Mosul ... Mr. ... was ... to ... Ankara ... Mr. ... was ... to ... Constantinople ... Mr. ... was ... to ... Angora

cess to protect the interests of the members of their families residing in Russia, and more particularly in the Caucasus. They have so far been protected from outrage.

3. Pending the conclusion of the commercial treaty (a draft of which is still the subject of negotiations between the Turkish and Russian Governments) the Turkish press has been recording the efforts of Turkey to the representatives of the Soviet Government. Trade a temporary arrangement has been discussed, arrangements for the import of the present head of commercial missions. Such arrangements would be based on the most favoured nation clause. Such arrangements would be based on the most favoured nation clause. Such arrangements would be based on the most favoured nation clause.

4. Russian interests in Turkey are considerable. The Russian Government has been endeavouring to settle the question of the Russian debt to Turkey. The Russian Government has been endeavouring to settle the question of the Russian debt to Turkey.

5. Mr. Kharakhan has been appointed Soviet Ambassador to Angora. He is expected to arrive in Angora about the end of May. He is expected to arrive in Angora about the end of May.

6. The Turkish Government has been endeavouring to settle the question of the Russian debt to Turkey. The Russian Government has been endeavouring to settle the question of the Russian debt to Turkey.

I have, &c.
R. M. HODGSON

E 4664 448 44, No. 111

M. Tracy to Mr. MacDonald (*Received May 27*)

No. 103
Telegraphic. *Constantinople, May 27, 1924*

My telegram No. 97.

Turkish newspapers of this day state that treaty and protocol to His Majesty's Government that Government of India's proposal respecting

It is understood that the question of the Turkish press has been discussed, arrangements for the import of the present head of commercial missions. Such arrangements would be based on the most favoured nation clause. Such arrangements would be based on the most favoured nation clause. Such arrangements would be based on the most favoured nation clause.

E 4664 448 44 No. 112

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Tracy (Constantinople)

No. 77.
Telegraphic. *Foreign Office, May 28, 1924*

YOUR telegram No. 103 of 27th May. Ratification.

Cannot assent to Article [illegible] as drawn. Turkish Government to be left with Mattersburg pressed, but definite date cannot now be given.

E 4807 145 44 No. 113

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald (*Received June 2*)

(No. 136.)
Sir *Constantinople, May 28, 1924*

I HAVE mentioned in past despatches that anti-French feeling has been a notable feature of the Turkish press. The recent attitude of the Turkish Government in accepting anything but cautious attitude regarding the particular questions where anti-French feeling, especially the journalists, but the press itself is so consistent that I think it well to draw your attention to the matter.

2. The question of the closing of the congregational schools which was the cause of quarrel between the Turkish and French Governments, and has since been a lesser degree has remained in state of [illegible] for some months, the publication in the Official Journal of the Ministry of Public Instruction of the recent visit to Constantinople of the Minister of Public Instruction to the Chamber of Deputies. Mr. Lindsay, having declined to go himself even on the latter's request, spoke to the Minister of the closing of the schools during the course of the current school year, and urged further delay. The principal congregations to see the Minister. His general answer was received at that time was that he would be closed.

3. None of the parties to the dispute are apparently anxious to the Apostolic Vicar here, who went to Angora on behalf of the congregations towards the end of April and Mr. Lindsay has since had a French official spoke in very similar terms as those taught here by Mr. Lindsay in official note. The French Embassy have also given the impression of Turkish Government to the Vicar. They also gave us the impression that the congregations would be closed.

4. The Turkish press has been [illegible] all interested in the question of the closing of the schools. The press has been [illegible] the Syrian question. The papers have [illegible] that the French troops in Syria [illegible] Moslem [illegible]. The [illegible] has been [illegible] in a general way. There are [illegible] Syria [illegible], but [illegible] have been [illegible] two [illegible] Turkish frontier posts.

5. It is said at Angora and frequently asserted that the Angora Government are preparing demonstrations [illegible] the frontier. The French the French [illegible] the Syrian question. My French colleague tells me that the Angora Government has been [illegible] by Article [illegible] on the 27th May regarding the [illegible] Turkish [illegible] posts. [illegible] Direct [illegible] Albanian Boy said that [illegible] were [illegible] with [illegible].

6. Political speculation is [illegible]. The Turkish Government does not [illegible] the charges [illegible] press [illegible] alleged grievances [illegible] themselves. The [illegible] of their own [illegible] they [illegible] that [illegible] first task of [illegible] French [illegible] will be [illegible] Parliament [illegible]. The first [illegible] was [illegible] favourable [illegible] ratification [illegible] appears now [illegible] [illegible] to be regarded as [illegible] postponing it. A senior member of the [illegible] has [illegible] recently said to [illegible] "Le vin est tiré, il faut le boire."

7. It is difficult to form any [illegible] view here as to the real extent of the fighting on the [illegible] and of the Syrian frontier. The French first secretary told Mr. Charles Adam some days ago that [illegible] here were [illegible] exaggerated, and that there were [illegible] see Mr. Charles Adam and Mr. [illegible] the correspondent of the "Temps" and other papers, who had just returned from a tour in Syria [illegible] three weeks in Mersina and had been along the frontier by car as far as [illegible] rates [illegible] shows [illegible] seriously [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] for [illegible] of work. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the frontier [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] had [illegible] roads [illegible] [illegible] to be free to transport [illegible] with [illegible] Turkish officers [illegible] had been [illegible] among these [illegible] [illegible].

...ressive activities to high political reasons. They were due rather ... weakness of the frontier incidents in some places such as Aintab, and to local ... protesting from property owners by the frontier new confiscation by the French of land in Syria awarded to small holders in Turkey.

5. Mr. Grant Watson reports the existence of some political agitation among the ... Kurdish population in the part of Northern Syria ... bordering the frontier, particularly to the south of Aleppo, but the town ... remains quiet and is small. The report adds that Kurds support from the ... Turkish Government and that the latter keeps in touch with Kurdish ... leaders in Syria. Kurds agitate. Some Aleppo traders say that there was a great increase ... in the Kurdish population of the Aleppo district, but other reports ... say that there was no general feeling of uneasiness. Kurdish chiefs, ... it is stated, have been told by the French that there will be no further ... interference with their tribal affairs, and that the latter look upon ... the Kurdish people as their best friends. Mr. Grant Watson ... considers that the Kurds will probably adopt a passive attitude ... for the present, but that their ... regarded as being ... aspects only ...

As regards the Turkish press ... Mr. Grant Watson refers to ... that Ahmed Emin has ... by the ... are ... paragraph 3 of my ... and No. 51 of the 19 ... March. He ... down the ... Emin is ... example of ... that the ... accepted ... for ... Italians ... concentrating troops ... Syria ... a definite ... that these troops are ... to aid ... France. As Mr. Grant ... suggests on his own ... all the more ... that ... should ... the alleged ... of ... Kemalist ... against ... Mosul ... Mr. Grant Watson ... that ... Ahmed Emin ... to ... Kemalist ... to

Ankara" he spoke as follows, after making complimentary references to the beauties of Constantinople and expressing his joy to be engaged with a mission in a country for which Germany and he himself had such a high regard:

"I shall strive to transform into present friendship our ancient comradeship in arms. I do not doubt that at this we shall receive the help of the rulers of the young Turkey. I shall shortly go to Angora and present my letters of credence to his Excellency the President of the Republic.

"As regards the question of transferring the Embassy from Constantinople to Angora, I have to be guided by the work I have to do. I think I shall reside at Angora. When I visit Angora I will discuss this matter also with his Excellency Ismet Pasha. I shall see the sites which I learn officially the Government has assigned for the building of an Embassy at Angora. I can not say anything definite at present."

3. Other versions of the interview in this morning's papers add nothing of particular interest. Pending further developments I do not think that any more important contact should be attached to M. Nalbant's statement regarding the transfer of the Embassy to Angora. He evidently intended to leave the question entirely open, while flattering Turkish susceptibilities by representing residence at Angora as not improbable.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

[E 5015/3750/44] No. 119

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald — *Received June 10.*

(No. 453.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 4, 1924.*

ON the 14th May the Swedish Minister, M. Wallenberg, met for Angora, accompanied by Mr. Kolmodin, the chief dragoman of his Legation, in order to negotiate a treaty of friendship between Turkey and Sweden.

2. The treaty was duly signed on the 31st May by M. Wallenberg and Tevfik Rushdi Bey, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The text has not been published, but the treaty is understood to be similar to those already concluded with various other Powers.

3. The press states that it was during the negotiations that M. Wallenberg also concluded a commercial convention. This is certainly incorrect. The Swedish plan was to follow the example of Germany and Hungary in concluding a treaty of friendship in the first instance, leaving further conventions to be negotiated later.

4. M. Wallenberg returned to Constantinople on the 3rd June.

5. The Swedish negotiations have been given as a reason for the delay in opening the long-expected negotiations between Turkey and Bulgaria. Whether this is the real reason, however, is somewhat doubtful, the delay has been due to internal difficulties connected with the position of Eastern Thrace. The Bulgarian negotiators have now begun to appear in the press that the Bulgarian negotiations will be put through in the near future.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Sofia.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

[E 5017/4795/44] No. 120

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald — *(Received June 9.)*

(No. 455.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 4, 1924.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 207 of the 31st June I have the honour to state that the excitement created in Constantinople and Angora by the alleged military preparations of the Italian Nationalists on the night 31st June/1st June but has shown a distinct tendency to subside during the last two days. A reaction in favour of a more moderate view of the situation was noticeable in the local press of the 3rd June, and the public have been still further reassured to-day by news from Angora to the effect that the Turkish representative in Rome reported yesterday afternoon a satisfactory interview with M. Mussolini. I enclose a cutting from this morning's "Gazette" giving the latest news.

2. The crisis, such as it was, may now be regarded as having lost any serious character. Its principal importance lies in the light it affords of the extreme suspicion with which Italy has come to be regarded. The nervous feeling which I described in the last paragraph of my despatch No. 433 of the 28th May is a very real one, and the Turks, however, usually so much more sober than the press, seems to have allowed itself to be swept into a state of nervous agitation or panic.

3. Although this nervousness is deep-seated and may be expected to persist, various causes combined to work up Turkish fears at the moment when the alleged Italian concentrations were announced.

4. There is in the first place a widespread feeling that somewhere or other Turkish foreign policy has gone wrong, that Ismet Pasha's Government has frittered away the strong position which Turkey secured for herself during the period from the Greek collapse in Asia Minor to the end of the Lausanne Conference, and that she is now at loggerheads with most of her neighbours and all the Great Powers of the West. Turks also realise the fundamental weakness of their country regard this state of affairs with misgiving.

5. Secondly, the departure of the Italian representative for Italy on the 27th May fitted in very well with the theory that Italy was contemplating some forward action with regard to Turkey. The explanation that he had gone to see his mother carried no conviction, and the less as it was the talk of the town that M. Montagna, having come here full of hope of what his personal influence could achieve, had left completely disheartened by the recent reception at Angora and by the attitude of the Turks towards Italian interests.

Thirdly, the reports of Italian activity coincided with a belief to realisation that the Italian force in the Dodecanese, especially Rhodes, was at last beginning to be a Turkish asset which it was negative. Certain Turkish papers dwelt on the consideration that Great Britain had with her usual astuteness made use of Italian aspirations in order to exert pressure on Turkey. The cession of Jubaland of which the Turks had ever heard and that some days ago was the object of Italian support, was the subject of many caustic comments, and the following week after that of M. Montagna has been supposed by some to have a bearing on Fascist Anglophobia and on the part of planned demonstrations against the visit of the Italian Sovereigns to London.

7. I do not think that responsible statesmen in Angora are quite so foolish as to take this last hypothesis seriously, but I have thought it worth while to analyse briefly the various causes, such as the factitious excitement of the last few days in order to show some of the workings of the Turkish mind at present in relation to questions of foreign policy.

8. It will be observed from the enclosed cutting that instructions have now been directed locally to reports of Italian preparations at Leros. These reports may again stimulate Turkish anxiety. Little is known here regarding the present state of the Dodecanese question, and, from their own point of view, Turks can only see in any naval or alleged Italian activity in the eastern group of islands a threat to the security of the coast of Asia Minor.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

Enclosure in No. 120.

Extract from the "Gazette" of June 4, 1924.

M. MUSSOLINI ASSURE DE SES INTENTIONS PACIFIQUES A L'EGARD DE LA TURQUIE.

Angora, le 3 juin. — Aujourd'hui, à minuit et demi, de l'expression une réponse est arrivée de Rome. L'impression générale a été que la réponse est favorable. Notre représentant a cette réponse a eu hier soir une entrevue avec M. Mussolini. Le Premier Ministre italien a longuement parlé de ses sentiments à l'égard de la Turquie. Il a tout d'abord commencé par nous exprimer ses regrets de Rhodes, mais a fini par faire observer que cette île fait partie du territoire italien et que les troupes y avaient été envoyées pour relever celles qui devaient être rapatriées. M. Mussolini a répété avant-hier toutes les assurances qu'il a déjà données publiquement. Une personnalité

autorisé, je fis consulter au sujet de cette réponse de M. Mussolini que je viens de rapporter ce qu'il m'a encore déclaré :

« Au cas même où les négociations en question viendraient à une action militaire, Mussolini ne se serait pas exposé à un échec. Cependant les assurances données par lui sont satisfaisantes quant à la forme. »

Après avoir pris connaissance de la réponse de Chevket Bey, Chevket Pacha a convoqué les Ministres en séance secrète pour discuter cette affaire. Au cours de cette séance des décisions seront prises au sujet de la question des concentrations de Rhodes et de la réponse à faire à la proposition de la délégation britannique de confier à la Société des Nations le règlement de la question de Mossoul.

On croit que les instructions seront envoyées cet après-midi à Fethi Bey à ce sujet. Il est aussi probable que Fethi Bey fera des déclarations à la presse après la réunion du Cabinet. Les personnes les plus compétentes, à Angora, estiment que l'idée d'une convocation de l'Assemblée nationale ne se produira pas de sitôt. Une autre personnalité que j'avais consultée, avant l'arrivée de la réponse de Rome, m'avait dit :

« Les négociations de Londres sont exactes, mais aucun fait n'en est pas encore bien précisé. Je ne puis pas concevoir qu'Italie se jette dans une telle aventure militaire. »

Le Président de la République, son Excellence Ghazi Mustapha Kémal Pacha, est venu à 7 heures pour présider une partie des délibérations du conseil. Munir Bey, conseiller légiste au Ministère des Affaires étrangères, assista également au conseil.

Consulat de Angora à Constantinople.

Angora, le 3 juin.

Il résulte de bonne source que les Italiens ont débarqué à Rhodes depuis le 2 mai, et qu'ils ont porté à trois, depuis cette date, les cuirassés qu'ils avaient auparavant dans ces parages. Les concentrations se font contre Chypre et contre Lemnos, bien entendu sans déclaration préalable de guerre. Les dernières escadres qui ont été signalées sont ces jours-ci arrivées à Rhodes. On ne dispose pas encore de preuves pouvant faire mettre plus en avant cette affaire.

« La station navale italienne ne paraît pas prête à se procurer du charbon à Smyrne. Si les Italiens prenaient des mesures contre la Turquie, il est à supposer qu'ils choisiraient comme base d'opérations pour délivrer le ultimatum public et toute autre démonstration navale l'île de Lemnos. »

Leros. Base navale italienne.

Le « Morning Post » publie d'intéressantes précisions au sujet des installations militaires des Italiens à Port de Leros : « Les nos 1 et 2 de la baie sont parmi les plus sûrs abris contre la tempête sur toute la côte orientale de la Méditerranée. Le premier couvre 1½ mille carré et le second 1 mille carré. Ils sont tous deux très profonds et peuvent recevoir les plus grands navires de guerre. Le port de Caymaki, situé à l'entrée du golfe de Panormos, est le plus vaste de la côte est. Asie Mineure et possède trois excellents ports qui avaient été visités par la flotte russe pendant la guerre de Crimée en 1881.

Le plus vaste de ces ports est celui de Lakki, près duquel les hydravions italiens et les autres sont installés. Le port Marina et le Portremo, ce dernier ainsi nommé d'après le fameux autel de la Vierge Artémis mentionné par Athénée dans le Secret de la Métamorphose et Oiseaux les Sœurs de Méléagre. Le dernier port est protégé par l'île d'Archangelos.

Les occupants italiens du « Morning Post » auraient tiré parti fort habilement de ces avantages naturels. Dans la baie de Leros a été installé un entrepôt de matériel pour sous-marins, tandis que la base de sous-marins de l'île d'Avramo reste à Rhodes, et relève à Leros. Environ une douzaine de canons à tir rapide ont été disposés aux points stratégiques autour du port de Lakki et un grand réservoir d'eau et de pétrole a été creusé dans la ville de Lakki et également près du premier port.

Un aérodrome capable de contenir une douzaine d'appareils a été érigé à Lepido, où Tagadi Pacha a construit un fort. Il est protégé par un fossé de 3 mètres de profondeur. Des jetées sont également érigées le long des quais du port, pour le débarquement des charbons et autres approvisionnements. Des pêcheurs et un certain nombre de navires de guerre stationnent en permanence à Lakki. Une station radiotélégraphique a été installée et le territoire est soumis à un régime strictement militaire. Le port de Lakki est si vaste que lors du bombardement vingt-quatre navires

y avaient été concentrés sur les Italiens, tandis que l'entrée avait été minée. Ces préparatifs, ainsi que le général anglais semblent témoigner que l'Italie a l'intention bien arrêtée de conserver Leros en son pouvoir, dans le cas où elle en aurait seulement envisagé la possession éventuelle à la Grèce, elle n'aurait certainement pas installé une base navale aussi forte à une époque où les impôts constituent une lourde charge pour le pays.

Londres, le 3 juin. — Le « Messager » publie certaines nouvelles parues dans la presse d'Athènes et reproduites par certains journaux anglais concernant les travaux de fortification qui auraient lieu à Leros. Nous croyons devoir dire que tout ne doit pas signifier que l'Italie songe à se désister de Leros.

E 4993 4795 44 No. 121

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. MacDonald (*Received June 10*)

No. 358 P. Bag

(Telegraphic) *Paris, June 9, 1924*

M. HERBETTE unveiled to-day a bust of Mr. Lloyd George to the accompaniment of caustic remarks by the latter on the subject of Italian designs on Turkey. Mr. Lloyd George took the Italians to task for their speech at the Conference of London, and for suggesting that Smyrna and South Eastern Anatolia should be taken from the Turks. M. Herbette, on the other hand, declared that when Mr. Lloyd George charged Italy with the desire to annex Asiatic territory he was speaking without foundation, and was guilty of calumny. Nobody, however, tried to contradict Mr. Lloyd George. He persisted in wishing for conquests, but was bored when he took away from the Germans all their colonies, and also assessed their capacity for payment at a figure which aroused a storm of indignation. Mr. Herbette concluded by remarking that if your Government were overthrown on a question touching the internal structure of the British Empire, and a new Government were formed to reassess the value of the Eastern Mediterranean, the latter would be strengthened by Mr. Lloyd George, the Conference would be saved, and the world would finally note an increased Bonapartist power. British parties of Parliament were united on the question and would have the full support of the whole British nation.

E 5077 1333 44 No. 122

Mr. Hodgson to Mr. MacDonald — *Received June 11*

No. 488.

Sir, *Moscow, May 23, 1924*

Mr. Urquhart's mission to represent Great Britain in the development of Russian trade with the North, and in particular with Persia, and the Caspian Sea, has now come to a close, and I have the honour to submit herewith a few brief observations on the subject.

2. Your delegation of representatives of the departments and various organisations interested in Persian trade, organised by the Russian Eastern Chamber of Commerce, has recently visited Moscow, Baku, and Enzeli (see Nos. 180 of the 21st May). Your visit was arranged to coincide with the period when samples of products which Russia offered for export were shown. The delegation reported very favourably on the prospects of trade provided that what appear to be the present excessive rates of interest are reduced, that long-term credits are introduced, production costs raised, and freights lowered, and that Government assistance by long-term credits is granted.

3. Trade with Persia is of more particular importance. The Grand Bazaar in Teheran was open from the 23rd May to the 5th July. The Press of the first two weeks were of trifling significance. There were series of attempts to corner the Persian markets. Experts from Paris, the Asiatic Chamber, flowed with their specimens, and reduced their prices by discounts of from 15 to 30 per cent. One manufacturer alone brought with him 2 tons of samples. Persians are therefore left free to choose from the best that the world can offer, and the Russians are hard put to it to find long-term credits.

4. The Soviet Government of export of Persian sugar, which amounted 70 per cent. of the whole of Persia's export trade, is the most serious obstacle to Russian efforts to oust English sugar. The Sugar Trust and the Commissariat for Foreign Trade are

reported to be forming a mixed company, with head office at Tehran. Textiles come second in importance. The All-Russian Textile Syndicate is catering for the special requirements of the Persian trade and has obtained permission to import 300,000 poods of American cotton for the purpose. The use of Persian cotton in Russia is increasing, Russia having bought the whole of this year's crop. Assistance has been rendered to Persian peasants by supplying them with American cotton seed.

5. Other articles for export from Russia already delivered at Baku include matches, ironmongery, chinaware and earthenware. Persian merchants, on their side, are offering cotton, rice, dried fruits, nuts and wool.

I have, &c.
R. M. HODGSON.

[E 5097/222/44] No. 123.

Consul Hough to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Aleppo, June 2, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following observations on the telegram from Sir H. Dobbs, enclosed in your despatch No. 63, on the subject of the persecution of Christians in Eastern Anatolia.

2. Generally speaking, it may be said that the statements of Mitran (*i.e.*, Bishop) Israil are in no way exaggerated. All evidence available here tends to confirm them. The main source of the following remarks is the Chaldean Bishop of Aleppo, Mgr. Chaya, who has been in correspondence with Mitran Israil, but, in addition, I have taken into account the statements of refugees arriving from Turkey and of missionaries who are in correspondence with colleagues over the border.

3. The fundamental question is whether the Turks, as stated, have decided, in violation of the Treaty of Lausanne, to expel all Christians from the country and confiscate their property. No one here has any doubt whatever that this is so, but the Turks, in accordance with the sinister traditions of their administrative methods, are carrying out their aim not by openly published decrees, but by secret terrorism and victimisation of Christians. The net result is that practically no Christians are left in Eastern Anatolia, except scattered individuals who either feel they would be in a more hopeless position if they left than if they stayed and faced the worst, or hope that by personal prestige or bribery they may succeed in retaining a tolerable *modus vivendi*. Yet an official enquiry would elicit that before leaving Turkey the refugees had all signed a declaration saying that their departure was entirely of their own free will.

4. I turn now to the questions of detail in clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Sir Henry Dobbs's telegram. As regards the seizure of Christian buildings and endowments, apart from the testimony of Bishop Israil, there is every reason to believe that most of the various Christian religious institutions, their churches, schools, hospitals and endowments (*i.e.*, wakoufs) have already been seized. In view of the fact that French, Italian and American school and hospital organisations in Anatolia have already or are shortly about to close down, it would not appear to me surprising that Chaldean, Syrian-Catholic, Jacobite and Armenian Church properties should also have been seized.

Mgr. Israil, when writing to Mgr. Chaya, stated that the Chaldean Episcopal buildings at Diarbekir, Mardin and Urfa had been commandeered, and that he was allowed to occupy only two rooms in them. As regards the religious properties of other communities, there is no doubt but that they have been seized by the Turkish Government, in many cases to serve as barracks. This is also confirmed by French military intelligence summaries.

5. As regards clause (3), Mgr. Israil has written to Mgr. Chaya saying that he has sent one of the three remaining clergy in Mardin to Deir-ez-Zor. He himself is obliged, much against his will, to remain in Mardin to protect as far as he can the few Chaldeans who still remain there, and to save as far as possible the church property from being dispersed or destroyed by the Turkish authorities. Certain plans of an unofficial nature have been made for saving church property, which in the interests of all concerned I refrain from describing in detail.

6. Urfa is very nearly swept clean of all its Christian population. The statements made by Mgr. Israil are corroborated. From various absolutely authentic sources it has been confirmed that all persons leaving their homes and other properties in

Anatolia forfeit them to the Turkish Government. In few cases can they find purchasers for their real property and they incur further losses by being obliged to leave with the minimum amount of luggage. The export of gold from Turkey being prohibited, it is not surprising that Christians should rarely risk taking gold away with them and thus by a breach of the law increasing the dangers which already beset them not only in their homes, but on their way to the Syrian frontier.

The law prohibiting the export of silver coins is not so strictly enforced, as far as can be ascertained.

7. From the foregoing it will be seen that the remarks in the last paragraph of Sir Henry Dobbs's telegram No. 225 to the Colonial Office are abundantly corroborated. If at any time it may be possible to enforce punitive measures against the leading spirits in the recent anti-Christian campaign, the following persons are reported to be among those most deserving of exemplary treatment:—

(1.) Djafar Tayar Pasha, Commander-in-chief at Diarbekir; most bitter against the Christians. Local rumour attributes part of his hatred to the fact that he was once taken prisoner by the Greeks.
(2.) Hadayet Effendi, chief commissioner of police at Diarbekir.
(3.) Khorshid Effendi (Mamour Tesvir), or emigration officer.
(4.) Tahar Direkdji } Informers and instigators against the
(5.) Pirindji Zadé Sedki, of Diarbekir } Christians.
(6.) Sheikh Safwat Bey (Naib), Deputy for Urfa; director of anti-Christian activity at Urfa.
(7.) Hadji Mustafa Kamel, chief of Urfa municipality.

I have, &c.
W. HOUGH.

[E 5093/4795/44] No. 124.

Mr. Kennard to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 532.)
Sir, *Rome, June 7, 1924.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 130 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report that to-day's papers publish an official communiqué, issued by the Volta Agency, in regard to the anti-Italian campaign which has lately been carried on in the Turkish press.

The announcements in the Turkish press on Italian foreign policy and on alleged military preparations directed by Italy against Turkey are, it says, deeply deplored in Italian political circles; unfounded and tendencious as they obviously are, such announcements are clearly intended by their authors to disturb the good relations existing between the two countries. Enquiries made of persons in authority have produced the following information: Signor Mussolini, in consequence of the tendencious reports published by several foreign newspapers, thought it desirable to ask the Turkish representative at Rome to call on him at Palazza Chigi; he then called his Excellency's serious attention to the fantastic information appearing in the Turkish press as regards alleged concentrations of Italian troops and the aggressive designs of Italy, which do not exist, and he emphasised the danger and harm of such news. He added that, although these reports would have collapsed of themselves, since they are entirely destitute of any foundation, it was none the less regrettable that a campaign was being carried on in the Turkish press giving rise to unjustifiable suspicion and mistrust in public opinion and certainly not assisting in the maintenance between the two countries of those relations of cordial friendship of which the Italian Government have given proof on repeated occasions to the Turkish Government.

The communiqué concludes with saying that the Turkish Ambassador, who was most distressed at what had happened, assured Signor Mussolini that he would report the conversation at once to his Government, who, he was convinced, would not fail to take the necessary steps for preventing the propagation of unwarranted information and for dissipating any suspicions aroused in public opinion by the Turkish press campaign.

I am sending a copy of this despatch direct to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
H. W. KENNARD.

[E 5112/5112/44] No. 125.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, June 11, 1924.*

I LEARN from a reliable source that Greek General Staff yesterday received from Governor of Mitylene a message stating that all Turkish merchant ships have been ordered to take refuge in Dardanelles immediately.

I also learn that Turks are preparing to mine Straits and Bay of Ismid.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 6.)

[E 5113/5112/44] No. 126.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, June 11, 1924.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Press reports that Turkish steamers in port of Salonica have been ordered to remain until further instructions.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 8.)

[E 5163/5112/44] No. 127.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June 13, 1924.*

REPORTS in Athens telegram No. 162 are, of course, untrue. As only Turkish vessels at Salonica are probably those chartered for exchange of populations (see Athens telegram No. 163), it is possible that they have been held up in connection with arrangements for settlement of emigrants.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 5.)

[E 5203/186/44] No. 128.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 460.)
Sir *Constantinople, June 7, 1924.*

AS reported in Mr. Lindsay's despatch No. 452 of the 4th June, the new German representative, M. Nadolny, arrived in Constantinople on the 3rd instant. A few days later the French representative called upon me to inform me that he had been approached by the Swedish Minister, M. Wallenberg, as to whether, in the event of M. Nadolny calling in person on M. Jessé-Curély, the latter would return his visit. M. Jessé-Curély had replied that before giving a definite answer he would like to consult myself and the Belgian Minister.

2. M. Jessé-Curély told me that he had already seen M. Michotte de Welle, who had energetically announced that if M. Nadolny called in person he would say that he was out, and that in no case would he do more than leave a card on the German representative. M. Jessé-Curély said that his own inclination was also to reply to M. Wallenberg that he would prefer a simple exchange of cards.

3. I told the French representative that, though I sympathised with M. Michotte, who had suffered personally as the result of the German invasion of Belgium, where his property had been burnt, I was not prepared to show such an uncompromising attitude in my relations with M. Nadolny. I was indifferent to the course that the latter might adopt, but the position in London and at Berlin did not justify any excessive aloofness, and if he asked to see me I would receive him and would return his visit. I added that I would so inform M. Wallenberg if he came to ascertain my views. M. Jessé-Curély admitted that my attitude was the more logical. Nevertheless, partly in order to support M. Michotte de Welle, but principally, I think, because he felt nervous as to what the French colony here might have to say about it, he said that he would maintain his own solution.

4. M. Wallenberg came to see me the following day, and, after having given me an accurate account of the result of his enquiry at the French Mission, asked me definitely

whether I was willing to receive M. Nadolny and return his visit. I raised no objection, and M. Nadolny called on me by appointment yesterday.

5. M. Nadolny informed me that, both parties having ratified the Treaty of Friendship, he proposed to go as soon as possible to Angora to present his letters of credence as German Minister. Once the representatives of the Allied Powers had been appointed Ambassadors and had presented their letters of credence he would himself receive and present fresh letters as Ambassador. He explained that this course had been rendered necessary and adopted in agreement with the Turkish and British Governments in order to avoid any chance of his becoming dean of the Diplomatic Body here for some time to come, since such a position for the German representative could not fail to provoke difficulties and incidents.

6. The above appears to bear out the explanation of the German Ambassador in London as reported in your despatch No. 1015 of the 29th May. M. Nadolny added that, in spite of his alleged statements in the press, his Government had no intention whatsoever of establishing their mission at Angora. Their idea was to have a liaison officer of some sort there and to bring out a ready-made wooden house from Germany for him to live in. I told him that His Majesty's Government were considering a somewhat similar arrangement.

7. It is interesting in this connection that M. Wallenberg, who returned from Angora a week ago after concluding the Turco-Swedish Treaty of Friendship, told me that not once during his stay there was it suggested to him that he should establish the Swedish Legation at Angora. Such restraint on the part of the Turkish Government might be taken to indicate that they realise that their efforts in this respect are doomed to failure and that they have decided to abandon the attempt.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 5213/3918/44] No. 129.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 476.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 11, 1924.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 641 of the 3rd June requesting my observations on Mr. Erskine's despatch No. 102 of the 21st May, relative to the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria and Serbia, I have the honour to state that so far as I am aware there has been little definite change in the situation between Turkey and Bulgaria since the date of Mr. Lindsay's despatch No. 349 of the 29th April.

2. There has, however, been one important development in the past few days, namely, that on the 6th June M. Radeff at last proceeded to Angora to negotiate a treaty and conventions between Bulgaria and Turkey. The negotiations began yesterday. I doubt whether they will be easy or rapid, but their outcome will obviously affect the whole situation.

3. I believe Turkey's attitude towards Serbia to be one of extreme reserve. Hints have been given in the press that Turkey is not prepared to make separate treaty arrangements with that country, and that the Angora Government considers that Serbia's proper course is to subscribe to the Treaty of Lausanne. As the time within which this can be done under the special protocol signed at Lausanne (Instrument No. 17 of the Final Act of the conference) will shortly expire, it would be interesting to know from His Majesty's representative at Belgrade what views are held there.

4. I do not think undue importance need be attached to the message conveyed to the Serbian Minister at Sofia on behalf of Enver Bey, having regard to the somewhat strained relations between Turkey and Bulgaria over minor differences at the time when it was delivered, and to the awkwardness of Enver Bey's personal position. I do not believe that Turkey's immediate interest in the relations between Balkan States amounts to more than (*a*) a natural desire not to see these relations assume the character of a combine directed against Turkey, and (*b*) an attitude of watchfulness in regard to any development which might reopen the question of Western Thrace.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Sofia and Belgrade.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 5215/3918/44] No. 130.

Sir A. Young to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 220.)

Sir, *Belgrade, June 12, 1924.*

SHORTLY after the receipt of your despatch No. 261 of the 2nd June requesting my observations on Sofia despatch No. 102 of the 21st May relative to the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria and Serbia, I took occasion to ask the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs how matters now stood between this country and Turkey.

2. M. Gavrilovic reminded me of the visit of Djevad Bey in June last, as reported in my despatch No. 216 of 1923. On that occasion the Angora representative was received in a friendly manner. He was told that, for reasons unconnected with politics, this country was unable to sign the Treaty of Lausanne. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government would, however, be very glad, pending the establishment of normal relations, to see a semi-official representative of the Turkish Government take up his residence in Belgrade. He would be assured of enjoying all diplomatic privileges, except that of official recognition. From that day, which was just a year ago, to this, nothing further had been heard from the Turks.

3. When I suggested that our representative in Sofia had understood from M. Radic that some sort of overtures had been made through the Turkish Mission in that capital, M. Gavrilovic put on his blank look and said that, if that had been the case, M. Radic had not reported it. I, of course, gave no corroborative detail for fear of compromising M. Radic, and dropped the subject.

4. M. Gavrilovic appeared to be rather displeased with the Turks at not having taken any notice of the Serbian readiness to enter on unofficial relations, and said he would write to the Serbian agent at Constantinople and ask him to stir up the matter.

5. I should be more likely to obtain from M. Nincic rather than M. Gavrilovic frank information respecting any Turkish intrigues either with this country or with Bulgaria, and in my next interview with his Excellency I will bear the subject in mind. He is always ready to expand on Bulgarian relations with Turkey. I think, however, I can safely say that M. Pasic and M. Nincic are dead set against a disturbance of the territorial *status quo* in any region, unless it be under the auspices of the recognised authorities in the matter. I presume no rectification of the Turco-Greek frontier could be countenanced as the result of a private arrangement if it affected the interests of a third party. The Serbs have consistently opposed the extension of Turkish territory on this side of the Straits, and I should not think that they would subordinate this opposition to the fear of Bulgarian aggrandisement. The maintenance of the integrity of existing treaties is their watchword.

6. M. de la Barra (see Sofia despatch No. 107 of the 3rd June) stayed here a few hours on his way from Sofia to Berne, and had an interview with M. Nincic. I can ask the latter what conclusions he drew, and thus open up the subject of Bulgarian aspirations towards the Ægean.

7. I may here mention that, according to the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, M. de la Barra considered that the Greek proposal had not been rejected, but the Bulgarian Minister told me that he had received a telegram from his Government to the effect that the Greek proposals in regard to Dedeagatch could not be accepted. No mention was made in the telegram of Cavalla or Salonica.

I have, &c.

ALBAN YOUNG.

[E 5409/3918/44] No. 131.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 404.)

Sir, *Athens, June 16, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 343 of the 2nd June asking for my observations on the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria and Serbia.

2. I should qualify the following remarks by saying that the general information at my disposal, coming chiefly from Greek sources or from diplomatists who are interested in pushing a particular view, cannot be altogether unprejudiced, and that the recent archives of this Legation contain singularly little reference to Balkan affairs.

3. The Serbian Minister in Athens, M. Markovitch, who apparently speaks with great frankness, said at a recent interview which I had with him that his Government were in full relations with Turkey, a statement which seems to clash with the facts as exposed by the Serbian representative in Sofia to Mr. Erskine. M. Markovitch further characterised Serbian relations with Turkey as good, but with the reservation that the Angora Government had in no way relinquished the hope of recovering a further portion of Thrace.

4. My Bulgarian colleague, M. Dobrev, has always represented his country to me as anxious to be on good terms with the Turks. I think he said that the only point of friction between the two Governments was the situation of some Bulgarians near Adrianople, whose treatment by the Turkish authorities were considered oppressive. In any case the message conveyed to the Serbian Government through Enver Bey seems particularly interesting, and, so far as I understand the position, I should certainly agree with the conclusions drawn in the last paragraph of Mr. Erskine's despatch No. 102. Some understanding with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would be a necessary preliminary to any further Turkish adventure in Thrace, as such a movement must at once antagonise both Bulgaria and Greece.

5. I gather, however, from conversations with my Serbian colleague that he does not regard any complications in the Balkans as at all likely in the immediate future. He contends that the Macedonian situation is much quieter; that Greece and Serbia have a working agreement which enables them to deal with the komitajis; that Bulgaria and Greece are militarily too weak to cause trouble, and that Turkey is fully occupied outside the Balkans. There is, therefore, he concludes (leaving Albanian dissensions aside) every prospect of peace for the present.

6. I find however that, in spite of these assurances, M. Markovitch is extremely anxious, and represents his Government as equally so, regarding Russian policy. He anticipates that the danger to Balkan stability will come from that quarter, since the Soviet Government are bound to assume a strong national attitude in their conduct of foreign relations, and will be driven by internal considerations, if by no other, to renew Russian claims to Constantinople. M. Markovitch asserts that large numbers of officers of the old Russian army have returned to their country and are now enrolled in the Soviet forces for service, with which many German officers have also been recruited. He believes that the Russian armies are more formidable than is generally supposed, and that Russian threats of intervention in Bessarabia are the first symptoms of a revival of Russian interest in the Balkans, the ultimate object of which is the possession of Constantinople.

7. M. Markovitch stated his opinion that, if Soviet ambitions take this direction, Bulgaria must inevitably cast in her lot with the Russian advance, and that she bases her hopes of future aggrandisement on Russian support. In present conditions M. Markovitch thinks that Bulgaria may be trusted to remain quiet, and that she will avoid committing herself to any understanding or alliance in the Balkans which would hamper her future action.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

[E 5410/3918/44] No. 132.

Sir A. Young to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 228.)

Sir, *Belgrade, June 19, 1924.*

SINCE writing my despatch No. 220 of the 12th June relative to the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria and Serbia, I have received a copy of Constantinople despatch No. 476 of the 11th June.

2. With reference to paragraph 3 of Mr. Henderson's despatch, I have no reason to suppose that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government have modified their intention not to sign the Treaty of Lausanne so long as it contains the obnoxious provisions relating to the partition of the Ottoman Debt. As you will remember from the earliest days of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government have persistently announced their refusal to engage themselves in the desired manner. A month or two ago the French Minister, at the request of the Council of the Ottoman Debt, enquired of this Government what were the exact cazas which they had inherited from the Ottoman Empire. He was told that, for fear of appearing to be yielding on the main point, his enquiry would receive no answer. I was at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs yesterday,

and I asked unofficially two of the higher officials whether, in view of the fact that the delay afforded by the protocol was fast expiring, there was any prospect of this Government rallying to the side of all the other Allies in regard to the Treaty of Lausanne, and they neither of them thought that there was any probability of a change in the attitude of Serbia. The French Minister does not propose to broach this subject without instructions, and I presume that I should not do so either, especially since I see from Tokyo telegram No. 143 of the 2nd June that the Japanese Government are calling attention at Paris to the propriety of informing the Serbian Government of their ratification and its relation with protocol 17 of the treaty.

3. One of the two officials above mentioned was M. Lazarović, the head of the Albanian and Bulgarian sections. As regards Bulgaria, he was watching the Bulgarian negotiations at Angora, and presumed that there would be attempts to define spheres of influence in Western Thrace to the detriment of Greece and therefore indirectly of this country. This Government looked with aversion on the return of Turkey to Europe; on the other hand, it had always supported such Bulgarian aspirations for an outlet to the Ægean Sea as were consistent with the Treaty of Neuilly liberally interpreted.

4. M. Lazarović knew nothing about the offers made by Greece to Bulgaria through M. de la Barra. It was only M. Nincić who had seen the latter.

5. M. Nincić is at present at Bled, where he has gone to spend a few days with the King.

6. I forgot, when commenting in my above-mentioned despatch on Sofia despatch No. 107, to refer to the passage in which it is stated that the official "Bulgaria" had quoted with approval an article in the Belgrade "Trgovinski Glasnik" advocating Serbian and Bulgarian outlets on the Ægean Sea. The "Trgovinski Glasnik" has always had an obsession for the common extension of Serbia and Bulgaria to the Ægean Sea. It is a newspaper which had considerably deteriorated of late, and its political articles have little significance.

I have, &c.
ALBAN YOUNG.

[E 5602/186/44] No. 133.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 496.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 23, 1924.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence ending with your despatch No. 689 of the 16th June, I have the honour to state that the German representative, M. Nadolny, presented his letters of credence to Mustafa Kemal Pasha on the 16th June. The speeches exchanged have been published, but they present no special features of interest. The Turkish version of M. Nadolny's speech does not clearly define his status, but in Mustafa Kemal's reply it is definitely described as being that of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister.

2. M. Nadolny returned to Constantinople on the 20th June. Conflicting statements continue to be published regarding his future residence, but it is evident that he has no immediate intention of establishing himself at Angora. The German Embassy buildings both in Pera and Therapia are at present being repaired.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 5608/32/44] No. 134.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 505.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 24, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you, with reference to your despatch No. 694 of the 16th instant, that I asked Adnan Bey yesterday what the present position was as regards the appointment of Fuad Hikmet Bey as representative in Constantinople of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Adnan Bey replied that he was sorry to say that his Government had decided not to proceed further with the idea of nominating Hikmet Bey to Constantinople, as he had been found to be too antiquated in his ideas

("trop vieux jeu"). He added that Angora had now another candidate in view, a legal counsellor, but that he was unable at present to give his name, as no definite decision had yet been reached.

2. It was perfectly obvious from the manner in which Adnan Bey spoke that he was himself not satisfied as to the suitability of the new candidate. I accordingly reminded him of the conversations which I had had with him when Ibrahim Tali's appointment was first mooted last January, and of the similar attitude adopted by Mr. Lindsay, as reported in his despatch No. 204 of the 11th March, when rumour was again busy with Ibrahim Tali's name. I also mentioned that I had, while on leave last March, taken the opportunity of a visit to Yussuf Kemal Bey in London to represent to him the serious mistake which the Turkish Government would make if they selected as their delegate in Constantinople anyone of inferior calibre.

3. Adnan Bey replied that he was already aware through Yussuf Kemal Bey that I had done so. His Government, however, was in a quandary. All the more important Nationalists were Deputies, and as such could not hold diplomatic appointments. Yussuf Kemal's resignation on that account made it extremely difficult for them even to find a successor to him in London. There were many Turks of the old régime who would make admirable Turkish representatives abroad, but the time had not yet come when use could be made of them. The attitude of the Grand National Assembly in this respect was very regrettable, as such Turks were no less patriote than the Nationalists of Angora, but for the moment that attitude was uncompromising. He said that he entirely agreed as to the necessity of having a delegate of Ambassadorial standing at Constantinople, but he added that he could not bring himself to represent the matter in that light either officially or unofficially in writing to his Government, lest he be regarded as attempting to exaggerate his own importance or to ensure his own retention here. He had, however, recently found someone who was going to Angora to convey his views privately to Ismet Pasha in that sense, and he had also suggested to the latter the desirability of his coming in person to Constantinople for a little while to judge of the position here for himself. He said that he personally saw no objection to Ismet Pasha taking this advice, as it would be easy to represent his visit as a perfectly natural and well-earned holiday.

4. I told Adnan that I found the suggestion an excellent one. Ismet Pasha's visit, if it materialised, would at least afford a chance of settling some of the more important outstanding questions, such as the Eastern Telegraph Company and the reference to the League of Nations of the Irak frontier dispute.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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